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ABSTRACT
This dissertation has three chapters that study two main aspects of public
economics. The title of my dissertation reflects the fact that an overarching
theme in my research is in studying individual’s behavior in order to learn
how to improve public policy, beyond learning about how people behave in
itself.
My first two chapters study how relative concerns a↵ect people’s behav-
ior. First, I show that people care about relative income (i.e., their position
in the income distribution) when making location decisions using evidence
from a field experiment. Second, I show that relative concerns are important
in determining people’s performance and participation. I do so by studying
the behavior of swimmers around the time they have to change age cate-
gory right after aging-up. I show that facing stronger competition not only
worsens swimmer’s performance, but also leads to higher dropouts. Finally,
I obtain the first causal estimates showing how access to gambling a↵ects
crime, by studying the recent expansion of video gambling in Illinois. Taken
together, these chapters provide evidence that advance our understanding of
individual’s preferences that can help inform public policy.
Chapter 1: Choosing Your Pond: Location Choices and Relative Income
We provide unique revealed-preference evidence that, when choosing where
to live, individuals care about their position in the income distribution.
We study the decisions of senior medical students in the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP). They must choose between programs that o↵er
similar nominal incomes, but in cities with di↵erent costs of living and income
distributions. We conduct a survey experiment with 1,100 NRMP partici-
pants to elicit their perceptions about cost of living and relative income in
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their prospective cities and their rank order submissions. To assess the di-
rection of causality, we embed an information-provision experiment. We find
evidence that, in addition to the cost of living, individuals care about their
relative income. Moreover, we find substantial and meaningful heterogeneity
by relationship status. We conduct a complementary survey experiment to
assess the robustness of our results. The evidence is consistent with a com-
bination of relative concerns and dating expectations.
Chapter 2: Big Fish in a Small Pool? The E↵ect of Competition on Perfor-
mance and Dropout
We take advantage of a natural experiment to identify the e↵ect of com-
peting against better peers on dropout and performance: discrete changes in
age-group swimming competitions. Using the universe of race times for U.S.
club swimming competitions, we first document large discouragement e↵ects
where the hazard rate of dropping out rises by 50% in category change years.
Furthermore, we explore how these changes a↵ect swimmer’s performance.
Using our rich data on times, we can track swimmers who compete both be-
fore and after aging up. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, along with
swimmer fixed-e↵ects to account for swimmer ability, we find that on average
swimmers are discouraged (i.e., swim slower) when facing faster competition.
This average e↵ect masks meaningful heterogeneity by swimmer ability: low-
ability swimmers are not significantly a↵ected, while middle- and high-ability
swimmers are similarly discouraged.
Chapter 3: Can’t Stop the One-Armed Bandits: The E↵ects of Access to
Gambling on Crime
We examine the e↵ects on crime and property values following state legisla-
tion in Illinois that legalized video gambling, but gave municipalities decision-
making authority over whether to allow video gambling terminals within their
local boundaries. Many jurisdictions adjacent to Chicago chose to allow the
terminals, while the City of Chicago itself did not, thus creating a natural
experiment with which to compare crime rates between areas closer to and
farther from video gambling establishments. Using detailed incident-level
crime data and a di↵erence-in-di↵erences strategy, we find that (i) access
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to gambling increases property and violent crimes; (ii) the crimes represent
“new” rather than displaced incidents; and (iii) the e↵ects are persistent over
time.
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To my family, for their love and support.
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CHAPTER 1
CHOOSING YOUR POND: LOCATION
CHOICES AND RELATIVE INCOME
with Ricardo Perez-Truglia
1.1 Introduction
It is well documented that individuals care about and respond to di↵erences
in cost of living when deciding where to live. Many theories predict that,
holding the cost of living constant, individuals also care about their rank in
the income distribution. For instance, relative income may matter for social
interactions, such as dating outcomes (Fisman et al. 2006) and eliciting
envy and pride (Luttmer 2005). In this paper, we provide the first test of
this hypothesis that relative income influences individuals’ location decisions
by means of a field experiment with 1,100 medical students in the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP).
To study how individuals trade o↵ between cost of living and relative
income, it would be useful to exploit data on how individuals choose from
a list of cities that o↵er di↵erent combinations of cost of living and relative
income. This setting would allow comparisons of how individuals trade o↵
between these two attributes. However, such datasets do not exist. Although
some datasets identify individuals moving from one location to another,1 they
do not include su cient information to estimate preferences. For instance,
they do not identify alternative combinations of cost of living and relative
income that the individual could have gotten in other locations. Even if such
data were available, one would have to address omitted variable biases.
In this paper, although we do not collect the ideal dataset, we get closer
to it than any previous study. We accomplish this by exploiting a unique
context, the NRMP, which uses an algorithm to pair medical students in the
United States with hospital residency programs, based on rankings submitted
by students and hospitals. Students submit their rankings to the NRMP, and
1For instance, the National Survey of Families and Households (Luttmer 2005), or the
United States Postal Service’s National Change of Address (Perez-Truglia 2017).
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the resulting match determines where they will live for roughly five years.
They choose between programs that o↵er almost identical nominal incomes,
but in cities with largely di↵erent costs of living and income distributions.
Thus, medical students face substantial tradeo↵s between cost of living and
relative income.
Several features of the NRMP make it desirable for this type of revealed-
preference analysis (Benjamin et al. 2014). First, the deadline for students
to submit their rankings creates an identifiable moment when the decision
becomes irreversible. Second, it is possible to identify and specify the entire
choice set faced by these individuals. Third, because most students are aware
of the incentive-compatible matching algorithm used by the NRMP, it is
possible to infer preferences directly without estimating a model that relies
on additional assumptions. Fourth, this is a high-stakes choice to which
participants devote ample time and attention: medical students devote their
entire fourth years of medical school to the Match and two months to ranking
residency programs. This decision is arguably one of the most important for
their careers and lives.
We conducted a survey of 1,100 senior medical students participating in the
2017 Main Residency Match. The survey asked participants to list their top
two favorite residency programs, because these two choices have the highest
stakes and receive the most individual attention. We elicited perceptions
about two aspects of the cities in which these two programs are located:
the cost of living and earnings rank (i.e., the position in the distribution of
individual earnings in the city).
We then elicited each subject’s expected rank submission. Using these
data on perceptions and choices, we can estimate how di↵erences in the
cities’ costs of living and relative incomes a↵ect location choices. On the
one hand, we expect individuals to prefer low costs of living, which means
high consumption. On the other hand, individuals also may prefer high or
low earnings rank, depending on certain mechanisms. For example, models of
relative concerns like envy and pride predict that individuals want to increase
their rank in their reference group, so they prefer less a✏uent ponds. On the
contrary, single individuals looking for a rich partner may prefer more a✏uent
ponds.
Perceptions about cost of living and earnings rank may be correlated with
unobservable attributes of the alternatives, which can generate omitted-
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variable biases. To deal with this concern, we embedded an information-
provision experiment in the survey. Immediately after eliciting perceptions
about cost of living and earnings rankings, we provided all individuals with
statistics about these two measures. We randomized the value of this feed-
back in a non-deceptive way by randomizing the data source used to compute
these statistics. For instance, students considering earning $54,000 at a resi-
dency in Champaign-Urbana, IL, received one of two messages: their earnings
rank would be 55.1% according to data from the Current Population Survey
or 60.3% according to data from the American Community Survey. We then
elicited their perceptions again after providing this feedback. This source-
randomization experiment created exogenous variation in posterior beliefs.
We exploited that exogenous variation in an instrumental variables model
to estimate the causal e↵ects of the perceived attributes, cost of living, and
earnings rank on choice.
Our baseline estimates, which use experimental and non-experimental vari-
ations in perceptions, suggest that a 1 percentage point decrease in cost of
living increases the probability that a program is chosen by 0.201 percentage
points (i.e., a behavioral elasticity of 0.201). This concern for a↵ordability
is consistent with the fact that half of pre-med students report money to be
the primary motivation for their career choices (Daniel and O’Brien 2008).
Although this preference for cost of living is statistically and economically
significant, it is by no means the primary concern for medical students. Using
perceptions about other characteristics of the residencies, we find that doc-
tors care substantially more about prestige and career prospects than about
cost of living.
Most important, our baseline estimates suggest that, holding cost of liv-
ing constant, individuals also care about relative income: on average, an
increase of 1 percentage point in earnings rank increases the probability that
a program is chosen by 0.186 percentage points (i.e., a behavioral elasticity
of 0.186). These baseline estimates suggest that the average individual gives
roughly the same importance to cost of living as to relative income. How-
ever, these average preferences mask meaningful heterogeneity. Non-single
individuals (i.e., those who are married or in a long-term relationship) prefer
locating to less a✏uent ponds. On the contrary, single individuals prefer
locating to more a✏uent ponds. This di↵erence in preferences is large in
magnitude and highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). The het-
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erogeneity is consistent with prior evidence from the happiness literature:
Luttmer (2005) finds that the positive e↵ects of relative income on happi-
ness are driven entirely by non-singles individuals. Also, the direction of this
heterogeneity is consistent with prior evidence that singles prefer to date
rich partners (Fisman el al. 2006) and prefer a more dense dating market
(Gautier et al. 2010) and thus should be attracted to more a✏uent cities.
We find that the baseline estimates of preferences for relative income satisfy
several robustness checks. First, these estimates are not sensitive to the in-
clusion of multiple residency and location characteristics as control variables.
Second, they are consistent with the experimental estimates that focus on
the variation generated by the information provision experiment.2 Third, we
find that the information related to earnings rank, which is provided roughly
one month before the submission deadline, has a lasting e↵ect on the final
rank order submitted to the NRMP.
We conduct an additional robustness check consisting of an auxiliary ex-
periment based on an online sample of respondents recruited through Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk. On the one hand, this sample has a disadvantage:
respondents are not planning to move anytime soon, so we cannot measure
the e↵ects on their actual location choices. Thus, we instead measure the
e↵ects of the information provision on their hypothetical location choices.
On the other hand, the auxiliary sample has a couple of advantages. Most
important, due to wider availability of subjects, it is possible to run addi-
tional experiments at any time. Additionally, the set of online respondents
is more diverse than the medical students in many dimensions, such as age
and occupation, allowing us to assess the external validity of the results.
The findings from this auxiliary experiment are consistent with and more
precisely estimated than the findings from the main experiment: we find that
the average individual prefers a high relative income and that this preference
is stronger for non-singles than it is for singles. Moreover, despite large
di↵erences in observable characteristics between the two samples, the findings
are quantitatively similar: the marginal rate of substitution between relative
income and cost of living is 0.90 (s.e. 0.64) in the main experiment and
0.66 (s.e. 0.20) in the auxiliary experiment, and the di↵erence is statistically
2The baseline estimates of preferences for cost of living are smaller in magnitude in these
specifications. Thus, if anything, our baseline estimates underestimate the importance of
relative income.
4
insignificant. This evidence suggests that preferences for relative income are
not exclusive to the sample of medical students.
In the last part of the paper, we provide evidence about the potential
mechanisms at play. One potential concern is that individuals do not care
about their relative income per se but that they use it as a signal for other
unobservable attributes of the city. We think this possibility is unlikely in
this environment of high stakes and high information. Medical students
devote two months to this decision, during which they travel to the locations
under consideration and they gather and analyze a lot of information about
the residency programs and their locations. It is unlikely that they would
need information about earnings rank to learn about other features of the
locations and programs, because they can learn this information directly.
Nevertheless, we provide a direct test of this confounding factor.
One version of this confounding factor is that individuals react to informa-
tion about relative income because it teaches them about the expected cost
of living. If the students expect to compete with their neighbors for some
goods like housing, then it would be natural for them to make such infer-
ences. Contrary to this hypothesis, we show that feedback about earnings
rank has a zero and precisely estimated e↵ect on expected cost of living, both
in the short term (the baseline survey) and in the long term (the follow-up
survey).
A second version of this confounding factor is that individuals react to
information about relative income because it teaches them about location
characteristics like public goods and crime rates. Although such inferences
are not unnatural, they operate in the opposite direction: because more
a✏uent cities tend to have more desirable amenities than less a✏uent cities,
this mechanism predicts that individuals will prefer more a✏uent ponds,
which is the opposite of what we find. To address this confounding factor,
we extend the survey instrument used in the auxiliary sample so that, after
individuals received feedback about relative income, we elicit perceptions
about other city characteristics, such as school quality and crime rates. We
find evidence that is consistent with the previous argument: if anything, this
confounding factor leads to a slight underestimation of the preferences for
relative income.
Considering this additional evidence, our favorite interpretation for the
estimated preference for relative income among non-singles is that they care
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about relative income per se. The literature on relative concerns (Luttmer
2005) provides several explanations for this preference. Individuals may an-
ticipate that their consumption aspirations will increase with their neighbors’
consumption (Frank 1985). Individuals could feel happier from observing
that they do better than their neighbors (Luttmer 2005). Also, individu-
als may expect to be treated better by peers when they rank higher in the
income distribution (Doob and Gross 1968, Fennis 2008, Nelissen and Mei-
jers 2011). Regarding the heterogeneity in preferences for relative income by
relationship status, our favorite interpretation consists of dating prospects:
being single increases the attractiveness of more a✏uent ponds, because more
a✏uent individuals are more desirable partners than less a✏uent individuals
(Fisman el al. 2006).
Our paper is related to several bodies of research, including a literature
documenting that individuals have substantial misperceptions of their own
income rank (e.g., Cruces et al. 2013, Karadja et al. 2017). This literature
shows that correcting these misperceptions has significant e↵ects on stated
preferences for redistribution. Yet, there is no evidence that these mispercep-
tions have a significant e↵ect on behavior. We fill this gap in the literature
by showing that misperceptions about relative income can have meaningful
economic consequences.
Our study relates to literature on the importance of relative income for
subjective well-being. Since the seminal contribution by Easterlin (1974),
several studies have argued that, with own income held constant, subjective
well-being increases with the relative income in the area of residence (Van de
Stadt et al. 1985, Clark and Oswald 1996, Luttmer 2005, Ferrer-i-Carbonell
2005, Perez-Truglia 2016).3 Our estimates are not directly comparable to
those from the happiness literature because of di↵erences in contexts and in
model specifications. With that caveat in mind, our baseline estimates sug-
gest that relative income concerns are smaller in magnitude than the relative
concerns estimated with happiness data by Luttmer (2005). However, due
to lack of precision, we cannot reject the hypothesis that these two estimates
are equal. Additionally, our results highlight an important aspect that is
3These studies often use a slightly di↵erent specification: holding own income constant,
well-being decreases with the average income in the group of reference. It must be noted
that some studies find the opposite e↵ect (Senik 2004) or mixed evidence (Clark et al.
2009). For an extensive review of the literature, see Tideman et al. 2008.
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impossible to study with happiness data: even if happiness depends on rel-
ative income, it is unclear whether individuals anticipate the externalities
brought by neighbors (Luttmer 2005). Our findings suggest that individuals
anticipate these externalities, at least partially.
This paper also is related to studies using surveys, in which respondents
must choose between pairs of hypothetical scenarios that encompass tradeo↵s
between income and status or between positional and non-positional goods.
These studies find that individuals are sometimes willing to exchange abso-
lute income for higher status (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway 1998, Johansson-
Stenman et al. 2002, Yamada and Sato 2016, Clark et al. 2017). Similarly,
evidence from laboratory experiments shows that relative standing a↵ects
the decision to buy a risky asset or share with others (e.g., Kuziemko et al.
2014). We contribute to this literature by estimating these tradeo↵s in a
real-world, high-stakes context.
Our study also contributes to literature that studies conspicuous consump-
tion using observational data (He↵etz 2011) and experimental data (Bursztyn
et al. 2017, Roth 2015). Last, this paper relates to a literature that uses
a variety of methods to measure how location amenities and cost of living
influence household location decisions (e.g., Albouy 2008).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the survey
design. Section 1.3 presents the econometric model. Section 1.4 presents
implementation details and descriptive statistics. Section 1.5 discusses the
distribution of perceptions and learning. Section 1.6 presents the preferences
for cost of living and relative income. Section 1.7 presents the results from
the auxiliary survey experiment. Section 1.8 presents supporting evidence
for the interpretation of our results. The last section concludes.
1.2 Survey Design
1.2.1 Timing of the Surveys
After graduating from medical school, students have to complete a residency
to become a Medicinae Doctor (MD). A residency usually lasts from three to
seven years, after which individuals may obtain their medical license. During
the fall semester of 2016, fourth year medical school students started their
7
participation in the residency match by submitting applications to residency
programs. Later in the semester, they were interviewed and flown out by
some of the programs they applied to.4 After all interviews were completed,
the students spend almost two months deciding how to rank their favorite
programs. Students have visited the cities during their interviews, and some-
times visit them again during this period. During this time, deciding on the
rank order preference is the students’ top priority: applicants claim to col-
lect a lot of information to aid their decision, such as characteristics of the
residency programs and characteristics of the cities where the programs are
located.
We follow Benjamin et al. (2014) in using this context to study prefer-
ences. They conducted a survey of medical students after the students had
submitted their rankings to the NRMP. The survey measured the submitted
rankings as well as the perceived rank of many aspects of the programs, such
as life satisfaction, happiness, and sense of control. In that study, Benjamin
et al. (2014) measure and compare the preferences inferred from rank choices
to those inferred from subjective well-being. We follow the survey collection
method from Benjamin et al. (2014) closely, but we change the survey itself
to test a di↵erent hypothesis, that is, whether individuals make a trade-o↵
between relative income and cost of living. In doing so, we deviate from
the survey design in an important aspect: we collect our baseline survey
before subjects submit their rank choices to the NRMP. We also embed an
information-provision experiment, which allows us to address concerns on
causality.
In the 2017 Match, the submission window for rank order lists opened
on January 15 and closed on February 22. We conducted a baseline survey
early in the submission period, which we describe first. We also conducted
a follow-up survey after the submission window closed, which is described in
Section 1.2.3.
1.2.2 General Structure of Baseline Survey
The baseline survey starts and ends with some background questions, such
as the subject’s medical school and marital status. The core of the survey
4In 2015, the median number of applications submitted was 30 and the median number
of interviews 16 (NRMP 2015).
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comprises the following group of questions, in the order listed below:
1. Choice Set: Elicit the names of the two favorite programs that the
individual was considering for his or her order rank submission.
2. Prior Beliefs: Elicit perceptions about the cost of living and the earn-
ings rank in the cities where these two programs are located.
3. Feedback: Provide subjects with feedback related to their perceptions.
4. Posterior Beliefs: Re-elicit perceptions about the cost of living and the
earnings rank.
5. Rank Choice: Elicit the individual’s expected rank submission (be-
tween the two programs).
The following sections provide details about each of these modules.
Choice Set
The survey asks individuals to list their top two preferred programs, in no
particular order, from a user-friendly list of all the available programs or-
ganized by state and metro area. We limited the survey to two programs
because otherwise it would have been too cognitively demanding. Most par-
ticipants expect to be matched to one of their top-two choices: similar to
previous years, 50.9% of the participants in the 2017 match were assigned
to their first choice and 16.6% were assigned to their second choice. We
concentrated on the participants’ top two programs rather than a random
pair of programs because this happen to be the part of the decision with the
highest stakes and to which individuals were paying the most attention. In
any case, our focus on the top two choices does not challenge the validity of
our estimates: the research design would be valid with any pair (or group)
of options, not only the top-two.5
5When individuals were listing the second program, we required respondents to make
a selection from a di↵erent metro area because otherwise no di↵erences would be present
in relative income and cost of living across choices. Our survey data indicates that no
more than 4% of individuals tried to select the same metro area. For those subjects, the
comparison was between two of their top programs but not necessarily the top two.
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Perceptions about Cost of Living and Earnings Rank
One important feature of the residency match process is that salaries are
relatively homogeneous across the di↵erent programs, even across special-
ties.6 Indeed, each program o↵ers the same salary to all its candidates (and
that salary is often publicly available on the program’s website). Despite the
homogeneity in nominal incomes, there is large heterogeneity in costs of liv-
ing and earnings distributions in the cities where the programs are located.
When designing the survey, we were constrained to using metropolitan areas
rather than other geographical levels of aggregation (e.g., commuting zones)
because the sources of data on cost of living are not collected at a finer level
than the metro area.
We asked two questions about cost of living (one for each metro area) and
two questions about the earnings rank (one for each metro area), in that
order. For the cost of living question, we provided the following brief intro-
duction: “You probably noticed that the average prices of goods and services
are di↵erent across di↵erent cities. As a result, with the same income, you
would be able to buy more things in some cities and less in other cities.” After
this introduction, we asked individual how much more or less expensive each
metro area was, relative to the U.S. average. To make answering the question
easier, we split it in two questions. The first question was: “Imagine that
you chose to work in the [Metro Name] metro area. Would you expect your
cost of living in this city to be cheaper or more expensive than the U.S. aver-
age?” The respondents could choose either “cheaper” or “more expensive.”
The second part of the question was: “How much [cheaper/more expensive]
is the [Metro Name] metro area than the U.S. average?” Respondents could
answer this second question with a drop-down menu ranging from 0% to 50%,
in 1 percentage point increments.
We also provided an introduction for the question about earnings rank:
“Now we want to ask you about your expected earnings rank. This rank
is defined as the share of the working individuals of a city who earn less
than you. You probably noticed that the distribution of earnings is di↵erent
across di↵erent cities. As a result, with the same earnings, you may be
relatively rich in some cities but relatively poor in other cities.” After this
6Even though there are no large income di↵erences in residency salaries, there can be
large di↵erences in post-residency salaries, especially across specialties.
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introduction, we asked the following question for each city: “Imagine that
you chose to work in [Metro Name]. With your individual annual earnings
of $[Salary], you would be richer than what percentage of [Metro Name]’s
individual earners?” Respondents could select their answer from a drop-down
menu that ranges from “Richer than 1% of individual earners” to “Richer
than 100% of individual earners,” in 1% increments.
We focus on this definition of reference group because it is the most widely
used approach in the related literature: e.g., Luttmer (2005) studies how the
happiness of an individual is a↵ected by the income of her neighbors.7 In
practice, individuals may care about their ranking in finer reference groups:
e.g., they may care disproportionately about their relative standing with
respect to neighbors in the same age cohort, rather than caring about all
neighbors equally. However, this source of measurement error is not a major
source of concern, to the extent that it can only introduce attenuation bias.
Information-Provision Experiment
One limitation with using perceptions is the potential for omitted-variable
bias. For instance, conditional on income and perceptions about cost of
living, perceptions about relative income may happen to be correlated with
perceptions about other characteristics of the area, such as the crime rate,
amenities, public goods, and so forth. To address this concern, we generate
exogenous variation in the perceptions about cost of living and earnings rank
by embedding an information-provision experiment in the survey.
Immediately after respondents provided their prior beliefs on both mea-
sures, they were shown two messages: one page with statistics about the cost
of living in the two cities being considered and a second page with statistics
about the earnings rank in each of the two cities. The following message is
a sample of the feedback page for cost of living: “Los Angeles-Long Beach-
Anaheim, CA metro area is 17.0% more expensive than the U.S. average.
The Champaign-Urbana, IL metro area is 6.6% cheaper than the U.S. aver-
age.” The following message is a sample of the feedback page for earnings
rank: “With your individual annual earnings of $54,000, you would be richer
7Moreover, this geographic definition of references group is used more generally in
the literature of social interactions more generally: e.g., Perez-Truglia (2017) and Perez-
Truglia and Cruces (2017) study how an individual’s political participation is a↵ected by
the participation of her neighbors.
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than 57.9% of Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA’s population. With
your individual annual earnings of $54,000, you would be richer than 60.3%
of Champaign-Urbana, IL’s population.” In both of these feedback pages,
individuals were asked to take a moment to review the information carefully
and were alerted that the information was only going to be shown once.
We did not allow respondents to continue to the next page until at least 10
seconds had elapsed.8
After individuals finished reviewing the feedback, we re-elicited their per-
ceptions about cost of living and earnings rank, which we denote as the pos-
terior beliefs. Given that our feedback entailed many figures for participants
to remember and process, we wanted to make it easier for individuals to com-
pare the options. Therefore, after eliciting respondent’s posterior beliefs, we
gave subjects a third page of feedback based on their posterior beliefs. The
following is a sample of that feedback page: “We understand this is a lot of
information to process, so we will help you make the comparison simpler. Ac-
cording to your final answers about incomes, cost of living and earnings rank:
If you chose to live in Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA, you would be
able to a↵ord 19.7% less than if you chose to live in Champaign-Urbana, IL.
If you chose to live in Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA, your earnings
rank would be 3.3% lower than if you chose to live in Champaign-Urbana,
IL.”9
We computed the statistics shown to the subjects using two alternative
data sources, and we cross-randomized which of the two sources were shown
to each individual. The sources were randomized between individuals; that
is, we used the same cost of living source for the two cities being considered
by each individual, and the same earnings data source for the two cities.
As a result, individuals were randomly assigned to one of four treatment
groups. For cost of living estimates, the two sources used were the Regional
Price Parity (RPP) data by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Cost
of Living Index (COLI) data compiled by the Council for Community and
8The median time spent on the feedback page was 18.5 seconds.








, where wi is the
nominal wage for city i and COLi is their posterior belief about cost of living (from 50







is the posterior belief about earnings rank in city i. As with the other feedback pages,
10 seconds had to elapse before respondents could move to the next page. The median
duration on the post feedback page was 19.5 seconds.
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Economic Research. For the earnings rank feedback, the two sources used
were the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population
Survey (CPS), both conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.10
This source randomization created a substantial amount of exogenous vari-
ation in signals. For instance, the correlation of the pairwise di↵erence in
cost of living shown to the respondents versus the corresponding pairwise
di↵erence from the alternative source is 0.656; the corresponding correlation
for the earnings rank is 0.649. These di↵erences across sources arise from
a combination of several factors, most notably sampling variation and data
definitions. For instance, the cost of living data is subject to sampling vari-
ation because it tracks the prices of a limited number of goods and services,
and earnings rank data is subject to sampling variation because the estimates
are based on a limited number of survey respondents. The variation in defi-
nitions arise because di↵erent cost of living indices give di↵erent weights to
expenditure categories, and because the earnings rank measures are based on
surveys with significant di↵erences in the survey method and the phrasing of
the questions used to elicit total annual earnings.
For the sake of transparency and to ensure the validity of the information,
the individuals were debriefed in the feedback messages on the name of the
source of the information that they received. We would not expect the source
name to have an e↵ect in and of itself, given that the individuals did not have
expertise on the data, and even experts may have only a weak preference on
which source is more trustworthy depending on the application. Indeed, we
find that the reaction of individuals to the information was orthogonal to the
name of the information source.11
Rank Submission Choices
The survey asked respondents to indicate which program they expected to
rank higher when submitting to the NRMP: “As of this moment: of the
two programs discussed so far, which one would you expect to rank higher
for the NRMP?” Individuals could indicate their ranking on a 6-point scale
ranging from “Very likely [Program 1] (in [Metro 1])” on one side to “Very
likely [Program 2] (in [Metro 2])” on the other. In the baseline results we
10For more details, see Appendix A.2.
11Results reported in Appendix Figure A.5.
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look at the binary choice of whether they expect to rank Program 1 over
Program 2 because a comparison with the ex post submission choices is
more straightforward. Nevertheless, results are similar when using the full
likelihood scale.12
The algorithm used by NRMP was designed by Roth and Peranson (1999)
to be 100% resistant to attempts of “strategic behavior,” meaning that it is a
weakly dominant strategy for students to submit their true preferences (i.e.,
it is optimal regardless of the behavior of the other applicants). Students
receive training from the NRMP that makes it explicit that it is in their best
interest to submit truthful ranks. Indeed, survey data indicates that only 5%
of participants attempt to misreport their true preferences with a strategic
motive (Benjamin et al. 2014, Rees-Jones 2017a).13 Furthermore, almost all
NRMP participants receive a match,14 and backing out from a match entails
serious sanctions.15 As a result, the rank choices provide a direct proxy for
the individuals’ true preferences.
Since most of the evidence on relative concerns is based on the happiness
literature (e.g., Luttmer 2005), we want to compare preferences inferred from
choice data with respect to the preferences inferred from happiness data, in
the spirit of Benjamin et al. (2012, 2014). For this purpose, we included the
following question about happiness rank: “If assigned to it, in which of the
two programs would you expect to live a happier life?” Responses used the
same likelihood scale as for rank.
12Results reported in Table A.10.
13These results are consistent with other surveys (NRMP 2015). Given the small share
of individuals attempting to manipulate rankings, we decided not to include questions
about this. Relatedly, Rees-Jones (2017b) provide complementary behavioral evidence
that NRMP participants may fail to fully optimize, including a discussion of the source of
those frictions.
14For instance, 95% of the 27,048 U.S. graduating medical students received a successful
match in 2017.
15For example, applicants with confirmed violations of NRMP policies are subject to a
one year bar from accepting or starting a position in any program sponsored by a Match-
participating institution, from one year to a lifetime bar from participation in future
NRMP Matches, and from one year to a lifetime identification in the matching system as a
match violator (Source: http://www.nrmp.org/policies/the-match-commitment/). Addi-
tionally, the NRMP has established rules prohibiting programs from contacting candidates
to ask or coordinate their rank orders.
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1.2.3 Follow-Up Survey
Shortly after the NRMP rank submission window closed, we conducted a
follow-up survey with the subjects that responded to the baseline survey.
Most importantly, at the very beginning of the survey we collected data on
the final rank order submitted to the NRMP. Additionally, we took the op-
portunity to ask individuals for some additional information. We elicited the
perceptions about cost of living and earnings rank, which allows us to mea-
sure the persistence of the information learned in the information-provision
experiment. Also, we measured additional characteristics of the subjects,
such as the places where they grew up and measures of materialism (Richins
and Dawson 1992) and competitiveness (Smither and Houston 1992). We
did not measure these secondary characteristics in the baseline survey due
to space and time constraints.
1.3 Econometric Model
1.3.1 Baseline Model
In this baseline model, we exploit all the variation in perceptions of earnings
rank and cost of living, which includes the experimental variation induced
by our information-provision as well as the remaining non-experimental vari-
ation.
Let i index subjects and j 2 {1, 2} denote the two programs being con-
sidered by the subject. We define ERi,posteriorj and COL
i,posterior
j as the
posterior beliefs for earnings rank and cost of living for program j in the
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cost of living between the two programs. Let Program1  i Program2 de-
note that individual ranks program 1 over program 2, and let I (·) be an
indicator function. The regression specification is:
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where X i is a vector of control variables and ✓ is the corresponding vector of
coe cients. We always include a constant and the log-di↵erence of nominal
residency wages as control variables. In the baseline specification, we include
an additional set of controls consisting of pairwise di↵erences in some resi-
dency and location characteristics: residency program rank (from Doximity),
quality of life inferred from compensating di↵erentials (Albouy 2016), pop-
ulation size, population density, share of African-American residents, share
of Democrat residents, and share of urban population.16 In any case, we
present results with alternative sets of control variables.
In the baseline specification, we estimate a Probit model, which implies
that the error term ("i) is normally distributed. As is typical in discrete-
choice models, using a Probit model is convenient in the sense that the ratio
between parameters can be readily interpreted as marginal rates of substitu-
tion. However, this specification choice is irrelevant in practice: the results
are virtually identical if we use alternatives such as Logit or Linear Proba-
bility models.
The two key parameters of interest are  ER and  COL. The parameter  ER
measures preferences for relative income over the duration of the residency.
Depending on the mechanism at play, we may expect  ER to be positive or
negative. For instance, the status models predict that  ER > 0 (individu-
als want to choose less a✏uent ponds) while some social interaction models
predict that  ER < 0 (individuals want to choose more a✏uent ponds). The
parameter  COL measures preferences for purchasing power during the resi-
dency. We expect  COL < 0: i.e., individuals prefer to live in places where
they can a↵ord to consume more.
Note that earnings rank and cost of living after the end of the residency
would be part of the error term. The duration of a residency depends on the
specialty: it lasts for a minimum of three years, it typically takes five years,
and in some cases it may require a minimum of seven years.17
In Section 1.8 we discuss the potential interpretations for  ER and  COL.
One possible interpretation, which happens to be the one that motivated this
16The source for the demographic characteristics is the 2011-2014 American Community
Survey. For the share of Democrat residents, we use the share of Obama voters between
all voters in the 2008 Presidential Elections.
17A small minority of subjects may expect to continue living in the same city after the
residency, in which case the cost of living and the distribution of earnings may also be
relevant for the post-residency period.
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survey design, states that  ER and  COL reflect preferences over relative and
absolute consumption during the residency. Let absolute consumption be
the nominal earnings divided by the cost of living index, and let relative con-
sumption be the individual’s rank in the distribution of absolute consumption
in the same city. If the cost of living decreases in an area, it increases one’s
absolute consumption level because one can a↵ord more goods with the same
nominal income. However, it also increases the absolute consumption level
of everyone else in the city, leaving one’s relative consumption unchanged. In
contrast, with the cost of living held constant, a change in the distribution
of the earnings in a metro area a↵ects one’s relative consumption, but it
does not a↵ect one’s absolute consumption. As a result,  ER could be inter-
preted as the marginal utility from relative consumption, while   COL could
be interpreted as the marginal utility from absolute consumption. Further-
more, the ratio    ER
 COL
would correspond to the marginal rate of substitution
between relative consumption and absolute consumption.
1.3.2 Instrumental Variables Model
The second model exploits the variation in beliefs induced by the source-
randomization experiment to estimate the causal e↵ects of perceptions on
choice. Let ERi,shown1,2 be the information randomly chosen to be shown to
the individual, and ERi,alt1,2 be the alternative information that could have
been shown to the individual, but was not shown. Let  ERi1,2 = ER
i,shown
1,2  
ERi,alt1,2 be the di↵erence between the information shown and the alternative
information that could have been shown. We estimate an IV-Probit model
that uses  ERi1,2 and  COL
i
1,2 as instrumental variables. In other words,
this model uses the variation introduced by the random assignment of sources
to estimate the e↵ect of perceptions on choice:
I(Program1  i Program2) = I( ER · ERi,posterior1,2 +  
COL · COLi,posterior1,2
+  1 · ERi,alt1,2 +  2 · COL
i,alt
1,2 + ✓X
i + "i   0)
ERi,posterior1,2 =  
ER























There is a simple way to understand the intuition behind this instrumental
variables approach. In a deceptive design, subjects would be shown the
statistic from a certain source, but with random noise added to this statistic.
Then we would only exploit the variation in beliefs generated by the random
noise. In our context,  ERi1,2 and  COL
i
1,2 play the role of the random
noise added to the feedback, only that they are generated in a non-deceptive
manner.
1.4 Implementation Details and Summary Statistics
Our recruitment strategy is similar to that of Benjamin et al. (2014). Dur-
ing December 2016 we contacted the Associate Dean of Student A↵airs at
all 135 accredited medical schools in the United States by email to ask for
permission to invite fourth year students participating in the 2017 Main Res-
idency Match to take part in our study. Our goal was to recruit as many
respondents as possible, so we followed up, by email and phone, with all the
deans who showed interest. Of the 79 schools that answered our invitation,
27 agreed to participate. The main reason given by the schools that de-
clined to participate was school policy restricting external surveys, in place
to avoid survey fatigue. Our sample of participating schools includes 22 of
the 50 U.S. states, and it is quite representative of the whole sample of 135
accredited medical schools – we do not find statistically significant di↵erences
in observable characteristics such as total enrollment, average MCAT scores,
undergraduate GPA at admission, acceptance rate, and U.S. News rank.18
For confidentiality reasons, we were not given email lists to directly invite
students to participate in our study. Instead, the deans agreed to forward our
invitation email containing the link to the survey to eligible students (i.e.,
senior medical students participating in the NRMP). This email invitation
asked students to participate in a confidential survey about the Main Resi-
dency Match for a study on how medical students select residency programs.
The message mentioned that the survey would take less than 10 minutes to
complete and respondents would be sent a $10 Amazon gift card by email as
a token of appreciation. Finally, the email stressed the eligibility criteria for
participating in the survey: being a graduating medical student participating
18For details, see Appendix A.1.
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in the Main Residency Match who has not yet submitted his or her rank to
the NRMP.19
The only reason why we excluded individuals who had previously submit-
ted their ranks was because we wanted individuals who were still deciding and
thus prone to using the signals from the information-provision experiment.
However, this concern is not important in the sense that submissions can be
modified anytime before February 22. Even if some students had already
submitted their rank at the time of responding to the survey, they would
still be able modify their rank. In any case, the vast majority of our subjects
responded to the baseline survey quite early in the submission period.
We took several measures to minimize the chance that non eligible students
would participate in the survey. First, deans were asked to carefully forward
the invitation to senior students participating in the Main Residency Match.
This request was not an issue since such a mailing lists already existed;
targeted announcements were already being sent to this group during the
semester regarding the Match. Second, individuals were reminded of these
restrictions in the invitation email and on the consent page of the survey.
Third, the first questions of the surveys acted as filters; we asked what match
the respondent was participating in and whether they had already submitted
their ranks. If they responded with a match other than the Main Residency
or “yes” to already submitting their rank, the survey ended there, and they
were excluded from taking the survey again.20
Last, at the end of the survey, respondents were required to submit their
university email address to “sign” a statement claiming that they were medi-
cal students participating in the NRMP and they understood that we reserved
the right to verify their status before making a payment. We were able to
confirm the validity of 100% of respondents for a subset of schools. Given
all the measures taken and the evidence obtained, we are confident that the
survey data are of high quality.
The invitation emails were sent to students in a staggered way, with the
first round of invitations sent on January 6, 2017, and the last round of
invitations and reminders sent on February 7, 2017. We estimated that
19There are a number of alternative matches for some specialties that have di↵erent
deadlines than the Main Residency Match.
20The survey platform blocks users from taking the survey again by using their I.P.
address and cookies, although students could circumvent this restriction by opening the
survey link from a di↵erent device.
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the student invitations were forwarded to around 3,676 students in total,
with 1,080 finishing the baseline survey, implying an overall response rate of
29.38%. The median survey completion time was almost 9 minutes. At the
end of the baseline survey we included an attention check question that was
passed by 96.4% of respondents. For the sake of transparency, we do not
drop the group that did not pass the attention check – indeed, we do not
drop any other group from the baseline sample.21
On February 23, 2017, the day after the NRMP rank submission deadline,
we sent respondents who participated in our baseline survey an invitation to
participate in the follow-up survey. We o↵ered participants an additional $5
Amazon gift card for participating in this shorter follow-up survey. We closed
the follow-up survey on March 12, one day before Match Week started (i.e.,
the time when the students find out where they are matched). The response
rate to the follow-up survey was 90.62%. Moreover, the characteristics of
the individuals who responded to the follow-up survey are similar to the
characteristics of individuals who did not respond to the follow-up.22
Figure 1.1 presents the distribution of dates when subjects responded to the
baseline survey, when they responded to the follow-up survey, and when they
submitted their ranks to the NRMP (for those who provided this information
in the follow-up survey). On average, students responded to the baseline
survey 24.5 days (s.d. 12.9) before submitting their ranks, and responded to
the follow-up survey 13.9 days (s.d. 11.8) after submitting their ranks.
Figure 1.2 shows the geographic distribution of the metropolitan areas in
which students’ top-two programs are located. This figure shows that there
is a broad geographical coverage of the U.S. territory.
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the
analysis. Column (1) corresponds to all respondents to the baseline survey.
Around 48% of respondents were male, the average age was 27 years, 35.4%
of respondents were single, 23.9% were married, and 40.7% were in a long-
term relationship. On average, students were o↵ered a salary of $54,000 for
the first year of their residency – this salary would make them richer than
56% of earners in the average metro area. Of course, this sample is not
21Upon inspection of the data, the 3.6% of respondents who failed the attention check
seem to have answered the survey as consistently as everyone else. And, as reported in
Appendix Table A.9, the results are virtually the same if we drop this 3.6% of the sample.
22Results presented in Appendix Table A.3.
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representative of the general U.S. population of adults: most notably, our
subject pool is younger and more educated. Nevertheless, our subject pool is
close to the U.S. average in terms of nominal wages and gender composition.23
To verify that the randomization was successful, Table 1.1 breaks down
the descriptive statistics by each treatment group. This table also reports
the p-value for the test of the alternative hypothesis that at least one mean
is di↵erent across the four treatment groups. First, this table shows that the
number of respondents was almost identical number of respondents across
all groups. Second, this table shows that the di↵erences in individual char-
acteristics are economically small and statistically insignificant across the
treatment groups, thus confirming that the random assignment was success-
ful.
1.5 Results: Distribution of Perceptions and Learning
1.5.1 Variation in Nominal Income, Cost of Living and
Earnings Rank
We first show that there is enough variation in cost of living and earnings
rank to allow for the estimation of the key parameters. Given that we do not
observe the “true” cost of living or earnings rank, but imperfect estimates
based on di↵erent data sources, the following results use our “baseline” esti-
mates: the RPP measure of cost of living and the ACS measure of earnings
rank (using the alternative data sources yield similar results).
Figure 1.3 shows a scatterplot of the pairwise di↵erences in cost of living
vs. the di↵erences in earnings rank. This figure shows three facts that are
crucial for estimating the preferences for cost of living and relative income.
First, the substantial dispersion in the y-axis suggests that there are large
di↵erences in cost of living across the pairs of cities that the individuals must
choose from. Second, the substantial dispersion in the x-axis suggests that
there are large di↵erences in earnings rank across the pairs of cities that
the individuals must choose from.24 Third, the R2 = 0.22 indicates that,
23For more details, see Appendix Table A.4.
24Furthermore, the vast majority of these di↵erences in cost of living and earnings rank
are orthogonal to di↵erences in nominal income – see Appendix A.3.1 for details.
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even though the two are correlated,25 substantial orthogonal variation exists
between cost of living and relative income.
1.5.2 Distribution of Prior Beliefs
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to measure perceptions
about cost of living and earnings ranks across di↵erent cities. To get a sense
of how informed individuals are about these aspects of their decision-making,
we start by comparing their prior beliefs (that is, perceptions prior to the
feedback) to the baseline statistics: the RPP measure of cost of living and
the ACS measure of earnings rank.
Respondents seem to have a relatively good idea of the cost of living in
the cities they are considering. Figure 1.4.a shows respondents’ prior beliefs
about cost of living along with the corresponding RPP estimates. The RPP
is meant to reflect all sources of expenditures, and for that they employ data
on prices in: apparel, education, food, housing, medical, recreation, rents,
transportation and other goods and services. If answers were completely
accurate, we would expect to see all responses on the 45 degree line. On
average, prior beliefs overestimate the baseline estimate by just 4 percentage
points; and the prior belief and RPP estimates are positively correlated, with
an R2 of 0.550.
However, individuals are substantially less well informed about their earn-
ings ranks. Figure 1.4.b plots prior beliefs about earnings rank against the
ACS estimates. On average, individuals underestimate earnings ranks by
almost 16 percentage points; and the prior belief and ACS estimates are pos-
itively correlated, but with an R2 of just 0.029. Because we are ultimately
interested in relative di↵erences for their decision making, we repeat this ex-
ercise using pairwise di↵erences instead of levels. It seems that respondents
have a better understanding of relative di↵erences in earnings rank, though
they still remain far less accurate than perceptions over cost of living.26 This
finding suggests that, while prior evidence suggests that individuals have
significant biases when assessing their position in the national income distri-
bution (Cruces et al. 2013, Karadja et al. 2017), these biases are even more
25The slope of −0.664 suggests that, on average, relatively more expensive cities tend
to have a higher distribution of nominal earnings.
26Detailed results reported in Appendix A.3.2.
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substantial when individuals try to predict their position in places where
they are not currently living.
1.5.3 Learning from Statistics
We next examine whether respondents learned from the information we pro-
vided. To do this, we examine the relationship between the initial perception
gap of respondents (i.e., the signal received minus the prior belief) and the
extent to which they revise their responses (the posterior belief minus the
prior belief). If respondents learn from the information provided, we would
expect a positive relation between their perception gaps and their revisions;
that is, respondents who originally overestimated would revise their beliefs
downwards, while those who underestimated would revise in the opposite
direction.
Indeed, the slope between the perception gaps and revisions can be used
to quantify the degree of learning from information.27 Let bpriork denote the
mean of the prior belief k, bsignalk the signal about k, and b
posterior
k the mean
of the corresponding posterior belief. When priors and signals are normally
distributed, Bayesian learning implies that the mean of the posterior belief
should be a weighted average between the signal and the mean of the prior
belief:
bposteriork = ↵k · b
signal
k + (1  ↵k) · b
prior
k
The degree of learning can be summarized by the weight parameter ↵k. This
parameter can take values from 0 (individuals ignore the signal) to 1 (indi-
viduals fully adjust to the signal). We can rearrange the previous equation:
bposteriork   b
prior






Which implies that we can estimate the learning rate (↵k) by estimating a
regression of the revision (bposteriork   b
prior
k ) on the perception gap between
the prior and the signal (bsignalk   b
prior
k ).
Respondents strongly updated their beliefs after being provided with feed-
27For a discussion about the estimation of learning models with survey experiments, see
Armantier et al. (2016) and Cavallo et al. (2017). Also, in relation to the identification
of pre.ferences from information-provision experiments, see Wiswall and Zafar (2014)
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back. Figure 1.5 presents the reduced-form e↵ects of information for cost of
living and earnings rank, respectively. Figures 1.5.a and 1.5.d present the
short-term e↵ect, that is, the revision made by respondents directly after
being given the information. The short-term learning rates, given by the
slopes reported in these figures, are 0.879 (s.e. 0.010) for the cost of living
and 0.873 (s.e. 0.011) for the earnings rank. These two learning rates are
statistically significant, precisely estimated, and we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that they are equal to each other (p-value=0.754). These learn-
ing rates are remarkably close to 1, meaning that respondents almost fully
reacted to the signals.
One limitation with this evidence is that individuals may have revised
their beliefs towards the truth regardless of the feedback we provided. For
instance, they may have taken extra time to think about the question, leading
to a more accurate response. The source experiment was designed to test
this specific hypothesis. We construct two variables: the information actually
shown and the “alternative” information that could have been shown. If the
alternative information had any e↵ect beyond the information shown, that
would be evidence that part of the revisions were due to reversion to the
truth rather than reversion to the information provided. Figures 1.5.b and
1.5.e show the relation between the alternative information and the revision
adjusted for the information actually shown. The alternative information
indeed has no e↵ect: the coe cients are close to zero (−0.034 for cost of
living and 0.060 for earnings ranking) and precisely estimated. Furthermore,
in Section 1.8.1 we show that there was no cross-learning (i.e., feedback on
cost of living did not a↵ect beliefs about earnings ranking and vice versa).
In survey experiments, one main concern is that instead of inducing genuine
learning, the information provided in the experiment may elicit spurious
reactions. For instance, if an individual is told that the cost of living in a city
is “10% more expensive than the U.S. average” and then later asked about
the cost of living in the same city, he or she may report a cost of living that is
closer to “10% more expensive than the U.S. average” for spurious reasons,
such as unconscious numerical anchoring (Kahneman and Tversky 1972).
Under the assumption that these e↵ects are temporary, we can disentangle
genuine from spurious learning by looking at the reaction to the information
provided in the experiment that persisted over time (Cavallo et al. 2017).
We look at the persistence of the e↵ect of feedback between the time par-
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ticipants responded to the baseline and follow-up surveys, which was 38.4
days on average. Figures 1.5.c and 1.5.f show the relation between the initial
perception gap and the long-term revision based on beliefs reported in the
follow-up survey (i.e., bposterior,LTk  b
prior
k ). There is substantial persistence the
e↵ects of the feedback: the estimated slope for the initial perception gap and
the long-term revision (i.e., the di↵erence between long-term belief and the
initial prior belief) for cost of living is 0.752 (s.e. 0.016), while for earnings
rank it is 0.626 (s.e. 0.020). These longer-term revisions are slightly weaker
than the short-term revisions, but that result is expected given that individ-
uals must have gathered some additional information in the time between
the two surveys.
1.6 Results: Preferences for Relative Income
1.6.1 Average Preferences
We first explore the baseline estimates of the e↵ects of earnings ranking and
cost of living. The baseline specification uses the Probit model from Section
1.3, with the expected rank submission as dependent variable. This specifica-
tion exploits all the variation in perceptions, which includes the experimental
variation induced by our information-provision as well as the remaining non-
experimental variation. We introduce the experimental estimates later in
this section.
Respondents prefer a lower cost of living. The Probit coe cients are pre-
sented in Table 1.2. Column (1) presents the results for the full sample, while
columns (2) through (7) present results by demographic subgroups. The es-
timated  COL from column (1) is negative and statistically significant (p-
value=0.027), suggesting that the average individual prefers programs with
lower costs of living. To better understand the magnitude of these Probit
coe cients, we can transform them into the corresponding marginal e↵ects,
where increasing the cost of living by 1 percentage point at a program’s loca-
tion decreases the probability of choosing that program by 0.201 percentage
points (which can be interpreted as a behavioral elasticity of -0.201).28
28These marginal e↵ects are reported in Appendix Table A.5.
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The fact that medical students care about cost of living during the resi-
dency is consistent with the view that money is a primary motivation for doc-
tors. For instance, according to a 2008 survey, 49% of pre-med students self-
reported being primarily motivated by money in their career choice (Daniel
and O’Brien 2008).29 Even though  COL is statistically and economically
significant, it does not imply that cost of living during residency is the main
feature that medical students pay attention to. Intuitively, if doctors care
about their post-residency consumption, they should choose residencies that
o↵er better post-residency job prospects. Indeed, in complementary analysis,
we find that doctors care substantially more about the prestige and career
prospects than about the cost of living during their residency.30
Most important, the average subject also prefers a higher earnings rank:
the estimated  ER from column (1) is positive and statistically significant (p-
value=0.065). This coe cient suggests that the average individual prefers to
live in a city where, holding her cost of living constant, she earns more than
her neighbors. The corresponding marginal e↵ect indicates that increasing
the earnings rank at a program’s location by 1 percentage point increases
the probability of choosing that program by 0.186 percentage points (for
a behavioral elasticity of 0.186). The elasticity for cost of living (-0.201) is
similar in magnitude to the elasticity for earnings rank (0.186) – indeed, their
di↵erence is statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that individuals
care about relative income nearly as much as they care about cost of living.
The evidence suggests that individuals take relative income into account
when they make their location decisions. This preference could be the prod-
uct of a combination of multiple mechanisms, pushing in di↵erent directions.
The positive sign of  ER suggests that the dominant mechanism is consistent
with models in which richer neighbors impose a negative externality, as in
Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Frank (1985), Cole et al. (1998) and Luttmer
(2005), among others. In this section, we focus on identifying the prefer-
ence parameters, and we provide a discussion of the interpretation of these
parameters in Section 1.7 below.
29These survey results are based on responses from 461 takers of the Kaplan MCAT test
in February 2008 and 453 takers of the Kaplan LSAT test in February 2008.
30Results presented in Appendix A.3.7.
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1.6.2 Heterogeneity by Relationship Status
The average preferences could potentially mask substantial heterogeneity.
For instance, Luttmer (2005) finds that the e↵ect of relative income on hap-
piness is driven entirely by the sample of non-single individuals. Further-
more, evidence from the urban economics literature indicates that single and
non-single individuals have di↵erent locational preferences (e.g., Couture and
Handbury 2016,Gautier et al. 2010). To explore heterogeneity in preferences,
columns (2) through (7) of Table 1.2 present estimates broken down by the
basic demographic groups measured in the baseline survey: relationship sta-
tus, gender and expected (post-residency) income.
To explore heterogeneity by relationship status, we elicited the relationship
status using the same categories as in Luttmer (2005). Column (2) of Table
1.2 shows the e↵ect for non-single individuals (i.e., the 65% of the sample who
are married or in a long-term relationship) and column (3) for the sample
of single individuals (35% of the sample).31 It is important to note that
by non-single we only refer to their relationship status, not to whether the
respondent participates as a dual match, which is a special regime used by
roughly 7% of subjects—indeed, the results are similar if we drop subjects
with dual matches.32
Comparing columns (2) and (3) indicate large heterogeneity in  ER by
relationship status. For non-single individuals, the estimated  ER (2.236) is
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. For the sample of single
individuals,  ER (−1.538) is negative and statistically significant at the 10%
level. The direction of the di↵erence in relative concerns between non-singles
and singles is consistent with the evidence from Luttmer (2005).
The di↵erence in  ER between non-singles and singles is highly statisti-
cally significant (p-value=0.001). Moreover, to address spurious results from
multiple hypothesis testing, for each p-value reported in the table we also
report the corresponding q-value based on Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001).
The q-value indicates the minimum false discovery rate (i.e., the expected
proportion of rejected null hypotheses that are actually true) at which the
null hypothesis would be rejected for that test given all tests reported in
31Appendix Table A.7 shows results breaking down the non-single individuals into mar-
ried and in a long-term relationship. The relative concerns are similar between these two
groups.
32See Appendix Table A.9 for more details.
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the same table. The di↵erence in  ER between singles and non-singles has
a q-value of 0.030, which indicates that this heterogeneity is unlikely to be
spurious. Contrary to the case of preferences for earnings rank, the rela-
tionship status does not seem to a↵ect the preferences for cost of living.
According to columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.2, the estimated  COL is -1.087
for non-singles and -1.058 for singles, with the di↵erence being statistically
insignificant (p-value=0.977).
These estimates suggest that while non-single individuals prefer to live in
less a✏uent ponds, single individuals would rather live in more a✏uent ponds.
While the preferences of non-single individuals can be rationalized by status
models, the preferences of single individuals cannot be rationalized by such
models. One potential explanation for the preferences of single individuals
lies in their local social interactions, such as in the dating market. These
subjects are at their prime dating age, and thus are likely to be looking
for long-term partners during their residency. Since individuals prefer to
date rich partners (Fisman el al. 2006, Hitsch and Hortacsu 2010), this can
naturally create a preference for locating in more a✏uent ponds. Moreover,
prior evidence suggests that, relative to single men, single women may have a
stronger preference for finding rich partners (Bertrand et al. 2015, Bursztyn
et al. 2017). Consistent with this view, we find that the preference for more
a✏uent ponds among singles is driven primarily by single women, although
this result is imprecisely estimated.33
Relative to other random single individuals from the general U.S. popula-
tion with a similar salary, the singles in our subject pool may have a stronger
reason to seek more a✏uent ponds: even though their wages during the res-
idency put them near the middle of the U.S. distribution of earnings, their
expected post-residency earnings will place them near the top of the earnings
distribution. If these subjects have a desire to meet a partner that can match
their permanent income, they should try to locate in the richest areas of the
United States.
Beyond dating preferences, there may be gender di↵erences in preferences
for cost of living and relative income. For instance, there may be gender
di↵erences in consumption aspirations or in status concerns. Columns (4)
and (5) explore potential di↵erences in preferences by gender. These gender
33Results reported in Appendix A.7.
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di↵erences are small:  ER is similar for females (1.041) and males (0.896),
and  COL is also similar for females (-0.972) and males (-1.443). Moreover,
neither of these two di↵erences are statistically significant (p-values of 0.894
and 0.642, respectively).
Last, even though all these subjects receive a similar income during the
residency, they have very di↵erent expected incomes after they finish their
residencies. It is possible that individuals who selected high-earning special-
ties may be more concerned about relative income. The test this hypothesis,
columns (6) and (7) split the sample in specialties with above and below me-
dian post-residency average salaries. Again, the di↵erences in coe cients are
statistically insignificant:  ER is 1.433 for below-median specialties and 0.777
for above-median specialties, and  COL is -0.690 for below-median special-
ties and -1.238 for above-median specialties, with neither of those di↵erences
being statistically significant (p-values of 0.544 and 0.580, respectively).
We also computed heterogeneity by other characteristics measured in the
follow-up survey. None of these dimensions are nearly as important as rela-
tionship status for predicting heterogeneity in preferences for income, both
in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.34 Because of the mag-
nitude of the heterogeneity by relationship status, in the remainder of the
paper, we report estimates for non-single and single respondents, in addition
to estimates for the entire sample.
1.6.3 Robustness Checks: Controlling for Other Observable
Characteristics
One potential concern with the baseline specification is that of omitted-
variable biases. For instance, if places where an individual expects higher
earnings rank (i.e., less a✏uent metro areas) are systematically worse in
terms of quality of life, then failing to account for quality of life would intro-
duce a negative bias in  ER, thus making relative concerns look weaker than
they actually are.
We present the baseline estimates using alternative sets of control variables
in Table 1.3. Each row corresponds to a di↵erent regression, with a di↵erent
set of control variables. The first row presents results for our baseline specifi-
34Results reported in Appendix Table A.8.
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cation, but without including any control variables for the characteristics of
the program or the metro area. The second row corresponds to the baseline
specification from Table 1.2, which includes the six baseline controls listed in
Section 1.3.1. The results in the first two rows of Table 1.3 indicate that  ER
and  COL are qualitatively and quantitatively similar between the baseline
specification and the specification without controls.
The third through last rows of Table 1.3 include di↵erent sets of additional
controls. These sets of controls were selected based on attributes that could
potentially be relevant for the options of the subjects and at the same time
may be correlated to the earnings rank. For instance, we may want to control
for crime rates: living in a less a✏uent city may be desirable for medical stu-
dents interested in certain specialties where they must learn to treat injuries
that are more common in high-crime areas, such as gunshot wounds. Also,
we may want to account for place of origin: medical students, who tend to
grow up in a✏uent areas, may want to remain in the the same areas where
they grew up (Agarwal 2015).
We examine the following groups of attributes: demographic characteris-
tics (population, population density, percentage urban population, percent-
age same gender, percentage age 25 to 34, share of college graduates, share
foreign, share Hispanic, and share black); amenities (quality of life from Al-
bouy (2016), per capita spending on local public goods, per capita spending
on education and health, overall crime rate and violent crime rate, share
of registered Democrat voters in the 2012 election); geography (distance of
program to city where they grew up, distance of program to current medical
school); economic factors (estimated income taxes, federal and state income
taxes, local sales tax, rent prices, and the Gini coe cient); a set of state
dummies; objective program characteristics (residency program rank from
Doximity, dummies for university hospitals and for community hospitals),
and subjective program characteristics (the subjective rank in prestige, pur-
pose, and prospect, as reported in the follow-up survey).
Comparing the results across rows of  ER and  COL of Table 1.3 suggests
that these estimates are robust to the choice of control variables, both in
terms of statistical significance and economic significance. Of course, small
di↵erences occur in the point estimates across specifications. For instance,
relative to the baseline  ER of 0.995 for the entire sample in column (3),  ER
ranges from a minimum of 0.703 with all controls to a maximum of 1.199
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with subjective program characteristics.35 However, all of these di↵erences
are statistically insignificant.
1.6.4 Robustness Checks: Experimental Estimates and
Long-Term E↵ects
In this section, we present results from two robustness checks. The first check
addresses concerns about omitted-variable bias by exploiting the exogenous
variation in beliefs generated by the source-randomization experiment. The
second is intended to address potential concerns about spurious e↵ects of
the information-provision experiment, by comparing the short-term e↵ects
to the long-term e↵ects. To make these estimates directly comparable to the
long-term e↵ects, in this section we restrict the sample to individuals who
responded to the follow-up survey.
Panel A of Table 1.4 presents the results for  ER. The first row presents
the baseline specification, while the second row presents the experimental
estimates. The experimental estimates are less precisely estimated than the
baseline estimates because they only use a portion of the variation in beliefs.
For each of the subgroups of single and non-single respondents, shown in
columns (1) and (2), the estimated  ER is qualitatively consistent across the
baseline and experimental specifications. For non-singles, the coe cient is
2.380 (p-value=0.001) in the baseline specification vs. 2.977 (p-value=0.025)
in the experimental specification. And for singles, the coe cients are -1.656
(p-value=0.095) in the baseline specification vs. -4.964 (p-value=0.012) in
the experimental specification.
Column (3) shows that, for the entire sample,  ER is slightly lower in
the second row (0.867) than in the first row (1.141) and, due to the lower
precision, becomes statistically insignificant in the second row. However,
we must take this finding with a grain of salt. First, due to the precision
of the experimental coe cient, this di↵erence between the first and second
rows is statistically insignificant. Second, the reduction in the average  ER
is driven primarily by the fact that the coe cient becomes more negative for
35According to the pseudo-R2 reported in panel C of Table 1.3, including these variables
increases the explanatory power of our model to some degree. For the full sample in column
(9), the pseudo-R2 increases from 0.015 in the specification with no additional controls to
a maximum of 0.123 with subjective program characteristics as controls.
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singles. This highlights the importance of taking potential heterogeneity of
preferences into account when studying location preferences.
Panel B of Table 1.4 presents the results for  COL. The results from the
baseline specification (first row) are qualitatively di↵erent from the results
in the experimental specification (second row). All the coe cients (for the
entire sample, singles and non-singles) become positive, are imprecisely esti-
mated, and are statistically insignificant. We must take this evidence with
a grain of salt: since the experimental estimates are not precisely estimated,
we cannot rule out large negative values for  COL, and in most cases we
cannot reject that the experimental coe cients are equal to those from the
baseline specification. Also, the coe cients from the first and second row are
not be expected to be equal, to the extent that the experimental coe cients
identify local average preferences instead of average preferences.36 However,
these findings are at least suggestive evidence that the baseline estimates
may overestimate the importance of cost of living.
The Appendix presents some additional results. In all the instrumental
variable specifications, we strongly reject the null hypothesis of weak instru-
ments. Also, the learning rates implied by the first-stage coe cients are
always close to 1, and for that reason the instrumental variables estimates
are similar to the reduced form estimates.37
The second robustness test is intended to address potential concerns about
spurious e↵ects of the information-provision experiment such as salience and
experimenter-demand e↵ects. For example, by asking individuals questions
about the cost of living and earnings rank, the baseline survey makes those
aspects more salient, which may make individuals overweight them in their
expected choice. However, this salience e↵ect may not necessarily exaggerate
the importance of relative income, because they would be expected to inflate
both  ER and  COL.
We should also be concerned about potential experimenter-demand e↵ects:
by providing individuals with information about cost of living and earnings
rank, the experimenter may be putting pressure on the subjects to use this
information in their expected choice. Again, this source of bias would not
36For instance, it is plausible that the information-provision experiment disproportion-
ally a↵ected individuals who were the most unsure about their priors beliefs about cost of
living, who likely are those who care the least about cost of living.
37Reduced-form and first-stage estimates are presented in Appendix Table A.11.
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necessarily exaggerate the importance of relative income: since most individ-
uals do not want to reveal to others that they care about status (Shigeoka
and Yamada 2016), the experimenter-demand bias would probably shrink
 ER towards zero.38
To address these remaining concerns, we estimate the e↵ects of the infor-
mation provision on the final rank submission, which takes place an average
of 38.4 days after the information provision. This can be achieved by using
the same instrumental variable model, but using the final submission rank
(elicited in the follow-up survey) instead of the expected submission rank
(elicited in the baseline survey) as the dependent variable. If the e↵ects were
spurious due to salience or experimenter-demand e↵ect, we would expect that
the information provided in the experiment would not have any e↵ect on the
final submission choice. In other words, we test whether the information
provided a month before the submission deadline had a long-lasting e↵ect on
the final ranks submitted.
The third row of Table 1.4 presents the experimental estimates based on the
long-term e↵ects of the experiment. By comparing the coe cients in the third
row to those from the second row, we can compare the short-term and long-
term experimental e↵ects. Panel A of Table 1.4 presents the results for  ER,
while panel B corresponds to  COL. The long-term experimental coe cients
are somewhat di↵erent from the short-term experimental coe cients, but
those di↵erences are mostly statistically insignificant. Most important, the
coe cient on  ER is still positive (1.993) and statistically significant for non-
singles, and negative (-5.285) and statistically significant for singles.
1.7 Auxiliary Experiment
In the previous section, we present evidence that individuals consider relative
income in their location choices. In this section, we present complementary
evidence from an auxiliary experiment.
38Also, our survey was conducted confidentially and online, which reduces the scope for
experimenter-demand e↵ects (Van Gelder et al. 2010). Additionally, it would be di cult
to reconcile the experimenter-demand channel with the finding that the earnings rank had
a positive e↵ect on non-singles and a negative e↵ect on singles.
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1.7.1 Survey Design
We designed a variation of the survey instrument that can be used in other
contexts besides the medical residency match. At the beginning of this sur-
vey, we ask respondents to list two cities that they know well to which they
would consider moving to. The rest of the survey instrument is identical
to the baseline survey instrument from our main experiment with medical
students: we elicit prior and posterior beliefs about cost of living and earn-
ings rank, we conduct the information-provision experiment, and we elicit
preferences for the two cities under consideration.
We conduct this auxiliary experiment using a sample of respondents from
Amazon Mechanical Turk.39 Compared to the main residency match experi-
ment, the primary di↵erence is that the subjects in the auxiliary experiment
are not moving anytime soon, so we cannot followup with them to measure
the e↵ects of the information provision experiment on their actual location
choices. Instead, we measure the e↵ects on their expected location choices.
On the one hand, this is a limitation of the auxiliary experiment.40 On the
other hand, this auxiliary sample has the advantage that, due to a wide
availability of subjects, it is possible to run additional experiments at any
time.
The results from this additional experiment also shed light on the exter-
nal validity of the results from the main experimental sample. For example,
it is possible that doctors have stronger relative concerns than the rest of
the population due to their competitive profession. Also, because most doc-
tors’ incomes substantially exceed the subsistence level, they may care about
positional externalities more than poor individuals. The observable charac-
teristics of the online sample used in the auxiliary experiment also di↵er from
those of the sample of medical students. For example, on average, partici-
pants in the auxiliary sample are older and less educated.41 Moreover, the
auxiliary sample may also di↵er in unobservable characteristics, such as their
proclivity for status concerns.
39Details about the recruitment are presented in Appendix A.3.14.
40The results from the previous section suggests that using hypothetical choices may
not be as problematic as generally thought, to the extent that preferences inferred from
expected choices are consistent with preferences inferred from actual choices.
41Descriptive statistics comparing sample characteristics between the main and auxiliary
experiment are presented in Appendix Table A.14.
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1.7.2 Results
We recruited 1,245 U.S. respondents using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Table
1.5 replicates the preference estimation from Table 1.4, but using the aux-
iliary experiment instead of the main experiment. The comparison between
Table 1.5 and Table 1.4 suggests that the results from the main residency
match experiment are robust in this auxiliary experiment.
The first row of Table 1.5 corresponds to the baseline estimates, which uses
the experimental and non-experimental variations in beliefs. The coe cients
 ER and  COL are similar between the main experiment and the auxiliary
experiment. Focusing on the entire sample, the estimated  ER and  COL are
1.141 and -1.262 in the main experiment (p-value=0.048 and p-value=0.017),
and 1.293 and -1.962 in the auxiliary experiment (p-value<0.001 for both).
That is, the coe cients have the same signs and similar magnitudes. The
coe cients are more precisely estimated in the auxiliary sample, in part due
to the larger sample size.
To compare magnitude of relative income e↵ects across the two experi-
ments, we can compare the ratio    ER
 COL
, which corresponds to the marginal
rate of substitution between relative income and cost of living. In the main
experiment, the ratio    ER
 COL
is 0.90 (s.e. 0.64). In the auxiliary experiment,
we find a corresponding ratio of 0.66 (s.e. 0.20). That is, the auxiliary exper-
iment suggests slightly weaker preferences for relative income than the main
experiment, but that di↵erence is statistically insignificant. The estimated
preferences for relative income are similar across the two samples despite
large observable di↵erences in observable characteristics. This constitutes
suggestive evidence that medical students are not special in terms of their
preferences for relative income.
The second row presents the experimental estimates based on the variation
driven by the source-randomization. The results from the auxiliary experi-
ment are even more robust than the results from the main experiment. In
the main experiment, the baseline estimates for  ER are similar to the ex-
perimental estimates, and this is true again in the auxiliary experiment. In
the main experiment, the experimental estimates for  COL are statistically
insignificant and smaller in magnitude than the baseline estimates. In the
auxiliary sample, the experimental estimates for  COL are negative, precisely
estimated, and statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Another finding from the main experiment is the heterogeneity in  ER by
relationship status. In the auxiliary experiment, we find evidence consistent
with this heterogeneity, although it is less extreme. Table 1.5 shows that,
when we break down  ER by relationship status, the coe cient of  ER is
smaller among singles than among non-singles. This di↵erence is economi-
cally large for the experimental estimates:  ER is 2.578 for singles and 0.664
for non-singles. However, there are two notable di↵erences: the di↵erence
is statistically insignificant in the auxiliary experiment (p-value=0.244), and
less pronounced in magnitude than the corresponding heterogeneity in the
main experiment. This di↵erence between the two experiments can be at-
tributed to the di↵erences in the characteristics of singles across the two
samples. Compared to singles in the auxiliary sample (i.e., people recruited
randomly from an online job marketplace), singles in the medical student
sample are more likely to be in prime dating age and less likely to have chil-
dren from previous relationships. Therefore, it is likely that single medical
students are more interested in their dating prospects.
1.8 Interpretation
1.8.1 Addressing Confounding Factors
When interpreting the coe cient  ER, one potential concern is that individ-
uals do not prioritize their relative income per se, but they use it as a signal
for other city attributes that they do prioritize. However, given that medi-
cal students are highly informed and are making a high-stakes decision, this
possibility seems unlikely. These students devote their entire fourth year of
medical school to the Match. After the hospital visits, they have about two
months to finalize their rankings. During this time, they continue to gather
information to aid their decision. Because they have been to these locations
and can easily obtain additional information directly, it is unlikely that they
would rely on earnings rank to learn about other features of the locations.
Nevertheless, we present direct tests for this confounding factor.
One version of this confounding factor is that individuals use information
about relative income to make inferences about the expected cost of living. If
participants in the NRMP believe that their earnings rank reflects the degree
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of competition with their neighbors for some goods, such as housing, it would
be natural for them to learn about cost of living from information about their
relative income. We can test this directly by examining how the information
provision experiment a↵ected posterior beliefs about cost of living.
In Figures 1.6 we use similar learning regressions from Section 1.5.3. The
key di↵erence is that the regressions in Section 1.5.3 explore the e↵ect of
relative income feedback on beliefs about relative income, whereas the ones
in this section measure the e↵ects of relative income feedback on beliefs about
cost of living (and vice versa). Figure 1.6.a shows the e↵ect of earnings rank
feedback on posterior beliefs about the cost of living from the baseline survey
(i.e., the short-term e↵ect). The slope is close to zero (-0.003), precisely
estimated (s.e. 0.006), and statistically insignificant. This coe cient suggests
that increasing the observed earnings rank by 1 percentage point reduces their
posterior beliefs about cost of living by 0.003 percentage points. To put this
magnitude in context, Figure 1.5.d suggests that the e↵ect of earnings rank
on posterior beliefs about earnings rank is 0.873 (s.e. 0.011). The di↵erence
between this 0.873 and the -0.003 e↵ect is economically large and statistically
highly significant. Figure 1.6.b shows the e↵ect of earnings rank feedback on
beliefs about the cost of living from the follow-up survey (i.e., the long-term
e↵ect). Again, the e↵ect is close to zero (-0.011), precisely estimated (s.e.
0.011), and statistically insignificant.
This evidence refutes the concern that subjects react to information about
relative income because they infer something about the cost of living. As
additional evidence that subjects see cost of living and relative income as two
distinct features of the city, Figure 1.6.c and 1.6.d show that the converse also
is true: feedback about cost of living does not a↵ect short-term or long-term
beliefs about relative income.
A second version of the confounding factor is that individuals use infor-
mation about relative income to learn about other city characteristics, such
as school quality and crime rates. Although these inferences would not be
unreasonable, this confounding factor would likely bias our estimates in the
opposite direction: if more a✏uent ponds tend to have desirable amenities,
then individuals should prefer to live in more a✏uent ponds, which is the
opposite of what we find.
We designed the auxiliary experiment to provide a direct test of this hy-
pothesis. Towards the end of the auxiliary survey, after individuals received
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feedback about the cost of living and the relative income, we included a set of
additional questions eliciting beliefs about other attributes of the two cities
under consideration. We picked eight attributes that individuals could ar-
guably perceive to be correlated to the average income in a city: quality of
schools, crime rates, quality of health services, quality of public spaces, qual-
ity of the environment, quality of entertainment, share of college graduates,
and share of supporters of Donald Trump.
One important di↵erence in context is that, whereas subjects in the main
experiment made a high-stakes decision for which they obtained substantial
information, subjects in the auxiliary experiment had no incentives to be
informed about the attributes of these cities. This di↵erence increases the
likelihood of the confounding factor: that is, because these auxiliary subjects
do not actively gather information, it is reasonable for them to use informa-
tion about earnings rank to make inferences about other unobserved city
attributes. Thus, this confounding factor would play a smaller role in the
main experiment than in the auxiliary experiment.
To measure the importance of this potential confounding factor, the third
row of Table 1.5 estimates the experimental model, adding these eight per-
ceptions as additional control variables. If individuals care about relative
income because they learn about the other characteristics, the coe cient
on  ER should be zero after controlling for these additional perceptions.42
On the contrary, the comparison between the second and third rows of Ta-
ble 1.5 rejects the hypothesis of this confounding factor: controlling for the
additional characteristics, if anything, increases the value of  ER. For in-
stance, among non-singles, the experimental estimate for  ER is 2.578 (p-
value=0.011) without these additional controls and 3.048 (p-value=0.004)
with these additional controls. The di↵erence between these two coe cients
is statistically insignificant. The increase in  ER caused by adding the ex-
tra controls is consistent with the previous argument that, if anything, this
confounding factor leads to an underestimation of preferences for relative
income.
42Consistent with the less informed nature of this subject pool, we find that the feedback
about cost of living and earnings rank did a↵ect a few of these additional beliefs. Results
presented in Appendix A.15.
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1.8.2 Favorite Interpretation
In light of this additional evidence, our favorite interpretation for the es-
timated preference for relative income among non-singles is that they care
about relative income per se. That is, they see their neighbors’ incomes as
a negative externality. The literature on relative concerns provides several
potential explanations for these preferences. Individuals may anticipate that
their consumption aspirations will increase with the consumption of their
neighbors (e.g., Frank 1985). Individuals could get a boost in happiness
from observing that they are doing better than their neighbors (e.g., Boskin
and Sheshinski 1978). They may prefer higher relative incomes, which allow
them to obtain non-market goods and services (Cole et al. 1998), such as
being invited on a date or to join a business venture or a club. Indeed, these
preferences would be consistent with evidence that rich individuals get pref-
erential treatment in a variety of social and professional interactions (Doob
and Gross 1968, Fennis 2008, Nelissen and Meijers 2011) and evidence that
individuals overspend on highly visible goods to appear rich to their peers
(He↵etz 2011, Bursztyn et al. 2017).
If the preferences for relative income reflect positional externalities, as in
Luttmer (2005), it is then useful to compare the magnitude of our coe cients
to those from Luttmer (2005).43 The key specification from Luttmer (2005),
which is estimated on the sample of non-single individuals, implies that most
of the utility from consumption derives from relative consumption rather
than absolute consumption: non-single individuals are willing to give up 1%
of absolute consumption to decrease the median consumption of neighbors
by 0.22%.44 According to our baseline estimates from column (1) of Table
1.4, non-single individuals are willing to give up 1% of their absolute con-
sumption to decrease the median consumption of their peers by 0.91% (90%
confidence interval: [−0.18%, 2.05%]).45 Compared to Luttmer (2005), our
baseline estimates suggest a weaker role for relative concerns; however, this
di↵erence is not statistically significant. Compared to Luttmer (2005), the
43We focus on Luttmer (2005) because it uses data for the United States and is then
the most comparable sample. The results are similar when we compare our estimates to
estimates from other papers using subjective data (reported in Appendix A.3.12).
44Appendix A.3.12 provides the details for this calculation.
45For the average individual in the sample, we would need to decrease the median
earnings in the area by 0.88% to allow the individual to climb up 0.519 (= 1/1.928)
percentage points in the earnings rank.
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results from our auxiliary experiment also suggest a weaker role of relative
concerns, with a statistically significant di↵erence: our auxiliary estimates
suggest that subjects are willing to give up 1% of absolute consumption to
decrease the median consumption of their peers by 2.79% (90% confidence in-
terval: [1.13%, 4.52%]).46 Assuming that the estimates from Luttmer (2005)
reflect real externalities, they suggest that individuals anticipate, at least
partially, the negative externalities from richer neighbors.47
Last, our favorite interpretation for the heterogeneity in preferences for
relative income by relationship status is due to dating prospects: being single
increases the attractiveness of more a✏uent ponds, because rich peers make
more desirable partners (Fisman el al. 2006). This results is also consistent
with Gautier et al. (2010), who show that singles are willing to pay higher
housing prices to benefit from a denser dating market in cities. Consistent
with our findings for non-singles, they find that after getting married, the
dating market benefits no longer matter for them, and couples move out of
the city.
1.9 Conclusions
We present results from a survey of 1,100 medical students who participated
in the National Resident Matching Program. These data provide unique
revealed-preference evidence that, when choosing where to live, individuals
care about their relative income. Furthermore, we find that individuals can
di↵er substantially in their preferences for relative income: non-single indi-
viduals want to live in less a✏uent ponds, whereas single individuals prefer
to live in more a✏uent ponds. Moreover, we present evidence that these
46Of course, part of the di↵erence may be due to di↵erences in the subject pools: i.e.,
senior medical students having weaker preferences for relative concerns than the average
U.S. resident. Also, any di↵erences in the trade-o↵s measures with happiness and choice
data would not imply that one of the two results are wrong: e.g., it is possible that the
happiness estimates reflect the true extent to which people care about relative concerns,
but when deciding where to live, individuals under-estimate how much their well-being
will depend on relative consumption.
47For a more direct comparison between happiness and choice data, we can also exploit
the survey responses on expected happiness. We find that the marginal rates of substi-
tution inferred by happiness are statistically indistinguishable from the marginal rates of
substitution inferred by choice; however, we cannot rule out large discrepancies due the
lack of precision (see Appendix Table A.13).
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preferences arise because individuals care about relative income per se.
A first avenue for future research is to find other contexts in which this
revealed-preference method could be used to estimate preferences for relative
income. For instance, although the settings may not be as clear as they
are for the medical residency, multiple job markets require job seekers to
choose between o↵ers in di↵erent cities. Using a broader subject pool will
help generalize the findings from this study and provide more data to study
heterogeneity in preferences.
Future research also should investigate the mechanisms underlying indi-
viduals’ concerns about relative income. For instance, there is little evidence
as to whether relative concerns respond to instrumental motives (e.g., dating
prospects) and non-instrumental motives (e.g., envy).48 Similarly, there is
little evidence on whether individuals care about their own perceptions of
relative income (i.e., self image) or about how they are perceived by others
(i.e., social image).49 These additional hypotheses can be explored by using
the same empirical framework proposed in this paper, but with additional
treatment arms designed to test specific mechanisms.
48For instance, Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson (2017) show suggestive evidence that, in
the context of an online work platform, concerns for relative wages operate though the
instrumental channel.
49One exception is Bursztyn et al. (2017) which shows suggestive evidence that, in the
context of demand for premium credit cards, at least some of the conspicuous consumption
operates through the self-image channel.
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1.10 Figures and Tables





























06 Jan 17 15 Jan 17 22 Feb 17 12 Mar 1701 Feb 17
Submissions Follow−up Baseline
Notes: Distribution of timing of responses to Baseline and Follow-up Surveys,
and NRMP rank submission dates (as reported by respondents in the follow-
up survey).
Figure 1.2: Geographic Distribution of Choice Set
Notes: Geographical distribution of metropolitan areas where top-2 residency programs
of respondents are located, for the continental United States. No responses were located
in Hawaii, while Alaska only has 2 responses. Only metropolitan areas with a residency
program participating in the 2017 NRMP are displayed (279 in total).
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      β = −0.664 (0.040)
      R
2
 = 0.224           
      N=1,099     
 
Notes: The gray dots correspond to the raw scatterplot, and the darker dots correspond
to the binned-scatterplot based on 20 bins. Slopes ( , with robust standard errors in
parentheses) and R2 are based on a linear regression. All variables for x-axis and y-axis
correspond to pairwise di↵erences across the two cities that the subject is considering
submitting to the algorithm. Data from survey responses, the Regional Price Parity Index
(for cost of living) and the American Community Survey (for earnings rank).
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Figure 1.4: Comparison Between Prior Beliefs and Statistics
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          β = 0.584 (0.073)
          R
2
 = 0.029           
          N = 2,160            
 
Notes: Comparison between respondent’s perceptions before the information provision
(i.e., prior beliefs) and statistics. The gray dots correspond to the raw scatterplot, and
the darker dots correspond to the binned-scatterplot based on 20 bins. Panels a and b
present data in levels (i.e., two observations per individual, one for each of their options).
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Figure 1.6: E↵ect of Earning Rank Feedback on Posterior Belief on Cost of
Living (and vice-versa)
a. E↵ect of ER-feedback b. E↵ect of ER-feedback
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          α = −0.011 (0.011)
          N=1,956               
 
c. E↵ect of COL-feedback d. E↵ect of COL-feedback
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          α = −0.082 (0.028)
          N=1,956               
 
Notes: Comparison between the di↵erence in statistics and respondent’s perceptions before
the information provision (i.e., prior beliefs), and di↵erence in respondent’s perceptions
after the information provision (i.e., posterior beliefs) and prior beliefs. The gray dots
correspond to the raw scatterplot, and the darker dots correspond to the binned-scatterplot
based on 20 bins. Panels shows the extent to which respondents adjust their perceptions on
earnings rank (cost of living) as a result in their perception gap in cost of living (earnings
rank) adjusted for the perceptions gap in ER (COL). The slope (↵, with robust standard
errors in parentheses) is based on a linear regression.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Balance
RPP RPP COLI COLI F-test
All ACS CPS ACS CPS P-value
Male (=1) 0.481 0.452 0.491 0.481 0.502 0.688
(0.015) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Age 27.091 27.092 27.104 26.985 27.181 0.863
(0.083) (0.164) (0.165) (0.145) (0.187)
Nr Kids 0.132 0.125 0.164 0.104 0.137 0.553
(0.014) (0.027) (0.033) (0.026) (0.029)
Single (=1) 0.354 0.401 0.312 0.343 0.358 0.189
(0.015) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Dual Match (=1) 0.074 0.077 0.059 0.104 0.055 0.157
(0.008) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014)
US News Rank 58.81 58.849 59.104 58.604 58.683 0.996
(0.787) (1.612) (1.560) (1.568) (1.565)
Prior: COLi1,2 0.409 0.445 -0.238 -0.567 1.982 0.506
(0.640) (1.364) (1.134) (1.308) (1.303)
Prior: ERi1,2 0.394 0.162 0.71 -0.526 1.221 0.595
(0.467) (0.903) (0.925) (0.906) (0.999)
Observations 1,080 272 269 268 271
Notes: Individual characteristics obtained from baseline survey. Column (1) corresponds to all respon-
dents, and columns (2) through (4) correspond to each of the four treatment groups given by all the
possible combinations from the source-randomization experiment. RPP and COLI are the two sources
used to compute the cost of living feedback (corresponding to the Regional Price Parity Index and the
Cost of Living Index, respectively). ACS and CPS are the two sources used to compute the earnings
ranking feedback (corresponding to the American Community Survey and the Current Population Survey,
respectively). The final column presents p-value for test of the null hypothesis that the mean characteristic
is equal across all four treatment groups. All variables constructed from the survey data, except for the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Preference for Relative Income: Experimental Estimates
Panel A:  ER Panel B:  COL
Non-Single Single All Non-Single Single All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 2.380⇤⇤⇤ -1.656⇤ 1.141⇤⇤ -1.234⇤ -1.379⇤ -1.262⇤⇤
(0.702) (0.991) (0.577) (0.743) (0.772) (0.531)
Experimental 2.977⇤⇤ -4.964⇤⇤ 0.867 0.353 1.663 0.662
(1.331) (1.974) (1.151) (1.160) (1.286) (0.881)
Experimental, 1.993⇤ -5.285⇤⇤⇤ -0.029 1.662⇤ 0.251 1.012
Long Term (1.188) (1.984) (1.071) (1.005) (1.359) (0.821)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Raw Probit (or IV-Probit) coe cients restricting sample to respondents who
completed the follow-up survey. All regressions include the baseline controls listed in
section 1.3. The independent variables are the posterior beliefs about cost of living and
earnings rank, from the baseline specification. The first row corresponds to the baseline
Probit specification. The second through third row correspond to IV-Probit regressions,
using the variation in perceptions generated by the source-randomization experiment as
instrumental variables. The first and second rows use the expected rank order submission
(from the baseline survey) as dependent variable. The third row uses the final rank order
submission (from the follow-up survey) as dependent variable. All results based on the
sample of individuals who completed the follow-up survey (978 responses, 647 from non-
singles and 311 from singles).
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Table 1.5: Results from Auxiliary Experiment: Preference for Relative
Income
Panel A:  ER Panel B:  COL
Non-Single Single All Non-Single Single All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 1.408*** 1.095** 1.293*** -2.203*** -1.618*** -1.962***
(0.376) (0.478) (0.292) (0.463) (0.566) (0.364)
Experimental 2.578** 0.664 1.706** -2.385*** -2.956*** -2.528***
(1.019) (1.272) (0.816) (0.666) (0.917) (0.531)
Experimental, 3.048*** 0.452 1.902** -2.329*** -3.753*** -2.688***
+ Controls (1.064) (1.430) (0.872) (0.691) (0.906) (0.563)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include
the baseline controls listed in section 1.3 with the exception of program characteristics. The
independent variables are the posterior beliefs about cost of living and earnings rank, from
the baseline specification. The first row corresponds to the baseline Probit specification.
The second through third row correspond to IV-Probit regressions, using the variation in
perceptions generated by the source-randomization experiment as instrumental variables.
The third row includes additional controls for di↵erences in city perceptions: quality of
schools, crime rates, quality of health, quality of public spaces, quality of the environment,
quality of entertainment, quality of colleges, fraction voting Trump in presidential election.
All results based on the sample of respondents in the United States on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (1,245 responses, 829 from non-singles and 416 from singles).
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CHAPTER 2
BIG FISH IN A SMALL POOL? THE




How do people respond when having to face harder competition? Do they rise
up to the occasion and exert more e↵ort? Do they get discouraged and drop
out? This type of situation is prevalent in various contexts. Within firms, a
worker can be promoted and has to compete against more experienced peers
over a bonus or promotion. In education, the best student from a small high
school that gets admitted to a top university becomes surrounded by high
performing peers and wants to say on top of the grade curve. Or a student
is the youngest of her cohort when starting elementary school. Even though
such situations are widespread, we do not have a good understanding about
the e↵ects of competition on performance and dropout.
Identifying these e↵ects outside of the laboratory is hard. For example,
individuals may self select into higher or lower competition environments
(e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). At the same time, it is hard to find
a context that allows to distinguish between the e↵ects of competition and
potential direct peer e↵ects since they usually go hand-in-hand. For example,
in the context of education, a student at top school not only has to compete
against high performing peers, but also can benefit from interacting directly
with them. A more general problem in the context of education is the dif-
ficulty of measuring di↵erential responses in the ability distribution because
ex-ante measures are rarely available or noisy.
In this paper, we take advantage of a natural experiment to study how
competing against better peers a↵ects performance and dropout. We study
individual’s decisions to participate and their e↵ort from club level swimming
competitions in the United States. In order to identify the causal e↵ect of
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competition, we take advantage of how age-group swimming competitions
are designed. When aging up into a new category, swimmers must compete
in the next age category, regardless of their ability and the timing within the
season. There are large di↵erences in the quality of competition before and
after aging up.
Using data from the universe of swimming competition times (collected
by USA Swimming, the governing body of competitive swimming in the
United States), we are able to follow individual swimmers over time and
know their exact date of birth. With this data we construct measures of when
a swimmer drops out of competing. We first test whether the likelihood of
dropping out increases at ages when swimmers have to compete against faster
peers. Then, we focus on a sample of swimmers whom we observe competing
within a window of days both before and after a birthday when they would
change age group. We evaluate the immediate e↵ect of changing age group
on performance using a regression discontinuity design, where we include
swimmer fixed e↵ects to control for their ability.1 We focus on a sample of
swimmers ages 10 to 15, the prime ages of club swimming and when the
shock of changing age category is the largest. For example, a swimmer who
is 12 years old competes in the 1-12 age category. As soon as she turns 13,
she must compete in the 13-14 category (or 13 and over).
This context has a number of important features that makes it possible
to address the shortcomings of studying the e↵ects of competition outside of
the laboratory. First, there is a large discrete change in competition when
changing age group that can only be avoided through not competing (drop-
ping out). Swimmers are not able to sort into a easier or harder category
as a result. Additionally, swimming events are standard and we can com-
pare performance within swimmer and event. Second, there are largely small
di↵erences in what can be though of as the e↵ect of direct interactions with
peers, which allow for cleaner identification of the e↵ects of competition. This
is by design, thanks to the way meets are arranged: the quality of swimmers
in directly adjacent lanes are typically of similar ability. Third, because we
can observe a swimmer’s times history and count with a large sample size,
we construct high quality measures of ex-ante ability to study heterogeneous
responses to competition by ability.
1When using time as the running variable in a regression discontinuity design, it is
equivalent to an event study.
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In a first stage, we document that indeed there is a very large change in
the quality of competition after aging up: on average the peers are between
10-12% faster (more than a standard deviation). The e↵ects are largest at
age 11 and 13 cuto↵s, and notably smaller at age 15. This is due to the way
races are organized: where at the age of 15 the di↵erence in competition is not
big because swimmers had already been competing against older swimmers
(meets typically combine 13-14 with 15 and older swimmers).
Next, we examine the e↵ects of competing against better peers on perfor-
mance, measured by their recorded times at swim meets. To avoid poten-
tial biases induced by selection or sorting by: (i) restricting the sample to
swimmer-events who are observed competing in the same events both before
and after their birthday, (ii) drop swimmers that recently started to com-
pete or that only compete sporadically, (iii) we control for number of events
swum, total distance, days since last competition – factors that could poten-
tially change di↵erentially when changing age group that if left unaccounted
for could bias estimates, and (iv) we include swimmer-event fixed e↵ects
in order to exploit the variation within a particular event for a swimmer.2
Because of these restrictions, we consider our estimates as potential lower
bounds to the e↵ects of competition on performance.
We find that, on average, swimmers get discouraged when changing age
category. On average, they swim around 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points slower
(about 4% of a standard deviation). Consistent with these e↵ects being
driven by competing against better peers, we do not find significant e↵ects
when turning 15 – age at which the change in competition is small. We find
similar discouragement e↵ects at the age 11 and 13 cuto↵s. Additionally, our
estimates suggest that the discouragement is persistent within the 2 month
window we observe. These results suggest that the discouragement e↵ects of
competition are sizable in the long-run through higher dropouts, and short-
run through worse performance.
Furthermore, the discouragement e↵ects on performance are heterogeneous
across the ability distribution. Worse swimmers are not significantly a↵ected
by age category changes, while middle and high ability swimmers are simi-
larly discouraged by changing age category. Furthermore, we find that the
2An event refers to the combination of stroke, distance, gender and course type (e.g.
100 freestyle mens, short course yards). Details on the context of swimming competitions
in the US are available in section 2.2.
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discouragement e↵ects are similar for boys and girls, which is consistent
with evidence from laboratory experiments showing that men and women
respond similarly to competition when competing against individuals of the
same-gender (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007).
One concern is that our results might be driven by other unobserved fac-
tors related to a birthday rather than by changes in competition. In order
to address this concern, we replicate our analysis using non category change
birthday cuto↵s (e.g. 10, 12 and 14). We do not find any significant e↵ects,
thus ruling out the possibility that our results are spuriously driven by un-
observable changes in behavior at a birthday. Furthermore, we can rule out
the possibility that results are driven by changes in event composition or
swimmers starting to participate in new events.
We later document that there are large long-term discouragement e↵ects
from competing against better peers. Using the universe of swimmers, we can
identify a swimmer’s last race after which she drops out. Using a Cox Pro-
portional Hazard model, we find that the likelihood of dropping out during
category change ages increases by almost 50%. This suggests that on aver-
age there is a large long-term discouragement e↵ect from competing against
better peers. We also find that this e↵ect is larger during o↵-season months,
which is consistent with the fact that the cost of dropping out is lower during
these times (i.e., less pressure from coaches or parents). Furthermore, we find
that dropout hazard rate during category change years increases exponen-
tially in ability, where the likelihood doubles for the top 5% of swimmers.
Our findings are informative to several literatures. For examples, it relates
to a literature studying the e↵ect of peers in education. For example, there
are a number of studies trying to identify the e↵ects of school starting age
(e.g., Elder and Lubotsky 2009, Lubotsky and Kaestner 2016, Matta et al.
2016). However, one challenge is separating the e↵ects of relative age and
age at testing. In our paper, we study a context in which we can observe a
child when she is both the oldest and youngest of the group. Extrapolating
our findings with caution, our results would suggest that there could be large
discouragement e↵ects when starting school as the youngest in the cohort.
Though this is likely heterogeneous in the ability distribution, where the
highest ability children may benefit the most from being held back a year.
Our paper also informs a discussion on the returns to college. For exam-
ple, Dale and Krueger (2002) compare students who were admitted to several
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universities and finds that the college attended does not significantly a↵ect
future earnings. Our results suggests these estimates may understate the dif-
ference because individuals would strongly sort to avoid stronger competition
in the more prestigious university.
Finally, our paper contributes to a broader literature studying how relative
concerns a↵ects behavior (e.g., Bottan and Perez-Truglia 2017, Kuziemko
et al. 2014, He↵etz and Frank 2011). In particular, that examines how
preferences for relative rank a↵ect individual’s performance and dropout. For
instance, there are a number of laboratory experiments showing that people
exert more e↵ort, are more likely to engage in gift-exchange and willing
to take gambles because the have preferences for “first place loving” and
“last place aversion” (Kuziemko et al. 2014, Gill et al. 2018). Another
set of studies test how providing information on rank a↵ects performance in
controlled workplace environments (Barankay 2012, Rosaz et al. 2016). We
contribute to this literature by studying the e↵ects of competition in a real
world setting with relatively high stakes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we provide a dis-
cussion on the institutional details and characteristics of age-group swimming
in the United States, along with describing the data on swimming competi-
tion times. In Section 3.4.1, we detail the identification strategy and sample
construction. We then discuss results in Section 3.4.2. Section 2.5 documents
the e↵ects of changing age category on dropping out from swimming.
2.2 Background: Swimming in the U.S.
2.2.1 Institutional
Swimming competitions in the United States are governed by USA Swim-
ming. The organization counts with a membership of over 400,000 swimmers,
that includes all levels of competitors, ranging from age-group to Olympic
swimmers.3 Besides supervising the overall organization of swimming com-
petitions in the country, USA Swimming is in charge of selecting the Olympic
team, as well as any other teams that represent the country internationally.
3High school team swimming competitions are not part of USA Swimming.
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To compete, a swimmer must join one of the over 2,800 clubs around
the country, where they train under the supervision of coaches. Training
is organized independently by the clubs and is typically arranged by swim-
mer ability. USA Swimming sanctions many di↵erent types of competitions.
The most common events by far are club Invitational Meets, where a host
club invites a number of other clubs to participate. This type of competi-
tion accounts for almost 97% of all swim times registered with USA Swim-
ming. Most Invitationals do not have entry time standards, allowing all club
members to participate.4 By participating in meets or past championships,
swimmers register o cial times that may allow them to qualify for future
championship competitions (e.g. regional, state or national). To qualify for
these higher level competitions, a swimmer’s o cial time must meet certain
time standards that vary with gender, age group and event.
At most meets, swimmers participate in multiple events. Events are de-
fined by the combination of distance, style, gender and course type (e.g. 100
Breaststroke, male, 11-12, Long Course Meters). There are two broadly de-
fined seasons where di↵erent courses are used. During the winter, almost all
competitions take place indoors in pools with lengths that follow the Short
Course Yards standard (a 25 yard length). During the summer, swimming
outdoors is feasible and most competitions are over the conventional Olympic
length of 50 meters (Long Course Meters). Even though the pool lengths are
standardized, the width (and therefore number of lanes) varies depending
on the venue. Most invitational meets are three-day events that take place
Friday through Sunday.
2.2.2 Age-group swimming
Before competing in a meet, coaches submit their team’s registration that
contain swimmer’s seed times several weeks in advance (the timing varies
depending on the meet and when coaches enter the data). A seed times is
a time designed to approximate how quickly a swimmer will swim in a race
for comparable ranking purposes. For age group swimming, this typically
reflects a swimmer’s best time in an event. At transitions between short and
long courses, coaches typically use established time conversions that predict
4Some invitationals do restrict participation in long distance events when the meet is
large due to time constraints.
57
time. Along with the seed time, coaches submit the swimmer’s age measured
at the first day of the meet. Since a swimmer’s date of birth is part of their
USA Swimming id number, coaches can not misreport ages. Races at the
meet are organized by event (e.g. 100 Freestyle, boys) and age group, for
which there are multiple heats (depending on the number of swimmers and
number of lanes in the pool).
The way age group swimming is organized provides crucial variation for
identifying the e↵ects of changing the quality of competition. It is important
to make the distinction between how races are scored and how heats are
organized, since they typically do not follow the same age cuto↵s.5 Swimmers
are o cially scored following the standard age group cut o↵s (i.e., 10 and
under, 11-12, 13-14, 15-16). The top swimmers in each age group/event are
usually awarded ribbons (or medals), though there is significant variation in
the position cuto↵ used for giving awards.
Even though swimmers are scored by the standard age groups at invita-
tional meets, the races are not typically swum using these cuto↵s. Instead,
several age groups are combined. Unfortunately, the race age structure used
in each meet is not recorded in our data, and manually coding each meet
in our data would be too burdensome. Instead, we selected a random sam-
ple of Local Swimming Committees and manually inspected the information
sheets for all non-championship meets from the 2015-2016 season. In total,
we coded 224 meets for 5 Committees, taking note of the age grouping used
in each to form the heats. These are presented in Table 2.1. Around 70% of
meets group the 11-12 year olds, following the standard cuto↵s for that age
group. Interestingly, this is not true for the 13-14 group, where only 36% of
meets are grouped this way. Instead, most meets group this age group with
older swimmers forming 13 and older heats (almost 45%). Thus, the vast
majority of meets (81%) follow the age 13 cuto↵ but not necessarily apply
an additional cuto↵ later on. In fact, only 32% of meets use the age 15 cuto↵.
This structure has important implications for our research design. First
of all, when a swimmer turns 11 or 13 they immediately face stronger com-
petition from the older swimmers who have more experience and physical
advantages over them. Furthermore, at the age of 13 they get exposed not
only to 13-14 year-olds, but also older swimmers. This means that by the
5This is true for the majority of meets that are invitationals. Championship meets
follow the standard age groups.
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time they turn 15, the “shock” of changing age group is relatively small be-
cause almost all swimmers have already been competing against these older
swimmers due to how heats are arranged. These age cuto↵s provide the
exogenous shock to the composition of a swimmer’s competition.
2.2.3 At the meet
Exploiting exogenous variation in the composition of competition is not un-
familiar in education research. Many papers exploit di↵erent sources of plau-
sibly exogenous variation of class composition to examine its e↵ects on test
scores (see Sacerdote (2011) for a survey). However, one shortfall of this
research design is that a change in class composition likely influences the
formation of direct peer networks, which, in turn, would a↵ect the estimated
e↵ect of class composition. We overcome this problem in our setting by ex-
ploiting how races are organized. In swimming we can define two types of
direct interactions with peers. First, we can have the e↵ect of coaches and
swimmers training under a particular coach. Interviews with coaches suggest
that changing coaches is not related to aging up, but rather are related to a
swimmer’s performance (i.e. they track swimmers within the club based on
their ability). We test this directly and find that the probability of changing
coach is not significantly a↵ected when aging up.
The second source of direct interaction with peers are swimmers who are
assigned in lanes directly adjacent to their own lane. Given how lanes are as-
signed within heats, the competitors that are directly observed by a swimmer
are unlikely to change significantly. Lane assignments are based on the rank-
ing of the seed times that were submitted well in advance by coaches. Lanes
are assigned from the center moving outwards. For example, the typical pool
has 8 lanes, so lane 4 is assigned to the number 1 seed, lane 5 to number 2,
then lanes 3, 6, 2, 7, 1, 8. For the next heat, lane assignment works in the
same way starting with the 9th seeded swimmer. It is important to mention
that pools vary in the number of lanes available and in their use. Sometimes,
outer lanes are not used for competition and are either left unused or are
used for warm-ups. We do not have any information on the number of lanes
in a pool, swimmer lane assignments or seed times in our data.
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2.2.4 Time measurement
Almost all times are measured electronically using pressure pads at the ends
of the pool that activate when touched by the swimmer. At the same time,
there are timekeepers as a backup in case of a faulty read or touch. All times
are collected and submitted digitally to USA Swimming to be processed
and included in the SWIMS time database. USA swimming maintains and
constantly updates the times database. These are publicly available through
their website, where one can search by swimmer name and view all their
recorded times (e.g., it is possible to view the race times for Michael (Fred)
Phelps). Even though a lot of detailed information is collected at the Meet
(e.g. lane assignments, heat number, seed time, prelim or final), most of this
information is lost when processed for the SWIMS database.
2.2.5 SWIMS Data
We have access to the SWIMS times database, containing all registered swim
times from competitions until June 2015 (over 80 million times). Even though
the data was anonymized, one can follow swimmers over time by their unique
ids. For each swimmer we have information on their gender, date of birth
and the club. In addition, for each swim time we know the swim date, Meet
(and meet type), Event (e.g. 100 Freestyle, Men, Long Course Meters), Time
(measured with a precision of a hundredth of a second), and Standard.
Swimmers start competing at a young age: 55% start at the age of 10 or
younger, and 42% of swimmers are boys. Most times (72%) are recorded
between the ages of 10 and 15, and swimmers compete the most when they
are 12 years old. On average, swimmers compete in 10 meets a year, although
there is significant heterogeneity: the 25th and 75th percentiles are 6 and 14
meets a year, and about 7% compete twice or less in a year. On average,
swimmers record 5 times at a meet. One drawback in the administrative
data is that we do not have information on disqualified swimmers (e.g. for
an early start), nor do we know whether a time corresponds to a prelim or
final time for meets that follow this structure.6
6Meets can be arranged into timed final, where each event is raced once, or prelim/final,
where first swimmers participate in prelims and then a sub group qualifies to the finals. The
administrative data does not distinguish whether a time belongs to a prelim or final time,
nor do it note if a meet follows timed final or prelim/final (or a combination depending
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The dropout rates in swimming are very high. We do not have the exact
information of when they dropped out but infer it from the data. About 44%
of swimmers who start between the ages of 6 to 10 dropout within the year,
and about 60% stop competing within 2 years.
2.3 Identification Strategy
To identify the causal e↵ect of competing against better peers on perfor-
mance, we exploit the discontinuous changes in age group when a swimmer
ages up as our source of exogenous variation in competition faced. Because
we observe the universe of swim times, we can focus on a sample of swimmers
who compete in a window around a threshold defined by their 11th or 13th
birthday, after which they start to compete in the next age group. Taking
advantage of this setting, we employ a regression discontinuity design where
the running variable is the day in relation to their birthday.
Formally, for a given outcome Yi,e,t (e.g., the logarithm of race time), for
individual i competing in event e on day t (in relation to their birthday,
where t = 0) a naive RD estimator would be:
Yi,e,t =  1(t   0) + f(t) + 1(t   0) ⇤ f(t) +  + "i,e,t (2.1)
where f(t) is a function of the running variable that is free to di↵er on either
side of the discontinuity.   estimates the local average treatment e↵ect of
changing age group. We would include event-specific fixed e↵ects ( ) to
account for di↵erent levels of time in di↵erent events. The error term, "i,e,t is
assumed to be uncorrelated with the variables of interest, and in this naive
example, would have to be assumed independent (which we know is not true
given that we have a panel data of swimmers). The naive RD estimator
would have many problems: (1) it ignores the panel structure of the data
and assumes that observations are independent; (2) the estimate of   would
likely be biased given that swimmers may act “strategically” around the
threshold (e.g. stop swimming right after they age up); (3) assumes that the
evolution of times are the same across di↵erent events which is implausible;
(4) does not account for other potential changes that may happen as a result
on the event).
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of moving into a more competitive category (e.g., swim less).
To address the potential problems above we focus on a sample of swimmers
who compete throughout the window around their birthday, and apply a
number of restriction to minimize potential sample selection biases (described
in detail in the next section). We then estimate the following equation:
Yi,e,t =  1(t   0) + fe(t) + 1(t   0) ⇤ fe(t) +Xi,t + ⌘i,e + "i,e,t (2.2)
where we include swimmer-event level fixed e↵ects (⌘i,e) to account for the
fact that ability varies across swimmers and by event. For example, a swim-
mer might be better in breaststroke than backstroke, or in a longer distance
than shorter ones. This allows fully exploit the panel structure of the data
and address individual-event level selection. Furthermore, the function of
the running variable is allowed to di↵er not only on either side of the dis-
continuity, but also to vary by event (fe(t)). To account for other potential
changes that may a↵ect swimmer performance, we also include a vector of
swimmer-meet characteristics (Xi,t) that includes the number of heats and
distance swam during the day, and the number of days since the last race.
Standard errors are always clustered at the swimmer level.
It is important to note that we do not observe heat assignments. Recall
that most invitational meets do not arrange heats according to the standard
age groups, but rather use these groups for scoring the races. In general,
di↵erent age groups are combined following: 10 and under, 11 - 12, 13 and
over.7 Therefore, we focus on the 11 and 13 birthdays since these are the
most commonly used cuto↵s for assigning swimmers to heats. Exploring the
15th birthday cuto↵ may provide additional insight for understanding the
mechanism since at that point the change is not heat assignment, but rather
time scoring (i.e. performance in age group versus performance in heat).
2.3.1 Sample construction
To estimate the model described above, we first define a 62 day window
around a swimmer’s birthday (11th, 13th or 15th). The approximately 2
7Recall that the “standard” age groups are: 10 and under, 11-12, 13-14, 15-16, 17 and
over. The time standards are based o↵ these groups as are qualifiers to championships.
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month window around the birthday was chosen in order to guarantee that
we capture enough swimmer-event times on either side of the threshold since
meets take place on weekends and do not occur every weekend. We show that
results are similar regardless of the size of the window used. Next, we impose
the condition that there must be at least one swimmer-event observation on
each side of the threshold (i.e. we observe the swimmer in a particular
event both before and after their birthday, when they compete in the next
age group). This is necessary to minimize any selection biases that could
be induced by changes in the composition of swimmers or changes in the
composition of events. For example, if the worst swimmers stop competing
right after aging up in order to avoid facing a stronger competition, then
even if the true e↵ect were zero, the change in composition could bias our
estimated coe cient downward. We address this by guaranteeing that the
same swimmer-events are observed both before and after a swimmer ages up
and include a swimmer-event fixed e↵ects in regressions.
A second restriction imposed on our sample of swimmers is that they are
“consistent” (or competitive) swimmers. By “consistent” we mean that they
compete regularly and have been competing for at least one year.8 It is
important to remove non-competitive swimmers since they are likely to be
una↵ected by changes in competition. Indeed, we find evidence in favor of
this, where these groups are not a↵ected by the change in age group. By
applying these sample restrictions we are not including swimmers who may
have dropped out (either permanently or temporarily). To the extent that
this sub-sample is anticipating potential negative e↵ects of being discouraged
by facing stronger competition, our results represent lower bounds on the
discouragement e↵ects of aging up.
In Table B.1 we present descriptive statistics for our di↵erent samples,
including our final sample in columns 4 and 8 for the age 11 and 13 thresh-
olds. By applying di↵erent restrictions the sample changes in the expected
direction: remaining swimmers competed in more meets, swim more often,
began swimming at a younger age, are better swimmers (i.e., by time in 100
Freestyle). However, notice that the average club quality does not change
significantly (measure by the club’s average Hi-Tek score). When looking
at the average swim time across events, it is necessary to be careful when
8Precisely, we drop any swimmers who are competing for the first time in 5 months, or
who have participated in less than 10 meets during their entire career.
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comparing across columns since the composition of events may change (less
experienced swimmers tend to compete in shorter distance events). If we
compare within a single event, it is clear that the quality of swimmers in the
sample is improving. Summary statistics for each event are available in the
appendix. We drop events that are not swam consistently over time (mostly
very long distance races such as the 1650 yard races).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Quantifying the change in competition after aging up
First we document the extent to which the quality of competition changes
when changing age category. Given that we do not have information on the
actual heat age group assignment in our data, we exploit the information
in Table 2.1 to construct an upper bound measure of the average race time
for the competition.9 We measure the quality of competition as the average
swim time in a given event and age group.
The local average treatment e↵ect estimates for changing age group on
the logarithm of average competition time is presented in Table 2.2. In each
column we present estimates for model 2.2 using alternative functional forms
of time, as well as including swimmer-meet controls or not. On average,
the quality of competition improves substantially when aging up. For ex-
ample, when moving into the 11-12 age category, the competition is around
13 percentage points (s.e. 0001) faster on average. These large di↵erences
can be mostly attributed to the fact that older swimmers within the new
age group not only are more experienced, but hold a significant physical ad-
vantage given that these are the ages of fastest physical development. At
the age 13 cuto↵, the e↵ect is slightly smaller with the competition being 10
percentage points faster (s.e. 0.001), and at age 15 the e↵ect is less than half
in magnitude. It is important to keep in mind that these estimates should
be interpreted as upper bounds for the e↵ect of changing age category; es-
pecially when thinking about age 15 where the actual e↵ect is likely closer
9Specifically, for the 11 cuto↵ we group 10 and under when swimmers are 10 and 11-12
for when they age up. For the age 13 cuto↵, when a swimmer is 12 we calculate the 11-12
average, and when 13 the 13 and over. Finally, for the age 15 cuto↵, when a swimmer is
14 we calculate the 13-14 average, whereas when 15 the 15-16 average.
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to zero since swimmers are mostly already exposed those older ages when
turning 13.
The changes in average competition represent a shift in the distribution
rather than only at the tails. We repeat the same analysis but examining
e↵ects on di↵erent moments of the distribution (e.g., 95th and 5th percentile).
The magnitude of the e↵ects are similar to the average e↵ect. To the extent
that swimmers compare themselves to other similar swimmers, the change in
competition seems to be similar across the distribution of ability of swimmers.
2.4.2 Main Results
To identify the e↵ects of increasing the quality of competition on a swim-
mer’s performance, we first estimate the reduced form e↵ect of changing age
category on the logarithm of a swimmer’s time in Table 2.3, where each panel
corresponds to a di↵erent age cuto↵. For both 11th and 13th birthdays (pan-
els A and B) we find that a swimmer’s own time increases immediately after
changing category. This discouragement e↵ect is highly statistically signifi-
cant. The estimates imply that swimmers are 0.45 percentage points slower
(s.e. 0.0003) when turning 11, and slightly smaller (0.37 percentage points,
s.e. 0.0003) when turning 13. This is in line with previous results that re-
vealed the largest change in the quality of competition occurred when turning
11. On average, the increase in a swimmer’s time as a result of changing age
category is equivalent to 3.73% of a standard deviation increase in time.
At the age 15 cuto↵ in Panel C, we find either no significant results or
very small increases in time that are less than one fifth the magnitude as
those found at age 11 (0.04 percentage points; s.e. 0.0002). This is con-
sistent with changes in quality of competition driving our estimates since
we first documented that the age 15 cuto↵ is not a significant shock given
that swimmers already face swimmers of that age when turning 13. Addi-
tionally, in the previous section we found that the upper bound estimate
for the change in competition is around one third of the magnitude as for
age 11. Taken together, this suggests that indeed the discouragement e↵ects
we find seem to be driven by changes in the quality of competition rather
than other potential factors related to a swimmers birthday or changing age
category (e.g. swimming in longer events) – these issues are addressed in
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the Robustness section below. Note that the estimated coe cients are quite
similar across specifications, and do not change substantially when including
swimmer-meet controls or by definition for the functional form of time.
An alternative way of evaluating the e↵ect of competition on performance
is by directly examining the relation between average competition and per-
formance. However, examining the relationship is troublesome since the re-
lationship can be spurious. For example, better swimmers compete in better
meets. In order to overcome this identification challenge, we take advantage
of the variation created by changes in age category and use it as an instru-
ment for the average quality of the competition. This way, assuming that all
the e↵ect of changing category operates through the quality of competition,
we can directly quantify the e↵ect of changing competition on performance.
We present results in Table 2.4, where the dependent variable is the loga-
rithm of a swimmer’s time and the endogenous variable is the logarithm of
the average competition time. Consistent with our reduced form findings, for
all age category changes we find that swimmers get discouraged from improv-
ing competition. For example, if the average time of the competition were to
improve by 1 percentage point, a swimmer performs almost 0.04 percentage
points worse (s.e. 0.003) in column 4 (i.e., a behavioral elasticity of 0.04).
The e↵ects are slightly larger at age 13 than 11, and significantly smaller at
age 15.
Givern our initial findings, it is useful to contrast the magnitude of these
average e↵ects with those from other studies. For example, in the context of
peer quality in education, our results align with lower bound estimates from
the literature as in Arcidiacono et al. (2012) (Burke and Sass 2013) who
find that a one standard deviation in peer quality increases maths scores
by 3% (4%) of a standard deviation. Similarly, Cornelissen et al. (2017)
find that a one standard deviation increase in peer ability in the workplace
increases wages by 0.3 percentage points on average. Our instrumental vari-
able estimates suggest e↵ects of a similar magnitude on average: making the
average competition one standard deviation faster (0.0875 at age 13) worsens
a swimmer’s performance by 0.338 percentage points.
66
2.4.3 Heterogeneity by Ability
In this section we take advantage of the fact that we can obtain measures
of individual’s ex-ante ability in order to examine heterogeneity by ability in
the e↵ects of competition on performance. We do so by first calculating the
within-age and cohort percentile rank for all times in the dataset. We then
calculate the average percentile for each swimmer during the year prior to
changing age category.10
In order to test heterogeneity by ability, we classify swimmers by ventile
and interact the treatment dummy by each ability group, as well as allowing
the forcing variable to vary by ability group as well. We plot the coe cients
along with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals in Figure 2.1, for each
category change cuto↵. At the age 11 and 13 cuto↵ we find similar patterns:
at the bottom of the distribution (slowest swimmers) we do not find any
statistically significant e↵ects of aging up. This finding is striking in relation
to the strong evidence found in the laboratory where individuals exhibit
“last place aversion” (Kuziemko et al. 2014, Gill et al. 2018), however, given
the confidence interval of the estimates for the lowest ability swimmers it
is not possible to rule out such behavior. After the 20th or 30th percentile
in the ability distribution, we find that swimmers get discouraged. This
discouragement e↵ect is quite stable and extends to the very top of the
distribution. Consistent with the average findings, we do not find significant
di↵erences by ability for the age 15 cuto↵.
2.4.4 Gender Heterogeneity
There is increasing evidence documenting that women respond to competi-
tion di↵erently than men (see Niederle 2016 for a survey of the literature).
For example, Gneezy et al. (2003) find that women perform worse on av-
erage in competitive environments but the e↵ect is significantly larger when
competing against men. We take advantage of our unique setting to examine
the extent to which there are di↵erential responses by gender to changes in
the quality of competition on performance. Given that there are significant
10Results are similar when classifying swimmer-events instead or using their best per-
centile. Additionally, we find similar results when using alternative measures of ability
based on swimming standards assigned or Hy-Tek score (a standardized measure to com-
pare times between events and ages).
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di↵erences in the magnitude of change in quality of competition between
genders at the di↵erent age cuto↵s, we use the instrumental variables ap-
proach, where we include the logarithm of average competition time and it’s
interaction with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the swimmer is a boy,
and instrument it by the category change indicator and it’s interaction with
boy. By looking at the interaction term we can directly test whether there
are significant di↵erences in the e↵ect of competition for boys compared to
girls.
We present results in Table 2.5. Interestingly, we do not find significant
di↵erences in the e↵ects of competition between boys and girls at age 11 and
13 category changes. Additionally, the coe cient for the interaction is close
to zero and precisely estimated (-0.009 percentage points; s.e. 0.006 at age
11 and 0.003 percentage points; s.e. 0.006 at age 13 ) . These results provide
interesting insight to the existing evidence examining di↵erences in responses
to competition between genders. First, recall that there is a larger propor-
tion of girls participating in swimming competitions than boys (i.e., they are
choosing to participate in a competitive environment). Second, considering
that our sample may already have a stronger preference for competition rela-
tive to the general population, the fact that girls are a↵ected similarly to boys
suggest that the findings in the literature could be driven by heterogeneous
preferences for competition rather than a gender specific trait.
However, at the age 15 cuto↵ we find that only boys are significantly
discouraged from the change in quality of competition ( while girls are not.
There are two potential ways of interpreting this result. First, preferences for
competition for girls change as they become older. Alternatively, this result
may be spurious because at the age of 15 the first stage is relatively small
for girls given that they develop earlier than boys, while at that age for boys
there still can be a significant di↵erence in development. Indeed, examining
di↵erences in the first stage for boys and girls, we find that it is twice as large
for boys at the age of 15 (see Appendix B.2). Even though there is a small
positive and significant e↵ect for girls in average competition at the age 15
cuto↵, recall that this value is an upper bound estimate given how it was
constructed. Since the e↵ect is relatively small it is likely that the true e↵ect
is closer to zero, which would explain why there is a significant di↵erence
between genders at the 15 cuto↵.
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2.4.5 Robustness
In this section we explore the robustness of our results, showing that the
discouragement e↵ects we find when changing age category indeed seem to
be driven by changes in competition rather than other factors.
We first test the robustness of our results to alternative definitions for dif-
ferent window sizes. It is important to note that as the window size changes,
so does the sample of swimmers given that we are imposing the restriction
that we have at least one observation per swimmer-event on each side of
the cuto↵. In the first three columns of Table 2.6 we present estimates for
widening and narrowing the window size. Coe cients remain stable, in the
same range as those estimated in Table 2.3. In Appendix Figure B.3 we plot
the distribution of coe cient for a range of di↵erent window sizes, showing
that results are not driven by the choice of the window size.
One concern when aging up is the possibility that swimmers start to com-
pete in new and longer events. To address this possibility we included a
number of swimmer-meet controls in our baseline regressions to account for
any changes in this dimension. Additionally, in column (4) of Table 2.6,
we drop swimmers who ever compete in long distance races (defined as 800
yards/meters or longer). Coe cients remain similar, suggesting that starting
to swim longer events is not driving our results.
An alternative explanation is that swimmers may change coach as a re-
sult of aging up. Anecdotal evidence suggests that swimmers are typically
tracked by ability rather than age for training. Given that the SWIMS data
includes information on the swimmer’s coach at each meet we can directly
test whether changing coaches drive our e↵ects. For this, we first discard any
swimmer that ever has missing coach information (around 4% of swimmers).
Next, we drop swimmers that at any point within our sample window indi-
cate a di↵erent coach than the first one indicated within the window (around
5% of swimmers). We then estimate model 2.2 on a sample of swimmers who
do not change coach within our sample window. In Table 2.7 we present our
initial estimates (from column (4) in Table 2.3) in odd-numbered columns,
and estimates restricting the sample to swimmers who have the same coach
in even-numbered columns. Point estimates remain remarkably stable, sug-
gesting that changes in coaching is not driving the worse performance after
aging up.
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We are relying on changes of age category as our source of variation for
the change in the quality of competition. One concern is that the e↵ect we
find could be spurious and the product of other events related to a birthday
(e.g. celebrations, changes in diet, excitement, etc.). In order to test this
we perform a placebo test, replicating the analysis above but using non-
category change birthdays (10, 12 and 14). Results are presented in Table
2.8, where in each column we have the di↵erent age cuto↵ and each panel
denotes the corresponding dependent variable. In Panel A, we explore the
e↵ect of placebo birthdays on the quality of competition (measured as the
log of their average time). Given that we count with a very large sample size,
we estimate statistically significant coe cients. However, their magnitude is
small and economically not very significant: their values are smaller than
the usual variation between meets. In Panel B, we estimate the e↵ect of the
placebo on the logarithm of a swimmer’s time and again find estimates close
to zero and not statistically significant. Even though the coe cient for the
age 12 placebo is significant at the 5% level, the magnitude of the coe cient
is very small – less than one fifth of the e↵ects we found. Again, in Panel
C we find no significant e↵ects when using the swimmer’s time in seconds
instead. These results suggest that any other events related to a swimmer’s
birthday are not playing a significant role in explaining the results we find
for changing age category.
Taken together, these results suggest that swimmers are discouraged and
swim slower when competing against better peers. This short term discour-
agement e↵ect does not seem to recover – at least not within a period of
two months after changing category (see Appendix Figure B.2). These ef-
fects are relatively small in magnitude (i.e., consistent with smaller e↵ects
found in the peer e↵ects literature). However, it is important to keep in
mind that these intensive margin e↵ects are capturing the lower bound dis-
couragement e↵ects. This is due to how our sample was constructed in order
to avoid potential sample selection bias, where we only keep those “compet-
itive” swimmers that consistently compete before and after their birthdays.
Therefore, these swimmers may be less sensitive to competition than the
average swimmer.
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2.5 The E↵ect of Changes in Competition on Dropout
Besides having short term e↵ects on performance, changes in competition
may also have longer-term implications for participating in swimming alto-
gether. For instance, a swimmer might get discouraged from not being able
to rank as well as before and quit swimming. The magnitude of this e↵ect
may also depend on the timing of when in the swimming season they age-up,
where the cost of doing so would be lower in the o↵-season. At the same time,
dropout may vary with a swimmer’s ability because they face higher-stake
races.
We use data on the universe of swimmers to test whether the likelihood
of dropping out is significantly di↵erent during ages when swimmers change
age category. Because we do not have o cial dropout data, we identify the
moment a swimmer drops out as the last race in our data after which they
do not compete again for at least two years.11 To estimate how category
change ages a↵ect dropout, we use a Cox Proportional Hazard Model, where
we estimate the probability of dropping out at a given age as a function of
an indicator variable for a category change age, gender, month of birth and
cohort indicators.
We find large discouragement e↵ects in dropout during category change
ages, where the hazard of dropping out increases significantly. The results
are presented in Table 2.9, where column (1) does not include any controls
and (2) includes cohort controls. In column (3), after accounting for month
of birth and cohort, we find that the likelihood of dropping out increases
by 48.8% (s.e. 0.004) during category change years compared to non-change
years – relative to the baseline hazard dropout rate. At the same time, on
average, boys seem to be around 5% (s.e. 0.004) less likely to dropout than
girls. However, this is reversed during category change years.
This large discouragement e↵ect is consistent with several explanations.
For instance, individuals may have strong preferences over their self-image
(Benabou and Tirole 2003) and decide to drop out in order to protect their
self-image (Köszegi 2006). These e↵ects can also be reconciled with individu-
als having preferences over status (He↵etz and Frank 2011), where swimmers
experience a negative shock to their “status” (i.e., rank) and get discouraged
11Using alternative definitions yields similar results. Note that we only have data until
mid 2015, therefore a number of swimmers will be right-censored.
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(Ederer and Patacconi 2010). Our results can also be explained by swim-
mers being disappointment averse, where they drop out in order to avoid
experiencing more negative emotions from worse rankings (Gill and Prowse
2012).
The timing of a swimmers birthday might matter because there is large
variation in number of competitions (i.e., exposure to competitions) over
the swimming season. The main swimming season starts in October and
runs through February. On average, there are over 10,000 meets across the
United States during the main season.12 During the o↵-season, August and
September have the fewest meets, averaging less than 2,500 meets in total.
There could be heterogeneity in the response to changing age category by
when in the season a swimmer ages-up due to factors like social pressure
(DellaVigna et al. 2012), which would become weaker in the o↵-season.
We find that the e↵ects of changing age category vary significantly by
month of birth, as presented in Figure 2.2. We plot the coe cients for
changes in the hazard rate of age category changes by month of birth with
respect to the average monthly number of meets nationwide. There is a clear
di↵erence in the magnitude of the discouragement e↵ect by timing during
the season. The likelihood of dropping out is around 40% higher if aging
up during the height of the o↵-season compared to the early main-season
months. This is consistent with the costs of dropping out being lower if
aging up during the o↵-season where factors like social pressure from club
members, coaches, or from parents being weaker.
2.5.1 Dropout E↵ects by Ability
Swimmers preferences over ranking might be non-linear. By examining het-
erogeneity across swimmers ability, we can obtain evidence regarding the
shape of a swimmer’s utility function over ranking. For example, if swim-
mers were “first place loving”, (e.g., Gill et al. 2018), then the discourage-
ment e↵ect of changing age category would be larger for the highest ability
swimmers. This means that a swimmer who drops from 1st to 10th would
have a larger loss in utility than a swimmer dropping from 11th to 20th.
We find strong evidence suggesting that preferences over ranking are indeed
12It drops during December due to the holidays.
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non-linear. In Figure 2.3 we plot the coe cients for changing age category by
ability ventile based on the swimmer’s best performance during the previous
year (across all events). The discouragement e↵ects are similar across the
bottom half of the ability distribution, where the likelihood of dropping out
during a category change age rises by around 33.8% (s.e. 0.021) . As we
move higher in the ability distribution, the discouragement e↵ect increases
slightly to 54.9% (s.e. 0.027) at the 80th percentile. After this point, it grows
exponentially for the highest ability swimmers. The discouragement e↵ect of
changing age category for the top 5 percent of swimmers is over two times
larger (104%; s.e. 0.052) than that of the lower half of the distribution.
Furthermore, we find that the higher o↵-season discouragement e↵ect is
mostly driven by the highest ability swimmers. In Figure 2.4 we plot the
coe cients by ability and month of birth. Below the 80th percentile of ability,
estimates for o↵-season birth months seem to be slightly than main season
birth months (though in most cases not statistically di↵erent). However, we
observe large di↵erences among the highest ability swimmers. A swimmer
in the top 5 percent born in August has a hazard rate of almost 183% (s.e.
0.197) higher than the baseline dropout hazard, while the largest e↵ect for a
during season month is an increase of 135% (s.e. 0.271) for November births.
Taken together, these results suggest that discrete increases in the quality
of competition leads to large discouragement e↵ects. The fact that the high-
est ability swimmers are those that are discouraged the most has important
implications for thinking about policy design. For example, when thinking
about the e↵ects of school starting age, our results suggest that delaying the
school starting age for a talented child could yield the largest benefits.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence that individuals get discouraged when mov-
ing into competing against better peers. We exploit a natural experiment:
age category changes in swimming competitions. In this context we are able
to circumvent several identification challenges. This discouragement e↵ect
manifests itself in two di↵erent ways: in the short-run, through a↵ecting
performance where swimmers perform worse (i.e., slower) on average; and in
the long-run, where the likelihood of dropping out substantially increases.
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Our findings can have important implications for designing incentive schemes.
For example, firms using tournaments in contexts with large productivity dif-
ferences among employees could lead to worse output than a non-competitive
rewards scheme. In the context of education, it suggests that the current age-
sorting of students could lead to sub-optimal outcomes compared to tracking.
Of course, it is important to keep in mind that our results are only inform-
ing the e↵ect of potential indirect peer e↵ects. This caveat is important
when thinking about education policy and how these trade o↵ with potential
positive (or negative) e↵ects from direct peer interactions.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Treatment e↵ect by Swimmer Ability
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Average Swimmer Percentile Before Agingup
Notes: Point estimates (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) of treatment e↵ects of
changing age category on performance (log of race time) by swimmer average age percentile measured in
the year before aging up by ventile.
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Notes: Point estimates obtained from a Cox Proportion Hazard Model for the e↵ect of changing age
category, estimated separately by month of birth. All estimates account for cohort and gender.
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Notes: Point estimates obtained from a Cox Proportion Hazard Model for the e↵ect of changing age
category, estimated separately by ability vintile. Ability is constructed by calculating a swimmer’s best
percentile rank for their age cohort during their previous year, across all events. A higher percentile
indicates a better swimmer. All estimates account for cohort and gender.
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Notes: Point estimates obtained from a Cox Proportion Hazard Model for the e↵ect of changing age
category, estimated separately by ability vintile and month of birth. Ability is constructed by calculating
a swimmer’s best percentile rank for their age cohort during their previous year, across all events. A
higher percentile indicates a better swimmer. All estimates account for cohort and gender.
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Table 2.1: Age composition of
heats at random sample of
meets
Percentage of meets seeding:
Ages 10 and under 41.96%
Ages 9-10 26.79%
Other (10-11, 12 under) 25.89%
Ages 11-12 70.27%
Ages 11 and over 1.34%
Other (10-11, 11) 23.03%
Ages 13-14 36.61%
Ages 13 and over 44.64%
Other (12-13, 13) 13.39%
Ages 15 and over 32.14%
Other (13 over, 15) 62.50%
Open meets (all ages) 5.36%
Nr Meets 224
Nr LSCs 5
Notes: Sample of all invitational meets for
the 2015-2016 season for a random sample of
Local Swimming Committees (LSCs). Using
each meet’s information sheet, the authors
noted the age cuto↵s used for seeding heats
for common events (e.g. 100 freestyle). Ta-
ble shows percentage of meets that seeded
the indicated age group.
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Table 2.2: E↵ects of age-category change on competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: log(Average Competition Swim Time)
Panel A: Age 11
Treatment -0.127*** -0.133*** -0.126*** -0.130***
(0.000659) (0.00138) (0.000652) (0.00134)
Observations 851,081 851,081 851,081 851,081
Ev-Swimmers 254,932 254,932 254,932 254,932
Panel B: Age 13
Treatment -0.0995*** -0.1027*** -0.0982*** -0.1007***
(0.00053) (0.00108) (0.00053) (0.00107)
Observations 928,198 928,198 928,198 928,198
Ev-Swimmers 272,130 272,130 272,130 272,130
Panel C: Age 15
Treatment -0.0486*** -0.0501*** -0.0465*** -0.0471***
(0.000517) (0.00106) (0.000518) (0.00105)
Observations 745,106 745,106 745,106 745,106
Ev-Swimmers 209,769 209,769 209,769 209,769
Controls No No Yes Yes
Linear Model Yes No Yes No
Cubic Model No Yes No Yes
Notes: Sample of swimmers competing within 62 days (both before and after) of
their Nth birthday (indicated in each Panel). Dependent variable is the logarithm
of the average time for all other swimmers in age-group (i.e. 11-12, 13 over, 15-
16) excluding their own time for that event-meet. Each coe cient corresponds
to a separate OLS regression that includes swimmer-event fixed e↵ects. Controls
includes: number of heats swum that day, total distance swum, number of long
distance swims, and number of days since last meet. The functions of running
variable (days with respect to Nth birthday) are event-specific and interacted with
Treatment. Linear Model indicates that the function used is linear, while Cubic
Model indicates that a cubic specification is used. Standard errors are clustered at
the swimmer level.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 2.3: E↵ects of age-category change on performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: log(Swim Time)
Panel A: Age 11
Treatment 0.00351*** 0.00403*** 0.00373*** 0.00449***
(0.000173) (0.000351) (0.000174) (0.000349)
Observations 851,081 851,081 851,081 851,081
Ev-Swimmers 254,932 254,932 254,932 254,932
Panel B: Age 13
Treatment 0.00309*** 0.00355*** 0.00307*** 0.00367***
(0.000138) (0.000280) (0.000141) (0.000280)
Observations 928,198 928,198 928,198 928,198
Ev-Swimmers 272,130 272,130 272,130 272,130
Panel C: Age 15
Treatment -2.44e-05 0.000123 0.000123 0.000354**
(0.000172) (0.000346) (0.000346) (0.000175)
Observations 745,106 745,106 745,106 745,106
Ev-Swimmers 209,769 209,769 209,769 209,769
Controls No No Yes Yes
Linear Model Yes No Yes No
Cubic Model No Yes No Yes
Notes: Sample of swimmers competing within 62 days (both before and after) of their
Nth birthday (indicated in each Panel). Dependent variable is the logarithm of swim
time (in seconds). Each coe cient corresponds to a separate OLS regression that
includes swimmer-event fixed e↵ects. Controls includes: number of heats swum that
day, total distance swum, number of long distance swims, and number of days since
last meet. The functions of running variable (days with respect to Nth birthday)
are event-specific and interacted with Treatment. Linear Model indicates that the
function used is linear, while Cubic Model indicates that a cubic specification is used.
Standard errors are clustered at the swimmer level.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Placebo e↵ects on non category change
birthdays
(1) (2) (3)
Age 10 Age 12 Age 14
Panel A: Dep Var.: Log(Average time competition)
Treatment -0.00872*** -0.00630*** -0.00151
(0.00186) (0.00112) (0.000931)
Panel B: Dep. Var: Log(Swim Time)
Treatment 0.000674 0.000651** 0.000137
(0.000462) (0.000290) (0.000272)
Panel C: Dep. Var: Swim Time (in seconds)
Treatment 0.0321 0.0254 -0.0187
(0.0383) (0.0268) (0.0339)
Observations 667,890 1,093,546 1,096,274
Ev-Swimmers 196,010 324,643 306,804
Notes: Sample of swimmers competing within 62 days (both before
and after) of their Nth birthday (indicated in each column). In Panel
A, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the average time for
all other swimmers in age-group (i.e. 9-10, 11-12, 13-14) excluding
their own time for that event-meet. In Panel B, the dependent vari-
able is the logarithm of own swim time. In Panel C, the dependent
variable is swim time (in seconds). Each coe cient shows the LATE
e↵ect for the age cuto↵ indicated for each column, corresponding to
a separate OLS regression that includes swimmer-event fixed e↵ects,
swimmer-meet controls, and event-specific cubic functions of the run-
ning variable (days with respect to Nth birthday). Controls includes:
number of heats swum that day, total distance swum, number of long
distance swims, and number of days since last meet. Standard errors
are clustered at the swimmer level.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant
at 1% level.
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Table 2.9: E↵ects of age-category change on dropout hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hazard of Dropping Out
Change Age Group (=1) 0.344*** 0.487*** 0.488*** 0.461***
(0.00405) (0.00407) (0.0041) (0.0049)
Male (=1) -0.0672*** -0.0521*** -0.0518*** -0.0751***
(0.00395) (0.00379) (0.0038) (0.0049)
Interaction 0.0716***
(0.0075)
Cohort dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Month dummies No No Yes Yes
Observations 581,242 581,242 581,242 581,242
Notes: Cox Proportional Hazard estimates. Sample of swimmers containing last age at which
swimmers appears in the data. Dropout defined as swimmer not competing within two years of
last meet. The data is censored on both sides since the times data set starts tracking swimmers
consistently in 2007 and we have data until mid 2015.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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CHAPTER 3
CAN’T STOP THE ONE-ARMED
BANDITS: THE EFFECTS OF ACCESS TO
GAMBLING ON CRIME
with Ignacio Sarmiento and Andres Ham
3.1 Introduction
Commercial and tribal gambling expanded rapidly during the early nineties
in the United States, becoming legal in forty states. More recently, many
State governments have been or are considering moving towards decentral-
izing gambling activity, moving it away from casinos to local establishments
such as bars and restaurants through video gambling.1 In Illinois, people
wagered over $14 billion in 2016, which generated over $277 million in tax
revenue (equivalent to around 1 percent of total state tax revenue). Encour-
aged by the apparent fiscal success of video gambling in Illinois, other states
are considering similar legislation. For example, Pennsylvania’s House of
Representatives passed a bill closely resembling to that in Illinois (House Bill
No. 271).2 Moving towards decentralized gambling changes the nature of
access to gambling: instead of being available at a few designated locations
(i.e., casinos), it can become widely available across the state – increasing
access drastically.
However, the potential e↵ects on crime and property values from such
a large increase in access to gambling are not well understood. Most of
the existing evidence focuses on the e↵ect of casino expansions on crime.
This research typically uses county-level variation in casino openings across
the United States or in Native American tribal areas, finding that casino
construction increases crime in the same county (Gazel et al. 2001, Evans
1This form of gambling is often referred to as “convenience gambling”. Video gambling
terminals or video lottery terminals are machines where a player bets on the outcome of
a video game (i.e., slots, poker, roulette, etc.). In 2017, this type of gambling was legal in
Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota and West Virginia.
2Additionally, several other states are considering similar legislation: Indiana (House
Bill No. 1262), Missouri (House Bill No. 990).
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and Topoleski 2002, Grinols and Mustard 2006, Reece 2010) and generates
some spillovers into neighboring areas (Barthe and Stitt 2007, Nichols and
Tosun 2017). However, we must be cautious when extrapolating these results
to the context of decentralized gambling. Casino construction entails changes
other than access to gambling itself. For example, a new casino may generate
a positive local labor market shock that may attenuate the potential negative
e↵ects on crime. At the same time, casinos may attract more people to the
area, increasing the likelihood of crimes occurring. Thus, the introduction
of casino gambling o↵ers a less-than-ideal case in which to study the e↵ect
of gambling on crime because location decisions depend on various factors
including local, social, and economic conditions, which may not always be
observed by the econometrician.
An ideal setting to study the e↵ects of increasing access to gambling on
crime would involve randomly placing gambling terminals in some locations
and not in others. In this setting, we could unequivocally examine the e↵ect
of access to gambling on crime by comparing how crime changes in areas
that are closer to gambling terminals relative to those that are farther away.
We take advantage of a setting that closely resembles the ideal experimental
situation in which to analyze the e↵ects of access to gambling: the legaliza-
tion and expansion of video gambling in Illinois. The Video Gaming Act of
Illinois was passed in 2009 and implemented in 2012. The law allows local
establishments in possession of a liquor license (mainly bars and restaurants)
to install up to five video gambling terminals. Local municipalities can de-
cide whether or not to allow video gambling in their territory. The City of
Chicago has maintained a ban on gambling since 1993. However, several mu-
nicipalities directly adjacent to Chicago have adopted video gambling, thus
greatly increasing access to gambling in some areas of Chicago.
In this paper, we first study how access to gambling a↵ects crime by com-
bining two data sources: data on establishments that adopted video gambling
in the areas neighboring Chicago, and monthly incident-level data on crime
from Chicago. We use a di↵erence-in-di↵erences strategy that incorporates
the timing of the introduction of video gambling and compares crime in cen-
sus block groups of Chicago that are closer to video gambling establishments
with those that are farther away. Our identification strategy relies on the fact
that the decision to allow gambling was made independently from the areas
of study in Chicago. Therefore, in absence of the Video Gaming Act, crime
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in areas relatively closer to establishments that ever adopted video gambling
should have evolved similarly to areas further away. We test this assumption
and find that indeed crime was evolving similarly in areas closer and farther
away from video gambling establishments before it was legalized.
We find that increasing access to video gambling leads to an increase in
property and violent crimes in Chicago. On average, being near at least
one video gambling establishment is associated with a 10 percent increase in
property crime, and an 8 percent increase in violent crime. These estimates
are similar after accounting for potential confounders, including access to
riverboat casinos, community-area specific trends, and demographic controls.
Our results suggest that video gambling is creating new crimes rather
than displacing existing ones. The e↵ects of access to video gambling are
strongest in the block groups closest to video gambling establishments. The
e↵ects decrease in distance, becoming and remaining at zero farther away.
Additionally, we show that video gambling also led to an increase in domestic
crimes, a type of crime that should not be subject to displacement.
One concern is that video gambling could have increased the availability of
bars. There is evidence suggesting that increasing access to bars can increase
crime (Rossow and Norstrom 2012, Anderson et al. 2017). If this were hap-
pening, our estimates could simply be capturing the e↵ect of more bars rather
than access to gambling. Using data on all liquor licenses granted in Illinois,
we show that the e↵ects of access to video gambling remain unchanged after
accounting for changes in access to bars over time.
We find that these e↵ects are mostly driven by property-type crimes. The
e↵ects are strongest for property crimes, and within violent crimes the e↵ects
are mainly driven by robbery – a violent form of property crime. These
findings are most consistent with the mechanism being driven by the direct
e↵ects of gambling such as problem and pathological gambling (i.e., financial
distress), and from increased payo↵ to crime (i.e., victims carrying more cash
for gambling or from winnings) (Grinols and Mustard 2006).
Back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest that in the four years since video
gambling was legalized in Illinois, the increase in crime costs Chicago resi-
dents approximately $600,000 per month, which is orders of magnitude larger
than the estimated transfers of State gambling tax revenue to the city. We
also examine the cost/benefit for legalizing video gambling within Chicago.
Making optimistic assumptions regarding the potential tax revenue, we can-
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not conclude that the potential tax revenue would be larger than the in-
creased social costs in crime.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. It relates to research
examining the relationship between gambling and crime. Most of this lit-
erature has focused on examining the e↵ect of casino expansions on crime,
finding mixed results overall (Gazel et al. 2001, Wilson 2001, Reece 2010, Hy-
clak 2011, Nichols and Tosun 2017, Falls and Thompson 2014, Humphreys
and Soebbing 2014). This is partly due to the fact that casino construc-
tions entail large changes in the a↵ected area. For example, several stud-
ies have documented positive e↵ects on the local labor market (Evans and
Topoleski 2002, Humphreys and Marchand 2013). However, Grinols and
Mustard (2006) have the most comprehensive study where they find that
casinos increase crime. We contribute to this literature in three ways. First,
by focusing on a context where factors other than access to gambling remain
mostly unchanged. Second, we study localized e↵ects of access to gambling
on crime, rather than aggregate e↵ects at the county-year level. Third, we
exploit a natural experiment where access to gambling was determined by
cities outside of Chicago.
We also contribute to a literature examining e↵ects of the expansion of “sin
tax” activities on crime. Recent studies have focused on the e↵ects of legal-
ized prostitution (Ciacci and Sviatschi 2016), marijuana dispensaries (Chang
and Jacobson 2017), and bars (Rossow and Norstrom 2012). We contribute
to this literature by studying the localized e↵ects of decentralized gambling
through the rapid expansion of video gambling terminals – an activity that
looks set to grow in several states over the next years.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides background on gam-
bling in Illinois, showing how access to gambling increased dramatically as a
result of the Video Gaming Act. Section 3.3 describes our data. Section 3.4.1
presents our identification strategy, Section 3.4.2 describes our results, and
Section 3.4.3 examines the robustness of our main results. Section 3.5 pro-
vides a brief discussion on the costs and benefits of legalizing video gambling
in Chicago. Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
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3.2 Video Gambling in Illinois
Gambling is not new to Illinois. Riverboat casinos were legalized in 1990
through the Riverboat Gambling Act (230 ILCS 10). This made Illinois the
second state (after Iowa) to legalize this form of gambling (Grinols 2004).
Gambling activities have been closely regulated in Illinois, which has allowed
only 10 casinos to open throughout the State. In 2012, riverboat casinos
generated about $350 million in tax revenue for the state and $83 million for
municipalities (Illinois Gaming Board 2016).
New spending initiatives have begun to rely on funds from gambling rev-
enue to cover costs. The 2009 Illinois Jobs Now! project was conceived to
foster economic activity, invest in infrastructure, and create new jobs in the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. This project’s cost was estimated to
be $31 billion, of which the state would account for $13 billion or roughly
40%.3 Twenty-year bonds financed by fee and tax increases (e.g., increases
in vehicle registration fees and alcohol/candy taxes) would mainly cover Illi-
nois’ share. The second largest revenue source would be tax income from
video gambling.
In 2009, the State passed the Video Gaming Act (230 ILCS 40) that legal-
ized video gambling in any retail location with a valid liquor license and not
owned by a horse racing firm or riverboat casino.4 Qualifying establishments
fill out an online application and must pay a $100 annual license fee. If their
request is approved, state-licensed technicians can install between one and
five video gambling terminals in the establishment.5 Terminals cannot di-
rectly dispense coins, cash, or tokens. Players instead receive vouchers that
can be exchanged for cash at the register. A player can wager $2 at most
and terminals cannot dispense more than $500 per game played. The total
revenue generated by video gambling terminals is divided in three parts: 70%
goes to establishments and terminal companies, 25% to the state, and 5% to
the municipality.
Once implementation of the Video Gaming Act began in September of
3Remaining funds were to be drawn from state debt and federal and local matching
grants.
4Other establishments also qualified for video gambling: licensed fraternal establish-
ments, licensed veteran organizations, and licensed truck stops.
5Video gambling activities are extensively regulated by the State. Manufacturers, dis-
tributors, suppliers, operators, and handlers must fulfill a number of requirements, pay
fees, and are subject to inspections.
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2012, adoption was fast. Figure 3.1 plots the number of video gambling
establishments over time. Many eligible businesses applied for licenses and
typically installed the maximum number of terminals allowed by the law.
Almost 25,000 video gambling terminals in about 5,000 establishments were
operational by 2016 (Illinois Gaming Board 2017). This places Illinois as the
largest video gambling jurisdiction in the world, surpassing Nevada. Video
gambling became widespread and convenient to such an extent that revenues
and attendance at riverboat casinos in Illinois have been in decline since
video gambling was adopted (CGFA 2015).
While the Video Gaming Act legalized video gambling across Illinois, each
municipality could choose whether to allow video gambling within its admin-
istrative limits, if it did not already have an ordinance prohibiting gambling.6
Out of 1,475 municipalities, around 12% either opted-out or already had an
ordinance that outlawed gambling. The most notable municipality that does
not allow video gambling is Chicago. The City of Chicago has had an ordi-
nance prohibiting gambling that dates back to 1993, passed by City Aldermen
in opposition to Mayor Daley’s plans to bring casinos to the city (ordinance
Title 8, Chapter 8-12). An amendment to this ordinance was proposed in
2012 to allow video gambling (O2012-2236), it was finally voted down in May
2015.
Even though Chicago has not adopted video gambling, access to gambling
has increased dramatically in the city as a result of the Video Gaming Act,
notwithstanding that there were a number of riverboat casinos and land-
based casinos in neighboring Indiana. This is driven by many bordering
municipalities that do allow video gambling. We plot the minimum travel
time from the centroid of each census block group to the nearest casino (Fig-
ure 3.2.a) or video gambling establishment (Figure 3.2.b). On average, access
to gambling increased by over 47% across the city (or 9 minutes). Given ex-
isting evidence suggesting that the relationship between gambling and travel
time approximates an exponential function (Grinols 2004), we would expect
such a large expansion of access to increase gambling significantly.
In order to identify the causal e↵ect of higher access to gambling on crime,
we exploit the increase in access to video gambling over time and space,
6The regulations for the referendum may be found in Section 70 of the Video Gaming
Act. They require asking constituents: “Shall video gambling be prohibited in [munici-
pality]?” The choices are Yes or No.
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taking advantage of detailed data on crime in Chicago that is unavailable for
the rest of Illinois. It is important to note that there are two main potential
sources of attenuation bias. First, we are examine a context where gambling
was already accessible, though it became dramatically more accessible and
widespread with video gambling. Second, the existence of illegal gambling
locations within the city of Chicago may also attenuate any potential e↵ects
of access to video gambling. For these reasons, our estimates in the following
sections should be considered lower bounds of the e↵ects of access to gambling
on crime.
3.3 Data
We combine data from two main sources. First, incident-level data on crime
from police reports between January 2006 and June 2016 available from the
City of Chicago Data Portal. Similar data is not available for cities neighbor-
ing Chicago. This information comes from the Chicago Police Department’s
Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting system. The data set pro-
vides the date, time, and location of the crime at the block-level. Each
incident is also classified according to the Illinois Uniform Crime Report-
ing (UCR) code, which in turn follows the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting guidelines.7 We classify incidents into prop-
erty and violent crimes. In the case of multiple o↵enses, the incident is clas-
sified using the FBI’s UCR Hierarchy Rule.8 This hierarchical classification
implies that reports for lower categories will be downward biased.9
We aggregate the data and construct a monthly panel of census block
groups because it is small enough to provide su cient geographic variation
7Violent crimes include: homicide, sexual assault, robbery and, aggravated assault and
battery; while property crimes: arson, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft. See
http://gis.chicagopolice.org/clearmap_crime_sums/crime_types.html for defini-
tions and descriptions (last access August 17, 2017).
8This rule assigns the highest hierarchy to violent crimes followed by property crimes.
It requires that in a multiple o↵ense scenario the incident must be classified with the
highest hierarchy.
9The data only contains incidents for which the police responded and completed a case
report. The geo-location is approximate and accurate only at the block level. It also
contains some missing geo-coordinates. If the address of the incident is present but not
the geo-coordinates, we geo-code them to the middle of the block because the last two
digits of the address are withheld. We dropped 401 (0.6%) incidents that could not be
geo-coded.
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in access. Additionally, we obtain socio-demographic characteristics at this
level to use as controls from the 2000 Census and the 2011-2015 American
Community Survey. The demographic data include total population, popu-
lation density, median age, average household size, percentage of males aged
between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, number of housing
units, percentage of vacant housing, and percentage of owners. We extrapo-
late these measures linearly over time and include them as controls to account
for any changes in socio-demographic characteristics.
Second, monthly data on establishments with video gambling from the
Illinois Gaming Board. The data contains the address of the establishment,
as well as information on the number of video gambling terminals installed,
statistics on volume played, and taxes collected. We geo-coded the location
of each establishment and use it to construct our main measure of access to
video gambling. We match establishments at the census block group level
and classify block groups each month inside of Chicago based on proximity
to video gambling using geographic adjacency (e.g., within 1 block is directly
adjacent, within 2 blocks is adjacent-to-adjacent, and so on).
3.4 Gambling and Crime
There are several potential mechanisms mediating the relationship between
access to gambling and crime. Previous research suggest that individuals ex-
posed to gambling, especially to electronic gambling machines, may become
problem or pathological gamblers (Wheeler et al. 2011). Pathological gam-
blers are more likely to engage in criminal activities as a result of financial
and/or emotional distress. In this sense gamblers have been linked to engage
in property crimes (Blaszczynski 1994), and domestic violence (Dowling et
al. 2016, Lorenz and Shuttlesworth 1983, Bland et al. 1993). Research has
also shown that pathological gamblers display other dysfunctional patterns of
behavior such as excessive drinking and drug use which may also contribute
to their criminal behavior (Walker 2013).10
The link between increases access to gambling and crime can be also ex-
plained by the standard Becker (1968) model. The increase of availability of
10See Kindt and Palchak (2002) for a discussion on the financial and social costs of
pathological gamblers.
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gambling places increases the payo↵ of crime. These places lower the costs
of finding potential victims who would be carrying extra cash to gamble (or
from their winnings), increasing the payo↵s to crime (Grinols and Mustard
2006).
By studying the expansion of video gambling in a decentralized manner, we
can largely minimize the role played by other mechanisms. Large scale devel-
opments, such as casinos, have been shown to increasing employment, wages,
and may spur economic development the area (Evans and Topoleski 2002,
Humphreys and Marchand 2013). In our context, these e↵ects are mostly
minimized because the expansion occurs in existing bars and restaurants,
rather than in new developments.11
3.4.1 Identification Strategy
To identify the e↵ects of increasing access to video gambling on crime in
Chicago, we exploit variation in the expansion of video gambling by estab-
lishments over time, and the fact that some census block groups had greater
access than others. Our identification strategy rests on the assumption that
closer places have greater access and are more likely to be a↵ected. Figure
3.3 illustrates our identification. Using this spatial proximity strategy helps
account for confounding unobserved neighborhood attributes (Linden and
Rocko↵ 2008, Diamond and McQuade 2016). For this reason, we restrict the
sample to census block groups that are within 6 blocks at any point in time.
This restriction does not play an important role in our results, since they
remain robust when including all census block groups in the City of Chicago.
We employ a di↵erence-in-di↵erences strategy that compares crime in block
groups that have greater access to video gambling establishments with blocks
that have lower access, before and after establishments near the Chicago bor-
der adopted video gambling. Our baseline specification for a given outcome
Crimei,t (i.e., number of crimes in block group i in month-year t) is:
Crimei,t = ↵i+ Within 2 blocksi,t+f(Riverboatsi,t)+ t n+ Xi,t+ t+"i,t
(3.1)
where Within 2 blocksi,t is an indicator that equals one if the block group
11We find that the Video Gambling Act did not significantly a↵ect the availability of
bars and restaurants.
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is within two blocks of a video gambling establishment at time t and zero
otherwise. ↵i are block group fixed e↵ects,  t are month-year fixed e↵ects,
and "i,t is the error term. Our parameter of interest,  , estimates the av-
erage di↵erence in crime between blocks that are within two blocks of es-
tablishments with video gambling relative to those that are further away
(4-6 blocks). Our main identifying assumption is that in absence of video
gambling, crime would have evolved similarly in areas that eventually had
high access compared to those with low access. In Section 3.4.3 we provide
evidence suggesting that this assumption is likely to hold.
This strategy accounts for a number of potential threats to identification.
First, there are a number of riverboat casinos in the greater-Chicago area.
During our period of analysis two new riverboat casinos opened, which could
potentially bias our results. To account for these potential confounding ef-
fects we include f(Riverboats), a quadratic function of the linear distance
to the nearest riverboat casino. Second, there could have been unobserved
public policies during our period of analysis that could a↵ect crime. For ex-
ample, if shocks in crime at the neighborhood-level were correlated with the
adoption of video gambling, our estimates would be biased. We account for
this potential threat by including t n, community area-specific time trends.
Finally, changes in crime could be driven by underlying changes in the socio-
economic conditions of block groups with higher access to gambling. To ad-
dress this possibility we include Xi,t, a vector of time-varying demographic
controls obtained from the Census and American Community Survey: total
population, population density, median age, average household size, percent-
age males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, number of
housing units, percentage of vacant housing, and percentage of home owners.
Given the count nature of the crime data, we estimate Equation (3.1) by
maximum likelihood using a Poisson regression. Since errors are expected to
be correlated within block groups and access to gambling varies at this level,
we cluster our standard errors at the census block level in all our regressions.
To maximize power, our main specification will define the main indepen-
dent variable as the block group being within two blocks of a video gambling
establishment. We make this definition based on results presented in section
3.4.3, where we find that the e↵ect increases in proximity to establishments
after they adopt video gambling. The e↵ects are largest within two blocks,
and becomes zero and remains zero four and more blocks away. Therefore
97
we define the treatment variable as being within two blocks, dropping blocks
within three blocks as a bu↵er, and use blocks that are four to six blocks
away as comparison group.
However, our estimates are robust to using alternative definitions of access
to gambling, including the number of establishments within two blocks, and
access measures typically used in the trade literature (Harris 1954, Hanson
2005) that employ a weighted average of the linear distance (or traveling
times) from the block group centroid to each establishment.12
3.4.2 Results
Main Results
We examine whether greater access to video gambling a↵ects property and
violent crime in Chicago. Table 3.1.a presents our core results using number
of property crimes as the dependent variable, while Table 3.1.b does the same
for violent crimes. We begin with a basic specification that does not control
for access to riverboat casinos, community area time trends, nor time-varying
demographic characteristics in column (1). Results show a statistically sig-
nificant increase in both property and violent crimes. Our estimates indicate
that being within two block groups of at least one video gambling establish-
ment increases property crime by almost 8.51% (s.e. 0.025) and violent crime
by 10.3% (s.e. 0.026).13
These estimates are robust to using alternative specifications. Column (2)
presents results after accounting for proximity to Riverboat Casinos. Col-
umn (3) includes community area time trends, and column (4) accounts
for time-varying demographic characteristics. Column (5) is our preferred
specification that incorporates all the previous controls. The point estimate
increases to 10.3% (s.e. 0.023) for property and decreases to 7.9% (s.e. 0.027)
12For example, if di,j is the linear distance (or traveling time) between block group
centroid i and establishment j, and (V Gj,t = 1) indicates that establishment j
has video gambling in period t, then gambling access (GA) is calculated as GAi,t =PJ
j=1 exp(  (V Gj,t = 1) · di,j).
13Given that we estimate non-linear Poisson regressions, estimated coe cients should
have a slightly di↵erent interpretation than OLS estimates. However, because the coe -
cient of interest is attached to a dummy variable and the resulting estimates are small,
the coe cient can be interpreted as the percentage change in crime e ̂   1 ⇡  ̂.
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for violent crime, though they are not statistically di↵erent from the base-
line specification. Estimates are very similar when using police district or
police beat specific time trends, accounting for any heterogeneity in policing
strategy.
Unlike some of the state or region-specific casino studies in the US (Gazel et
al. 2001, Wilson 2001, Reece 2010, Hyclak 2011, Falls and Thompson 2014)
or the Canadian gambling literature (Arthur et al. 2014, Humphreys and
Soebbing 2014), we do find that greater access to gambling increases crime.
Compared to research studying casino openings across the US, our estimates
are somewhat lower. Grinols and Mustard (2006) find average rises of 16%
in property crime and 20% in violent crime. Evans and Topoleski (2002) find
smaller increases when accounting for state-specific time trends, about 10%
for both types of crime. However, crime e↵ects due to casino openings are
driven by multiple mechanisms, not just gambling itself. For example, part
of the increase in crime could be driven mechanically due to an increase in
the number of people visiting casino counties.
Further Results
We provide additional evidence that our results are indeed driven by access to
video gambling and are not spurious. We exploit three di↵erent dimensions of
our variation in access to gambling: its e↵ects over time, and the availability
of video gambling establishments.
To explore the e↵ects of access to gambling over time, we conduct an event
study analysis, where we classify block groups in bins of six months with re-
spect to when it first had a gambling establishment within two blocks. Point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals are presented in Figure 3.4. Both
property and violent crimes show similar patterns: before becoming exposed
to video gambling we do not observe any significant di↵erences in crime
between blocks that are within two blocks from gambling establishments
compared to those that are further away. This provides suggestive evidence
validating our main identifying assumption, that trends evolved similarly
before video gambling was adopted.
The e↵ect of access to video gambling on crime seems to be persistent. On
average, the e↵ect after three years or more on property crime it is 13.4%
(s.e. 0.035), while for violent crime is 12.6% (s.e. 0.047). The pattern of
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the e↵ects over time is consistent with the timing and expansion of video
gambling establishments described in Figure 3.1. Additionally, it is also
consistent with evidence that it takes around a year for individuals to become
compulsive video gamblers (Grinols and Mustard 2006).
Finally, we find that e↵ects are also increasing in availability of video
gambling establishments. One measure of availability is by volume played at
gambling establishments within two blocks. On average, the monthly volume
played in establishments within two blocks is $2.8 million. We present results
in Figure 3.5, where we classify block groups within two blocks of gambling
establishments by total volume played at those establishments by quartile.
Indeed, results suggest that the e↵ects are increasing in volume played as
would be expected. We find that results are similar when using several
alternative measures of availability (or access) to video gambling: the number
of establishments, including volume played or number of establishments as a
regressor, and using access measures typically used in the trade literature.
3.4.3 Robustness
Testing for Di↵erential Trends
Identification of the e↵ect of access to gambling on crime depends on the
assumption that in absence of video gambling, crimes in high access areas
would have evolved similarly to those further away. Though we cannot test
this directly, we provide a number of tests that lend support to it. One
approach is to create placebo indicators that equal one for a period of time
before the unit becomes “treated” (i.e., a lead of the Within two blocks
variable). This variable would capture any di↵erences in trends between
groups before being exposed to video gambling. We thus estimate Equation
(3.1) and add the placebo variable.
Results are presented in Table 3.2, where in each column we change the
time-span of the placebo variable. Column (1) presents our preferred speci-
fication results from Table 3.1, column (2) adds a placebo for one year prior,
column (3) does it for 2 years prior and column (4) for 3 years prior. The
point estimates on all the placebo coe cients are close to zero and we can
reject the null hypothesis that the magnitude of e↵ects of access to gambling
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and the placebo are equal (the largest p-value is 0.0026). Additionally, the
event study figures presented before (Figure 3.4) tell the same story: there do
not seem to be large systematic di↵erences in trends between groups before
video gambling is adopted by an establishment.14 Taken together, the evi-
dence is reassuring that our findings are not driven by di↵erences predating
video gambling adoption.
Proximity to Video Gambling and Displacement
Our identification strategy implicitly assumes that access to video gambling
increases with geographic proximity to video gambling establishments. In-
stead of estimating our model using a dummy variable indicating that a block
group has at least one video gambling establishment within two blocks, we
examine e↵ects by block group distance (i.e., one block away, two, etc.). If
our e↵ects were driven by increased access to gambling, we would expect that
blocks that are closer to gambling (i.e., has higher exposure) establishments
experience a larger increase in crime. We show point estimates and 95%
confidence intervals of these estimates by block in Figure 3.6. Both property
and violent crimes display a similar pattern: the e↵ects are largest for the
blocks with highest access to gambling (within 1 block), and they decrease as
we move away. At a distance of three or four blocks the e↵ects are zero and
remain constant at greater distances. For areas within one block of gambling
establishments, the average increase in property and violent crime is 13.1%
(s.e. 0.038) and 14.4% (s.e. 0.040), respectively.
One concern with the interpretation of our results is that access to video
gambling is displacing crime within Chicago: shifting criminal activity to-
wards areas closer to gambling establishments. However, there are various
results suggesting that our estimates capture new crimes in Chicago rather
than displacing existing crime. First, if our e↵ects were driven by displace-
ment, we would expect to find e↵ects decreasing monotonically with distance.
However, as shown in Figure 3.6, point estimates are zero and remain at zero
after three or more census block groups away from a video gambling estab-
lishment. Second, when including all block groups of Chicago or restricting
the sample to block groups ever within 10 blocks of a video gambling estab-
14The findings are unchanged if we perform the same event study analysis using quarters
instead of semesters, although the estimates are more imprecise.
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lishment we find that point estimates are slightly smaller.
Finally, if e↵ects were driven solely by displacement, then there is a form
of crime that should not be a↵ected by it: domestic incidents.15 We repli-
cate our baseline analysis using the number of domestic crimes as dependent
variable in Table 3.4. We find suggestive evidence that access to gambling
increased the number of domestic crimes by around 3-4%, though the esti-
mates are not precisely estimated. Depending on the specification used, they
can be either borderline significant or insignificant at the 10% level. This
is consistent with evidence documenting the e↵ect of emotional cues and
family violence. For example, Card and Dahl (2011) find that upset losses
increase domestic violence by 10% during the hour after a football game.
Our estimates on domestic crime are substantially smaller than the e↵ects
on property and violent crime, suggesting that emotional cues may play a
smaller role in the context of gambling.
Access to Bars
A potential concern is that the increase in crime may be driven by an increase
in access to bars rather than gambling. In 2016, video gambling terminals
brought establishments over $5,100 a month on average in revenues.16 This
could have had two e↵ects. First, it may encourage new bars to open (or
extend the life of existing bars). Given that there is evidence documenting
a positive correlation between bars and crime (Rossow and Norstrom 2012,
Anderson et al. 2017), an increase in the number of bars could drive our
results. Second, bars located inside Chicago may relocate outside the borders
to benefit from video gambling. This could have two opposing e↵ects. On
the one hand, the number of local bars can decrease and this could bias our
estimates downwards. On the other hand, it could shift people towards the
border increasing the likelihood of crimes happening in areas near the border.
Our results remain unchanged when accounting for access to bars. We
use data on all the liquor licenses granted by the Illinois Liquor Control
15Besides classifying a crime by type (e.g., homicide, aggravated battery, etc.), the
Chicago Police Department also notes whether the incident was domestic or not based
on the relationship between the victim and the o↵ender. Specifically we focus on violent
crimes complemented with simple assault and battery classified as domestic plus o↵enses
against family. We do so to get a domestic violence measure that best fit the definition of
the Department of Justice (see https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence)
16Own calculations based on data from the Illinois Gaming Board.
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Committee during the period of July 2009 to March 2016.17 We geo-coded
all establishments in the greater Chicago region and constructed a monthly
panel at the census block group level containing the number of active liquor
licenses. From this data we generate two variables: the number of bars in
each block group and the number of bars within two blocks.
Results are presented in Table 3.3, where the first two column replicates
our original analysis with and without community area trends, restricting
the sample to the time period for which we have data on liquor licenses. Col-
umn (3) adds the number of bars (in hundreds) in same block as a control,
column (4) adds number of bars (in hundreds) within two blocks as a con-
trol, column (5) adds both but exclude video gambling access to show that
access to bars and video gambling are not highly correlated. Column (6) re-
introduces access to video gambling and includes both measures of access to
bars. Notably, the coe cient of interest remains very stable suggesting that
changes in access to bars are not mediating the e↵ect of access to gambling
and crime.
3.5 Back of the Envelope Cost/Benefit
Taken together, our evidence suggests that access to gambling has increased
property and violent crimes in Chicago. In this section we conduct a back
of the envelope cost/benefit calculation of the Video Gambling Act for the
City of Chicago. For this exercise, we first break down e↵ects by crime type
and use cost estimates typically used in the literature to impute the costs of
crime. Because Chicago does not directly collect tax revenue from gambling,
calculating the benefit is not straight forward. Using alternative measures
for benefits, we find that the costs greatly outweigh the benefits.
We disaggregate results by type of crime in Table 3.5. Overall, we find
that the e↵ects are mainly driven by property-type of crimes: note that
violent crimes are mostly explained by robbery, a violent form of property
crime. Higher access to gambling adds 12.6% more robberies (significant at
the 1% level). Results for other forms of violent crime are mixed: we find no
significant e↵ects on homicide, assault or sexual assault; though we do find
statistically significant increases (at the 10% level) in aggravated battery
17This was all the data available at the time of our FOIA request.
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(11.1%). On the other hand, the increase in property crime is driven mostly
by motor vehicle thefts (15.9%), followed by burglaries (11.3%) and larcenies
(6.71%) – all statistically relevant at the 5% or 1% level.
The large increase in robbery (and burglary, larceny, car theft) is consistent
with direct e↵ects of gambling such as problem and pathological gambling,
where financial distress may drive individuals to commit crimes that have
a monetary return. It is also consistent with crime being more profitable,
where individuals carry more cash to gamble (or from their winnings) and
become more profitable targets.18
We can obtain the back of the envelope estimates of the cost associated
with the increase in crime in Chicago as a result of video gambling in adja-
cent municipalities. Following Chalfin and McCrary (2017), we use estimates
produced by Cohen and Piquero (2009) on the costs of crime that take into
account both direct costs to the victim and indirect costs from reductions in
the victim’s quality of life. We present the costs for each type of crime in
Table 3.6. We estimate that, on average, the social cost associated to the
increase in crime in areas located within two block groups from an establish-
ment with video gambling is around $600,000 per month (in 2016 dollars).
This is particularly large considering that the City of Chicago does not re-
ceive any direct benefits in terms of tax revenues from video gambling because
that activity is banned within city limits.
However, access to gambling can be socially costly beyond increasing crime
(and crime itself can be costly in other dimensions). For instance, access
to gambling might potentially a↵ect property values. There is large social
stigma associated to gambling, therefore individuals may consider living near
an establishment with video gambling terminals as a dis-amenity (Grinols
2004). At the same time, because access to gambling increased crime, this
may in turn a↵ect property values (e.g., Pope and Pope 2012). In a prelimi-
nary analysis of sales transaction data for Chicago, we are finding suggestive
evidence that access to gambling may also have negatively a↵ected property
values. Future work will focus on better identifying whether the social costs
of gambling indeed extend to property values as well.
18This has been observed in other contexts. For example, there is evidence that when
Food Stamps switched payments to Electronic Benefits Transfers (EBT) crime decreased
(Wright et al. 2014).
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3.6 Conclusion
We estimate the e↵ects of increasing access to gambling on crime taking
advantage of the legalization and expansion of video gambling in Illinois.
Using crime data for Chicago, which does not allow gambling, we compare
areas in the city that have relatively higher access with those that have lower
access to gambling. We show that despite there being numerous casinos in
the vicinity of Chicago, the Video Gaming Act drastically increased access
to gambling in the City. In turn, higher access to gambling increases both
property and violent crime. This costs the City almost $600 thousand per
month while it does not receive direct tax revenue from the activity.
There are numerous avenues for future research. More work is necessary
to better understand and disentangle the mechanisms at play. Our results
suggest that the mechanisms could be through problem and pathological
gambling (i.e., financial distress) or increased payo↵ of crime. Learning the
extent to which one or the other operates is important to design policies
for mitigating the increase in crime. This is particularly important consid-
ering that video gambling is not only here to stay, but is set to expand in
other states. To the extent that the e↵ects are driven by pathological gam-
bling, there are several non-profits and government organizations providing
numerous services targeting gambling addiction. For example, the Illinois
Alliance on Problem Gambling provides a number of services such as phone
and text-based counseling, and a free subscription service to receive motiva-
tional messages via text message. Learning about the e↵ectiveness of these
programs would be a step forward to stop the one-armed bandits.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Number of Video Gambling Establishments in Illinois













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dots represent video gambling establishments operating in April 2014. Map of Chicago census
block groups. Each block group is classified by geographic proximity to video gambling establishments.
For example, one block denotes directly adjacent to a block (outside Chicago) with at least one video
gambling establishment, two block denotes two blocks away (i.e., adjacent-of-adjacent), and so on. Six
block is six or more block groups away from a video gambling establishment.
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Years with respect to video gambling establishment opening within 2 blocks
Coefficient 95% CI
(b) Violent Crimes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within one, two, four, five and six block
groups from a video gambling establishment. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for estimating
Equation (3.1) using dummy variables indicating timing with respect to first video gambling establishment
operating within two blocks. The omitted category is 1 year before video gambling establishment operates
within two blocks (-1).
109












































































Volume Gambled Within 3 Blocks
Coefficient 95% CI
(b) Violent Crimes
Note: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video gambling
establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Point estimates and 95%
confidence intervals for estimating Equation (3.1) using dummy variables by volume played at video
gambling establishments within two blocks. Classified into four groups by quartile of monthly volume
played: Low ($1 - $801,313.7), Mid Low ($801,313.7 - $1,603,046), Mid High ($1,603,046 - $3,442,390),
High ($3,442,390+). The omitted category is zero volume.
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Blocks to closest Video Gambling Establishment
Coefficient 95% CI
(b) Violent Crimes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video
gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Point estimates
and 95% confidence intervals for estimating Equation (3.1) using dummy variables for proximity of closest
video gambling establishment (i.e., one block, two, etc.). The omitted category is 6 blocks (that is, has at
least one video gambling establishment within six blocks).
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Table 3.1: The E↵ect of Access to Video Gambling on Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Property Crime
Within 2 Blocks (=1) 0.0851*** 0.0840*** 0.0917*** 0.104*** 0.103***
(0.0246) (0.0243) (0.0247) (0.0226) (0.0226)
(b) Violent Crime
Within 2 Blocks (=1) 0.103*** 0.100*** 0.108*** 0.0816*** 0.0792***
(0.0259) (0.0263) (0.0247) (0.0270) (0.0269)
Observations 105,918 105,918 105,918 105,918 105,918
Number of blocks 834 834 834 834 834
f(Distance to Riverboats) No Yes No No Yes
Community Trends No No Yes No Yes
Demographic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within one, two, four, five and six block
groups from a video gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes.
Each coe cient is an estimate of Equation (3.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors clustered at the
block group level are in parentheses. Within 2 blocks equals one if the census block group is within 2 block
groups of a video gambling establishment after the establishment adopted video gambling. All estimates
include block group fixed e↵ects and month-year e↵ects. f(Distance to Riverboats) is a quadratic function
of distance, in miles, from the block group centroid to the closest riverboat casino. Community Trends are
community area time trends. Demographic controls are obtained by extrapolating between the Census and
American Community Survey: total population, population density, median age, average household size,
percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, and number of housing units.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 3.2: The E↵ect of Access to Video Gambling on Crime, with
Placebos
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Property Crime
Within 2 Blocks (=1) 0.103*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.0884***
(0.0246) (0.0242) (0.0245) (0.0290)
Placebo (1 year prior) 0.0146
(0.0185)
Placebo (2 years prior) 0.00799
(0.0198)
Placebo (3 years prior) -0.0168
(0.0214)
P-Value (Within 2 = Placebo) .0001 ¡0 ¡0
(b) Violent Crime
Within 2 Blocks (=1) 0.0792*** 0.0794*** 0.0867*** 0.0895***
(0.0269) (0.0290) (0.0314) (0.0330)
Placebo (1 year prior) 0.000710
(0.0280)
Placebo (2 years prior) 0.0136
(0.0251)
Placebo (3 years prior) 0.0138
(0.0256)
P-Value (Within 2 = Placebo) .0132 .009 .0059
Observations 105,918 105,918 105,918 105,918
Number of blocks 834 834 834 834
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within one, two, four, five and six block
groups from a video gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent
crimes. Each coe cient is an estimate of Equation (3.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors
clustered at the block group level are in parentheses. Within 2 blocks equals one if the census block
group is within 2 block groups of a video gambling establishment after the establishment adopted
video gambling. Placebo variables equal one for the indicated period of time (1, 2 or 3 years) before
an establishment within three block groups first adopts video gambling. All estimates include block
group fixed e↵ects, month-year e↵ects, a quadratic function of distance to the closest riverboat
casino, community area-time trends, and demographic controls obtained by extrapolating between
the Census and American Community Survey: total population, population density, median age,
average household size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, and
number of housing units. total population, population density, median age, average household size,
percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, and number of housing
units.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 3.3: The E↵ect of Access to Video Gambling on Crime,
Controlling for Access to Bars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Property Crime
Within 2 Blocks (=1) 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.108***
(0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0233) (0.0235)
Number of Bars in:
Same Block (/100) 2.282 2.589 2.785
(2.126) (2.100) (2.084)
Within 2 Blocks (/100) -0.600* -0.686* -0.696*
(0.351) (0.370) (0.356)
(b) Violent Crime
Within 2 Blocks (=1) 0.0619** 0.0623** 0.0624** 0.0629**
(0.0275) (0.0272) (0.0277) (0.0274)
Number of Bars in:
Same Block (/100) 2.184 2.447 2.503
(1.777) (1.791) (1.815)
Within 2 Blocks (/100) -0.366 -0.443 -0.461
(0.440) (0.437) (0.443)
Observations 82,566 82,566 82,566 82,566 82,566
Number of blocks 834 834 834 834 834
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within one, two, four, five and six
block groups from a video gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of property
or violent crimes. Each coe cient is an estimate of Equation (3.1) using Poisson regression.
Standard errors clustered at the block group level are in parentheses. Within 3 blocks equals
one if the census block group is within 3 block groups of a video gambling establishment after
the establishment adopted video gambling. Number of bars is the number of active liquor li-
censes in the same block group or within three block groups. All estimates include block group
fixed e↵ects, month-year e↵ects, a quadratic function of distance to the closest riverboat casino,
community area-time trends, and demographic controls obtained by extrapolating between the
Census and American Community Survey: total population, population density, median age,
average household size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans,
number of housing units, percentage of vacant housing, and percentage of home owners.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 3.4: The E↵ect of Access to Video Gambling on Domestic Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic Crime
Within 2 Blocks (=1) 0.0433* 0.0406* 0.0430 0.0297 0.0323
(0.0262) (0.0247) (0.0263) (0.0243) (0.0247)
Observations 105,918 105,918 105,918 105,918 105,918
Number of blocks 834 834 834 834 834
f(Distance to Riverboats) No Yes No No Yes
Community Trends No No Yes No Yes
Demographic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within one, two, four, five and six
block groups from a video gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of domestic
crimes. Each coe cient is an estimate of Equation (3.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors
clustered at the block group level are in parentheses. Within 2 blocks equals one if the census
block group is within 2 block groups of a video gambling establishment after the establishment
adopted video gambling. All estimates include block group fixed e↵ects and month-year e↵ects.
f(Distance to Riverboats) is a quadratic function of distance, in miles, from the block group
centroid to the closest riverboat casino. Community Trends are community area time trends.
Demographic controls are obtained by extrapolating between the Census and American Commu-
nity Survey: total population, population density, median age, average household size, percentage
males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, and number of housing units.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft
Within 2 blocks (=1) 0.113*** 0.0671** 0.159***
(0.0351) (0.0285) (0.0398)
Observations 105,918 105,918 105,918
Number of blocks 834 834 834
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(b) Violent Crime
Sexual Aggravated Aggravated
Homicide Assault Assault Battery Robbery
Within 2 blocks (=1) -0.0961 -0.00943 -0.0446 0.111** 0.126***
(0.142) (0.103) (0.0469) (0.0452) (0.0382)
Observations 70,485 97,790 104,521 104,013 104,775
Number of blocks 555 770 823 819 825
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within one, two, four, five and six block
groups from a video gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes.
Each coe cient is an estimate of Equation (3.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors clustered at
the block group level are in parentheses. Within 2 blocks equals one if the census block group is within
2 block groups of a video gambling establishment after the establishment adopted video gambling. All
estimates include block group fixed e↵ects, month-year e↵ects, a quadratic function of distance to the
closest riverboat casino, community area-time trends, and demographic controls obtained by extrapolating
between the Census and American Community Survey: total population, population density, median age,
average household size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, and number
of housing units.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 3.6: Back of the Envelope Monthly Cost Estimates for Chicago
Crime Estimated Cost Total Cost 95%
New Incidents Per Incident Conf. Int.
per month
Property: 167,010.09 [0.09; 0.24]
Motor Vehicle Theft 17.71 6,326.41 112,035.03 [0.07; 0.16]
Larceny 30.40 517.18 15,721.39 [0; 0.03]
Burglary 17.06 2,300.51 39,253.66 [0.02; 0.06]
Violent: 428,742.95 [0.19; 1.17]
Robbery 10.42 13,803.08 143,845.95 [0.07; 0.22]
Aggravated Battery 6.69 42,559.50 284,896.99 [0.09; 0.48]
Total 595,753.03 [0.28; 1.42]
Notes: All dollar amounts in 2016 dollars. Estimated number of new incidents per month is based




APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Information about the Subject Pool
We recruited 27 of the 135 accredited medical schools in the U.S. to par-
ticipate in our study.1 In order to compare school characteristics from our
sample with those not participating in our study, we obtained data from
U.S. News (that is best known for compiling data and publishing ranks for
universities and hospitals). We present descriptive statistics for the universe
of medical schools, non-participating and participating schools in Table A.2.
Medical schools participating in our study have slightly higher enrollment,
lower average MCAT score, and are a little lower ranked on average than
non-participating schools. However, none of these di↵erences are statistically
significant at conventional levels. The only statistically significant di↵erence
we do find is that the faculty to student ratio in participating schools is lower
than in non-participating schools. Overall, it seems that participating medi-
cal schools are fairly representative of the overall universe of schools and not
substantially di↵erent from non-participating schools.
Next, in Table A.1, we present the list of participating medical schools,
along with the estimated size of the senior cohort, number of finished surveys
and response rates. Around half of the schools reported the exact number of
senior students who were participating in the Main Residency Match. For the
remaining schools, we imputed the values of these variable using the average
for the reporting schools (22% of the total enrollment). The overall response
rate was almost 30%. Note that in the table we are excluding 20 observa-
tions that were deemed invalid either because answers to key questions were
missing or feedback did not display correctly. These issues were due to tech-
1This project was reviewed and approved in advance by the Institutional Review Board
at University of California Los Angeles (IRB 16-001968; 17-001449).
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nical di culties most likely due to using a outdated internet browser without
the proper Javascript support required to display and interact correctly with
the survey. We have significant variation in response rates across medical
schools. The response rate at Penn State is particularly low due to the fact
that instead of forwarding the invitation by email, fliers were posted in the
student lounge.
The day after the rank order submission deadline to the NRMP, we sent
email invitations to the follow-up survey directly to respondents who had
participated in the baseline survey. In Table A.3, we present descriptive
statistics for our entire sample, and by whether respondents participated in
the follow-up or not. The overall response rate to the follow-up was 90.6%.
We do not find any statistically significant di↵erences between the follow-up
and non-follow-up respondents for all variables with the exception for single,
where it appears that single students were less likely to participate in the
follow-up survey. Additionally, participants to the follow-up survey reported
slightly higher prior beliefs in cost of living than non-follow-up respondents.
However, they were similarly “accurate” in their prior belief of cost of living.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of Medical Schools in the U.S.
Notes: Each dot represents one of the 135 accredited medical schools contacted to partici-
pate in the study (excluding one in Hawaii). Dots do not denote exact location since they
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2: Comparison of Characteristics between Participating and
Non-Participating Medical Schools
All schools Non-Participants Participants P-value
Enrollment 630.98 619.338 671.727 0.398
(23.117) (24.891) (57.213)
NR 0.267 0.287 0.185 0.245
(0.038) (0.044) (0.076)
Avg. MCAT 32.222 32.364 31.727 0.253
(0.252) (0.293) (0.475)
NR 0.267 0.287 0.185 0.245
(0.038) (0.044) (0.076)
Undergrad GPA 3.735 3.734 3.737 0.902
(0.009) (0.010) (0.019)
NR 0.267 0.287 0.185 0.245
(0.038) (0.044) (0.076)
Acceptance rate 0.066 0.067 0.062 0.458
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
NR 0.274 0.296 0.185 0.206
(0.039) (0.044) (0.076)
US News Ranking 45.451 43.478 51.636 0.166
(2.784) (3.309) (4.872)
NR 0.326 0.361 0.185 0.049
(0.040) (0.046) (0.076)
Tuition 51,404.98 51,333.526 51,651.818 0.913
(1,097.842) (1,193.139) (2,689.180)
NR 0.274 0.296 0.185 0.206
(0.039) (0.044) (0.076)
Faculty per student 2.363 2.518 1.827 0.039
(0.221) (0.279) (0.177)
NR 0.274 0.296 0.185 0.206
(0.039) (0.044) (0.076)
Peer Assessment score 3.14 3.139 3.145 0.961
(0.076) (0.093) (0.106)
NR 0.222 0.231 0.185 0.59
(0.036) (0.041) (0.076)
Observations 135 108 27
Notes: Data for 135 accredited medical schools contacted by authors to participate in study. Data obtained
from U.S. News for 2016. NR indicates the proportion of observations for which the statistic was either
not published or missing. P-value in final column for the di↵erence in means between participating and
non-participating medical schools. Standard deviations reported in parenthesis.
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Table A.3: Comparison of Characteristics between Respondents to Baseline
and Follow-Up Surveys
All No Follow-up Follow-up P-value
Male (=1) 0.481 0.505 0.479 0.621
(0.015) (0.050) (0.016)
Age 27.091 26.921 27.108 0.482
(0.083) (0.253) (0.088)
Nr Kids 0.132 0.079 0.138 0.160
(0.014) (0.039) (0.015)
Single (=1) 0.354 0.505 0.338 0.001
(0.015) (0.050) (0.015)
Dual match (=1) 0.074 0.079 0.074 0.841
(0.008) (0.027) (0.008)
RPP treatment (=1) 0.499 0.525 0.496 0.588
(0.015) (0.050) (0.016)
ACS treatment (=1) 0.500 0.475 0.503 0.601
(0.015) (0.050) (0.016)
Average Residency Salary ($1000s) 0.013 0.019 0.012 0.871
(0.013) (0.042) (0.014)
Relative residency percentile 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.944
(0.007) (0.025) (0.007)
Pass Attention Check (=1) 0.964 0.950 0.965 0.509
(0.006) (0.022) (0.006)
Prior ER1,2 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.775
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005)
Prior COL1,2 0.004 -0.007 0.005 -0.479
(0.006) (0.016) (0.007)
Posterior ER1,2 -0.009 -0.012 -0.008 0.639
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
Posterior COL1,2 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.856
(0.004) (0.014) (0.004)
Observations 1,080 101 979
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parenthesis. P-values correspond to the test of
the null hypothesis of equal means between follow-up and non-follow-up samples. Relative
residency percentile based on residency quality ranks computed by Doximity. All variables
constructed with data from the baseline survey.
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Table A.4: Comparison of Characteristics between Experimental Subjects
and U.S. Population of Earners
Survey ACS 2015
Med. Students Adult Earners
Age 27.091 41.258
(2.725) (12.330)
% Male 0.481 0.515
(0.500) (0.500)




US Born 0.950 0.809
(0.218) (0.393)
% More than College 1 0.125
(0.000) (0.331)
Notes: Data from 2015 American Community Survey PUMS for the subsample of adults
in between 21 and 65 years of age and who receive positive wage income.
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A.2 Estimation of the Feedback Provided to Subjects
A.2.1 Earnings Rank
To provide feedback on the earnings rank of each metropolitan and wage
o↵ered at the location, we used data for the American Community Survey
(ACS) at the metro area level for 2015 and the latest data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS), as stated in the debriefing message.2 From the
data we estimated the parameters (µ and  ) for fitting a log-normal distri-
bution. In the ACS we based this on the proportion of total full-time year
round workers with earnings in each earnings bin, over which we estimated
the parameters of fitting a log-normal distribution using maximum-likelihood
for each metropolitan area. For the CPS, we combined weekly earnings with
overtime earnings in order to obtain as close a measure as possible to that in
the ACS. We obtained the parameters for fitting a log-normal distribution
by estimating, for each metro area, a right-censored Tobit of annualized log
earnings on the intercept. In the ACS, only 2% of metro areas were missing,
while 20% of metro areas were missing for the CPS. Most of the metro ar-
eas with missing values from the ACS were imputed using the corresponding
values obtained from the 2011-2015 5-year ACS.3 The missing values in the
CPS were imputed using the state-averages.
From these parameters, given a wage in dollars, it is easy to calculate
the percentile using a simple formula:  (log(wagej)   µj)/ j. This way it
was possible to provide personalized feedback according to di↵erent wages
reported in the survey. For our sample of metro areas, the average percentile
rank for earnings of $55,000 is 59.2% and 68.9% for the ACS and CPS, and
the correlation is 0.91.
Although both sources are similar in levels, there is plenty of exogenous
variation between them when comparing pairwise di↵erences of chosen lo-
cations. We show this variation in Figure A.2.a, where the R-squared of
regressing the pairwise di↵erences for the ACS on the pairwise di↵erences for
the CPS is 0.430.
2At the time, the latest two months available were September and October of 2016.
3Only 3 metro areas were still missing for which we imputed with the average values
for the country.
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A.2.2 Cost of Living
To provide feedback on cost of living in the metropolitan areas we use the
Regional Price Parity Index (RPP) compiled by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the Cost of Living Index (COLI). The Cost of Living Index has
been published since 1968 (formerly known as ACCRA) and has been used
extensively in academic research. For the Regional Price Parity Index we
used their final index for 2014 (the latest available at the time we conducted
the survey), and for the Cost of Living Index we used their raw data for the
first quarter of 2016, and calculated our own index by computing a weighted
average over the expenditure categories grocery, utilities, transport, health,
and miscellaneous (excluding housing).
Both sources are quite similar: for the sample of potential metro areas that
respondents can choose from based on the residency programs available, the
mean cost of living for the RPP and COLI are 102.4 and 110.2, while the
correlation between levels is 0.95. Note that the original indices have an
average of 100. However, our sample of metro areas only include those for
which there was a potential residency program to apply to. Therefore only
286 metro areas are included in our sample. These are mostly large and
more expensive metro areas, which explains why the average is larger than
100. Additionally, 37 and 117 metro areas were imputed for RPP and COLI,
respectively. We imputed values using predictions based on OLS regressions
that included metro area census characteristics such as population, average
household size, income, population density, racial and educational composi-
tion, housing characteristics and state dummies. The R2 for those regressions
was 93% and 86%. In our survey, less than 1% of metro options receiving
RPP feedback were imputed, while only 11% of COLI feedback metro options
were imputed.
Even though both sources are similar when comparing them in levels, there
is substantial exogenous variation when comparing the pairwise di↵erences
between chosen locations. The variation is presented in Figure A.2.b, where
the R-squared for regressing the pairwise di↵erences of RPP on COLI is only
0.436.
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Notes: Pairwise di↵erences of statistics from di↵erent sources of cost of living and earnings
rank based on cities and wages indicated by respondents in the survey. The gray dots
correspond to the raw scatterplot, and the darker dots correspond to the binned-scatterplot
based on 20 bins. The sources in Panel a correspond to ACS (American Community
Survey) and CPS (Current Population Survey). The sources from Panel b correspond to
RPP (Regional Price Parity Index) and COLI (Cost of Living Index). The slope ( , with
robust standard errors in parentheses) and R2 are based on a linear regression.
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A.3 Additional Results
A.3.1 Variation in Nominal Income, Cost of Living and
Earnings Rank
Residency programs do not compensate for di↵erences in cost of living or
earnings rank through wages. Figure A.3.a presents a scatterplot of the the
costs of living versus the (log) nominal residency income. The strength of the
association between these two variables represent the degree to which resi-
dencies compensate for local cost of living. The low value of the R2 (0.115)
shows that residencies compensate only partially, leaving substantial orthog-
onal variation between cost of living di↵erences and di↵erences in nominal
income.
In a similar spirit, Figure A.3.b explores the extent to which programs com-
pensate for di↵erences in the distribution of income through their nominal
wages. This figure shows a scatterplot of the earnings rank at the residency
income versus the nominal income. The strength of the association indicates
how much of the di↵erences in earnings rank are generated by di↵erences in
nominal income. Again, the low value of the R2 (0.011) indicates that the
vast majority of the variation in earnings rank is orthogonal to the nominal
income.
A.3.2 Accuracy of Prior Beliefs, Pairwise Di↵erences
Respondents may have a poor idea of the levels of cost of living and earn-
ings rank, but they may have a better understanding of relative di↵er-
ences—ultimately the relevant statistic in decision making. We repeat our
previous analysis, examining the pairwise di↵erences instead of levels. in
Figure A.4.a for cost of living and Figure A.4.b for earnings rank. Although
the results for cost of living are almost identical, prior beliefs about earnings
ranks are somewhat more accurate with pairwise di↵erences. For example,
the slope coe cient increases to 0.793, while the R2 increases to 0.15 (5 times
larger than in levels). In any case, even under this alternative specification,
the accuracy of prior beliefs about earnings rank remain far less accurate
than those for cost of living.
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A.3.3 Learning Rates are Similar by Information Source
One concern with our experimental design is that individuals may have up-
dated their beliefs di↵erentially depending on the source used. For example,
if respondents believe one source to be less trustworthy than another they
may disregard that feedback. We explore the extent to which this could have
happened by separately examining learning by the information source used.
In Figures A.5 we present the same figures as in section 1.5.3 by information
source. Learning rates for cost of living and earnings ranking are almost iden-
tical between sources, showing that respondent’s reactions to information did
not depend on the source.
A.3.4 Beliefs are Persistent in Follow-up Survey
Since posterior beliefs on cost of living and earnings ranking were elicited
directly after providing respondents feedback, we are interested in examin-
ing how persistent these beliefs are a month later. We show that posterior
beliefs are persistent for both cost of living and earnings rank in Figure A.6.
The persistence in cost of living is twice as large as that of earnings rank
(correlation of 0.844 versus 0.464), most likely due to respondents reverting
to their prior beliefs over time and the fact that their priors were significantly
more accurate for cost of living than earnings rank.
A.3.5 Complementary Evidence: Hypothetical Questions
To provide some additional suggestive evidence that individuals care about
their consumption rank, we included a couple of hypothetical questions at
the end of the follow-up survey.
In the first scenario, we elicited the subjects’ preferences for a reduction
in cost of living while holding the earnings rank constant. More precisely, we
asked the respondents whether they would be better o↵, the same, or worse o↵
if their own cost of living and the cost of living of all other individuals in the
city went down by 10%. Figure A.7.a shows the distribution of responses.
Consistent with preferences for absolute consumption, 80% of respondents
answered that they would be better o↵ with this change, with 19% reporting
that they would be the same and less than 1% responding that they would
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be worse o↵.
In the second scenario, we elicited the subjects’ preferences for an increase
in earnings rank, while holding the cost of living constant. To do so, we
asked the respondents whether they would be better o↵, the same, or worse
o↵ if their own income and cost of living stayed the same but all other
individuals in the city faced an income reduction of 10%. Because of the
social desirability bias, individuals may not want to “confess” so directly
that they care about relative income, and thus these responses probably
lead to an underestimation of concerns for relative income. Figure A.7.b
shows the distribution of responses. Consistent with individuals having direct
preferences over relative income, 44% of individuals responded that they
would be either better or worse o↵, with significant heterogeneity. While
31% of individuals reported that they would be better o↵ with the poorer
neighbors, 13% of individuals reported that they would be worse o↵.
A.3.6 Marginal E↵ects
Given that it is not possible to directly interpret coe cients from Probit
regressions, in Table A.5 we present estimates from columns (1) to (3) from
Table 1.2 along with their corresponding marginal e↵ects at the average in the
first two rows. The third and fourth row restrict the sample to respondents
from the follow-up survey. For example, the coe cient in column (3) for the
baseline sample implies that an increase of 1 percentage point in earnings
rank in location 1 would increase the probability of choosing that location by
0.186 percent (or, in other words, an implied behavioral elasticity of 0.186).
A.3.7 Preferences over Subjective Program Characteristics
To better understand the magnitude of our results, we compare the estimates
for preferences over earnings rank and cost of living with those of subjective
perceptions of residency program characteristics (prestige, career prospects
and sense of purpose). These perceptions were elicited by the end of the
follow-up survey and are standardized to have mean zero and standard de-
viation of one. We estimate the baseline model presented in section 1.3.1,
introducing the three perceived program characteristics one by one. Since we
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only observe these perceptions in the follow-up survey, we restrict the sample
to those respondents.
The results are presented in Table A.6. The coe cients on the three sub-
jective perceptions of the program are positive, as expected, and highly sta-
tistically significant (all p-values¡0.001). This means that individuals prefer
programs associated with higher purpose, career prospects and prestige. Fur-
thermore, we can compare the strength of these preferences to the strength
of preferences for cost of living.4
We cannot compare the raw Probit coe cients directly, because the in-
dependent variables are measured in di↵erent units. For a meaningful com-
parison, we can calculate the standardized coe cient corresponding to a one
standard deviation decrease in cost of living. According to column (2) of Ta-
ble A.6, a one standard deviation decrease in cost of living would correspond
to a Probit coe cient of 0.167 (i.e., the non-standardized coe cient, 1.211,
multiplied by the standard deviation of cost of living, 0.138). This standard-
ized coe cient can be compared to the coe cient of 0.441 corresponding to
a one standard deviation increase in the sense of purpose. This comparison
implies that the sense of purpose of a program is 2.64 times as important
as the cost of living. By the same metric, the career prospects (column (3))
and sense of prestige (column (4)) are 2.27 and 1.49 times as important as
cost of living. In sum, the characteristics of a program are systematically
more important for the choice of residency than the cost of living during the
residency.
A.3.8 No Other Significant Preference Heterogeneity
In this section we explore additional heterogeneity over preferences for earn-
ings rank and cost of living. We first decompose the results of heterogeneity
by relationship status in two ways. In columns (1) and (2) of Table A.7, we
show that within non-single respondents, preferences over relative income are
similar for married or long-term relationship respondents. However, it seems
that preferences for cost of living are mostly driven by married respondents
(though the di↵erence is borderline insignificant, p-value=0.109). In columns
(3) to (6) of Table A.7, we estimate preferences by gender, within relation-
4The results are similar if we do the comparison with respect to the preferences for
earnings rank instead.
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ship status. Preferences over earnings rank seem to be stronger for females
in general, though the di↵erence is not statistically significant for non-singles
or singles.
In addition to the dimensions explored in the paper, we present results for
heterogeneity across di↵erent dimensions in Table A.8. In columns (1) to (4)
we explore heterogeneity according to di↵erences in hypothetical choices of
changes in earnings rank and cost of living. Interestingly, we find that those
who believe they would be better o↵ if cost of living were to decrease care
significantly more about earnings rank than respondents who claimed they
would be the same or worse o↵. However, we do not find any significant
di↵erences for the hypothetical question of a change in earnings rank.
Next, we explore whether there is preference heterogeneity across di↵erent
individual traits, such as degree of materialism, competitiveness or life di-
mensions valued the most. The materialism index is based on questions that
typically reflect status from consumption (see follow-up survey questionnaire
in Appendix ??, based on Richins and Dawson, 1992). Even though we do
not find statistically significant di↵erence in the e↵ects in columns (5) and
(6), the point estimates are di↵erent and reflect that those who are classified
as more “materialistic” (or in other words, those most concerned by the sig-
naling value of material goods) care more about earnings rank, while those
who are less “materialistic” care more about cost of living. In columns (7)
and (8) we explore heterogeneity by the degree of competitiveness using com-
monly used indices in psychology (Smither and Houston, 1992). We do not
find any significant di↵erences across these traits. Finally, in columns (9) and
(10) we explore heterogeneity according to a principal component score of
the rank of di↵erent life dimensions by importance (happiness, health, sense
of purpose, spirituality, control over life). We do not find any statistically
significant di↵erences in these dimensions.
A.3.9 Results are Robust to Dropping Specific Subgroups
In this section we explore the sensitivity of our baseline results to dropping
specific subgroups that may potentially attenuate our estimates for prefer-
ences over earnings rank and cost of living. In the first row of Table A.9 we
report the baseline estimates. In the second row, we re-estimate the model
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dropping respondents that did not successfully answer a question at the end
of the baseline survey designed to test whether they were paying attention
and reading the questions carefully. In this question we describe how emo-
tions can play a role in influencing responses and respondents have a menu of
emotions to choose from. However, at the end of the paragraph we instruct
respondents to only select the option “none of the above” (see Appendix ??
for the full question). Only 3.6% of respondents failed to answer this question
correctly. Estimates do not change much when dropping these respondents
– if anything, the coe cients are slightly larger in magnitude.
One additional concern is that respondents may not choose according to
their own preferences but define it jointly with their spouse when they are
both participating as a dual match. In the third row of Table A.9 we drop
respondents who are participating in a dual match (7.4% of the sample).
Again, the results are similar when we drop these respondents.
A.3.10 Results are Similar when using Binary Probit or
Ordered Probit
In the baseline survey we asked respondents about their intention to rank
using a likelihood scale, that we later converted in to a binary variable in
order to directly compare it to their final rank submission in the follow-
up survey. However, we could also exploit the full variation of using the
likelihood scale by means of estimating an ordered Probit model. The results
are presented in Table A.10. Overall, the results are quite similar regardless
of using the binary or likelihood variables.
A.3.11 Instrumental Variable Regression
We break down the Instrumental Variables regression into the first-stage
and reduced-form regressions. Table A.11.a presents the same experimental
estimates as those found in the second row of Table 1.4. In the next panel we
focus on the first stages. As discussed in section 1.5.3, respondents learn from
our information provision experiment, where learning rates are close to 1 for
both earnings rank and cost of living. It does not seem that weak instruments
are a problem overall. However, the instruments are substantially weaker for
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the sample of singles compared to the non-singles, where the Cragg-Donald
F-statistic drops from 169 to 42. In the final panel of Table 1.4 we show that
the reduced form estimates are similar to those obtained by IV.
A.3.12 Comparison to Studies using Subjective Data
We are interested in comparing our results to those obtain in previous studies
based on happiness surveys or hypothetical choices. It is important to note
that these other studies measure relative concerns in a slightly di↵erent way.
They compare the e↵ects of own consumption versus the mean consumption
of peers. They present an econometric model along the following lines:
U = a · log(y)  b · log(ȳ)
Where y is the individual’s own income and ȳ is the average income in the
individual’s reference group. With parameters a and b, we can calculate the
trade-o↵ between absolute and relative income. The e↵ect of absolute income
is given by a b: i.e., what would happen if increase my income by 1% if I am
also increasing everyone else’s income by 1%. The e↵ect of relative income is
just b: i.e., what happens if you increase everyone else’s income by 1% while
leaving my own income unchanged. An individual with parameters a and b
should be indi↵erent between a 1% increase in her absolute consumption and
a a b
b
decrease in her relative consumption. Table A.12 shows the estimates
of a and b reported in other studies, and the resulting estimate of a b
b
.5
Section 1.8.2 compares our estimates with respect to the findings from
Luttmer (2005). In this section, we provide comparisons with respect to
other studies. According to our baseline estimates for non-singles (column
(1) of Table 1.4), the average individual is willing to give up 1 percent of her
absolute consumption to decrease the median consumption of her peers by
0.91%.6 The other studies that use happiness data suggest a corresponding
trade-o↵ of 0.89% (Clark, Senik and Yamada, 2017) and 1.02% (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005); while the studies using hypothetical choices suggest a cor-
5The table does not include standard errors or confidence intervals because we do not
have su cient information to compute those (a bb is a non-linear function, and thus it
does not su ce with the standard errors of a and b).
6This result arises because, for the average individual in the sample, we would need
to decrease the median earnings in the area by 0.91% to allow the individual to climb up
0.518 (= 1/1.928) percentage points in the earnings rank.
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responding trade-o↵ of 1.85% (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002) and 1.18%
(Yamada and Sato, 2013). All of these estimates are in the ballpark of our
own estimate of 0.91%, implying that, relative to these other studies, our
estimates suggest a similar role for relative concerns.
Last, we must note that some studies find the opposite e↵ect. For instance,
Senik (2004) and Clark, Kristensen and Westergrd-Nielsen (2009) find that
life satisfaction is increasing in the mean income of the reference group.
And Shigeoka and Yamada (2016) show estimates from a hypothetical choice
experiment with mixed results: while the U.K. respondents prefer poorer
peers, the opposite is true for their U.S. respondents.
A.3.13 Estimated Preferences are similar when using Choice
or Happiness
We can also exploit a di↵erent outcome variable, the happiness rank between
the options, to compare the preferences inferred from choice versus happiness.
Consistent with Benjamin et al. (2014), we observe a significant correlation
(0.456) between the choice ranks and happiness ranks of these individuals.
However, this association is far from perfect, which suggest that individuals
are not choosing to maximize their happiness only. As a result, it is not
obvious that preferences inferred from choice will be similar to preferences
inferred from happiness.
Table A.13 presents results using happiness as outcome variables. These
coe cients are of course not directly comparable to those of choice, because
they are based on di↵erent dependent variables with di↵erent distributions.
The baseline preferences are roughly consistent. For instance, for the full
sample,  ER is 1.141 (s.e. 0.577) for choice and 0.936 (s.e. 0.520) for hap-
piness; while  COL is -1.262 (s.e. 0.531) for choice and -0.311 (s.e. 0.479)
for happiness. We cannot reject the null hypotheses that these two pairs of
coe cients are equal. This evidence suggests that the happiness and choice
trade-o↵s may be similar – however, given the precision of the estimates, we
cannot reject the possibility of substantial discrepancies.
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A.3.14 Recruitment of Auxiliary Experiment
We conducted an auxiliary experiment using a sample of respondents from
Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk), an online job market for crowdsourcing
small tasks. During September of 2017, we recruited the auxiliary sample
through work postings (or HIT - “Human Intelligence Task”) on mTurk.
Participants were invited to participate in a 8 minute survey “about city
perceptions”. When accepting the task, participants were re-directed to the
survey. After successful completion of the survey, participants were given a
code to redeem their payment of $0.60 for completing the task. We restricted
the survey to participants located in the United States.
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Figure A.3: Variation in Nominal Income, Cost of Living and Earnings
Rank
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          β = 0.081 (0.024)
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          N = 1,080            
 
Notes: The gray dots correspond to the raw scatterplot, and the darker dots correspond
to the binned-scatterplot based on 20 bins. Slopes ( , with robust standard errors in
parentheses) and R2 are based on a linear regression. All variables for x-axis and y-axis
correspond to pairwise di↵erences across the two cities that the subject is considering
submitting to the algorithm. Data from survey responses, the Regional Price Parity Index
(for cost of living) and the American Community Survey (for earnings rank).
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Figure A.4: Comparison Between Prior Beliefs and Statistics
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          β = 0.793 (0.057)
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 = 0.150           
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Notes: Comparison between respondent’s perceptions before the information provision
(i.e., prior beliefs) and statistics. The gray dots correspond to the raw scatterplot, and
the darker dots correspond to the binned-scatterplot based on 20 bins. Panels a and
b present pairwise di↵erences between an individual’s options (i.e., value for first option
minus that of the second option). The slope ( , with robust standard errors in parentheses)
and R2 are based on a linear regression.
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Figure A.5: Reduced-Form Evidence of Learning in the
Information-Provision Experiment by Feedback Source
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          α = 0.878 (0.015)
          N=1,080              
 
Notes: Comparison between the di↵erence in statistics and respondent’s perceptions before
the information provision (i.e., prior beliefs), and di↵erence in respondent’s perceptions
after the information provision (i.e., posterior beliefs) and prior beliefs. The gray dots
correspond to the raw scatterplot, and the darker dots correspond to the binned-scatterplot
based on 20 bins. Panels a and b show cost of living revisions to statistics from RPP
(Regional Price Parity Index) and COLI (Cost of Living Index). Panels c and d show
earnings rank revisions to statistics from CPS (Current Population Survey) and ACS
(American Community Survey). The slope (↵, with robust standard errors in parentheses)
is based on a linear regression.
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Figure A.6: Correlation between (Posterior) Beliefs in Baseline and
Follow-Up Surveys
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          β = 0.464 (0.036)
          N=1,956              
 
Notes: The gray dots correspond to the raw scatterplot, and the darker dots correspond
to the binned-scatterplot based on 20 bins. Panels a and b present data in levels (i.e.,
two observations per individual, one for each of their options). The slope ( , with robust
standard errors in parentheses) and R2 are based on a linear regression.
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Figure A.7: Survey Responses, Preferences over Hypothetical Changes to
Cost of Living and Earnings Rank




























































































Notes: Distribution of responses to hypothetical choice questions included in follow-up
survey. Panel b corresponds to the question labeled “Event A”, while panel b corresponds
to the question labeled “Event B” in the questionnaire to the follow-up survey in Appendix
??.
141
Table A.5: Probit Marginal E↵ects
Panel A:  ER Panel B:  COL
Non-Single Single All Non-Single Single All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Sample
Raw Probit 2.236⇤⇤⇤ -1.538⇤ 0.995⇤ -1.087 -1.058 -1.073⇤⇤
(0.669) (0.880) (0.539) (0.663) (0.749) (0.485)
Marginal E↵ect 0.418⇤⇤⇤ -0.267⇤ 0.186⇤ -0.203 -0.183 -0.201⇤⇤
(0.125) (0.155) (0.100) (0.124) (0.130) (0.090)
Follow-up Sample
Raw Probit 2.380⇤⇤⇤ -1.656⇤ 1.141⇤⇤ -1.234⇤ -1.379⇤ -1.262⇤⇤
(0.702) (0.991) (0.577) (0.743) (0.772) (0.531)
Marginal E↵ect 0.425⇤⇤⇤ -0.253⇤ 0.202⇤⇤ -0.221⇤ -0.211⇤ -0.224⇤⇤
(0.125) (0.154) (0.102) (0.132) (0.118) (0.094)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, *
p¡0.1. Raw Probit coe cients and corresponding marginal e↵ects at the mean. Probit
regressions of expected rank order submission on posterior beliefs about cost of living and
earnings rank estimated by sample (i.e., coe cients of a same row and sample are from
a single regression). All specifications include the baseline controls listed in section 1.3.
Results for Baseline Sample are based on the sample of individuals who completed the
baseline survey (1,080 responses, 698 from non-singles and 382 from singles). Results for
Follow-up Sample are based on the sample of individuals who completed the follow-up
survey (978 responses, 647 from non-singles and 311 from singles).
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Table A.6: Preferences for Subjective Program Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 ER 1.141⇤⇤ 1.147⇤ 1.172⇤ 1.172⇤⇤
(0.577) (0.609) (0.602) (0.584)
 COL -1.262⇤⇤ -1.211⇤⇤ -1.470⇤⇤⇤ -1.412⇤⇤⇤







Pseudo R2 0.035 0.120 0.093 0.059
Observations 978 978 978 978
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05,
* p¡0.1. Raw Probit coe cients. Probit regressions of expected rank order submission
on posterior beliefs about cost of living and earnings rank estimated by sample (i.e.,
coe cients of a same row and sample are from a single regression). All estimates, include
the baseline controls listed in section 1.3. Mean (standard deviation) for ERi,posterior1,2 is
-0.008 (0.098) and for COLi,posterior1,2 is 0.010 (0.138). Measures for subjective program
characteristics (prestige, prospects, purpose) are standardized to have mean zero and
standard deviation of one.
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Table A.7: Preference Heterogeneity with Respect to Marital Status:
Additional Results
Non-Single Non-Single Single
Married LT Relationship Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 ER 2.002⇤ 2.345⇤⇤⇤ 2.754⇤⇤⇤ 1.733⇤ -2.472⇤ -1.023
(1.187) (0.841) (0.964) (0.966) (1.282) (1.318)
 COL -2.403⇤⇤ -0.311 -1.172 -1.366 -0.630 -1.634
(0.999) (0.844) (1.023) (0.952) (0.805) (1.294)
Di↵. P-value [q-value]:
ER 0.813 [0.883] 0.430 [0.746] 0.454 [0.784]
COL 0.109 [0.640] 0.509 [0.919] 0.890 [0.746]
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.052 0.079 0.052 0.060 0.027
Observations 259 439 360 338 200 182
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, *
p¡0.1. Each column corresponds to a separate Probit regression. Coe cients for Probit
regressions of expected rank submission (at baseline) on earnings rank and cost of living
(measured by posterior beliefs in baseline survey), and controls (e.g. relative wage, etc.)
as defined in section 1.3. P-values corresponds to the test of the null hypothesis that
the coe cients are equal between the two sub-groups. Multiple-testing q-values based on





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.9: Robustness to Sample Definition
Panel A:  ER Panel B:  COL
Non-Single Single All Non-Single Single All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Sample 2.256⇤⇤⇤ -1.533⇤ 0.990⇤ -1.087 -1.041 -1.066⇤⇤
(0.672) (0.878) (0.541) (0.672) (0.748) (0.488)
Pass Attention 2.266⇤⇤⇤ -1.375 1.071⇤⇤ -0.927 -1.263 -1.079⇤⇤
Check (0.685) (0.896) (0.545) (0.689) (0.783) (0.501)
Drop Dual 2.215⇤⇤⇤ -1.305 1.024⇤ -1.110 -1.118 -1.133⇤⇤
Matches (0.701) (0.852) (0.551) (0.675) (0.770) (0.496)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05,
* p¡0.1. Raw Probit coe cients. Probit regressions of expected rank order submission
on posterior beliefs about cost of living and earnings rank estimated by sample (i.e.,
coe cients of a same row and sample are from a single regression). All estimates, include
the baseline controls listed in section 1.3. The first row shows estimates for baseline sample
(1,080 responses, 698 from non-singles and 382 from singles). The second row restricts
the sample to respondents who pass the attention check question in baseline survey (1,041
responses, 678 from non-singles and 363 from singles), while the third row restricts the
sample to respondents who are not participating as dual match (1,000 responses, 641 from



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.11: IV, First Stage, and Reduced Form Estimates
Non-Single Single All
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: IV-Probit Estimates
 ER 3.109⇤⇤ -5.131⇤⇤⇤ 0.910
(1.360) (1.942) (1.165)
 COL 0.387 1.687 0.693
(1.177) (1.274) (0.887)














Wald test of exog. p-val. 0.308 0.003 0.056
Cragg-Donald F-stat. 169.38 42.37 204.04




 COLi1,2 0.532 1.814 0.754
(1.095) (1.376) (0.858)
Observations 639 327 966
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, *
p¡0.1. Raw Probit (or IV-Probit) coe cients. All regressions include the baseline controls
listed in section 1.3. The independent variables are the posterior beliefs about cost of
living and earnings rank, from the baseline specification. Panel A presents raw IV-Probit
estimates using model detailed in section 1.3.2. Panel B shows the first stage for each


































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.13: Preferences Inferred from Happiness
Panel A:  ER Panel B:  COL
Non-Single Single All Non-Single Single All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 1.545⇤⇤ -0.135 0.936⇤ -0.661 0.468 -0.311
(0.634) (0.954) (0.520) (0.621) (0.761) (0.479)
Experimental 3.057⇤⇤⇤ -2.012 1.694⇤ 0.027 1.388 0.488
(1.098) (2.024) (0.975) (1.049) (1.236) (0.794)
Experimental, 2.919⇤⇤⇤ -2.361 1.335 0.415 -1.133 -0.212
Long Term (1.078) (2.183) (0.983) (0.949) (1.211) (0.760)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05,
* p¡0.1. Coe cients for Probit regressions of variable indicating that respondent would
live happier life at location 1 (at baseline, or at follow-up for “long term”) on earnings
rank and cost of living (measured by posterior beliefs in baseline survey), and controls
(e.g. relative wage, etc.) as defined in section 1.3. All results based on the sample of
individuals who completed the follow-up survey (978 responses, 647 from non-singles and
311 from singles).
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Table A.14: Comparison of Characteristics between Experimental Subjects
and Online Sample
Main Experiment Auxiliary Experiment
Med. Students Online Sample Di↵erence
Age 27.091 37.476 -10.385***
(2.725) (11.980) (0.350)
% Male 0.481 0.391 0.090***
(0.500) (0.488) (0.021)
% Married 0.240 0.461 -0.221***
(0.427) (0.499) (0.019)
% Has children 0.089 0.527 -0.438***
(0.285) (0.499) (0.017)
Observations 1,080 1,245
Notes: Standard deviations and Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample statistics for Main Experiment (Medical Student





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Sample construction
To study the e↵ect of competing against better peers on performance we
make several sample restrictions to ensure minimize the potential of inducing
sample selection bias. To address this we take a number of steps in defining
the sample. In Table B.1 we show how the sample changes as we make the
di↵erent sample restrictions. First, we keep times within a 62 day window on
both sides of a swimmer’s birthday in column (1). Next, we keep swimmers
who are competing both before and after aging up in column (2). This drops
around 67% of swimmers in the sample. Overall, the sample characteristics
do not change substantially as a result.
Next, we keep swimmers who are not new (i.e., they have competed for over
a year). This is important because new swimmers typically have significantly
steeper improvement during the first year and therefore could be less sensitive
to changes in competition. This change drops an additional 7% of swimmers
and, as one would expect from keeping more experienced swimmers, the
quality of swimmers in the sample increases (i.e., they are faster on average).
Finally, for similar reasons as with dropping new swimmers, we also drop
“non-competitive” swimmers. That is, swimmers who compete sporadically.
This drops an additional 7% of swimmers and again the average quality of
swimmers increases as a result.
After employing all these sample restrictions, we have a sample of over
30,000 swimmers around each of the cuto↵s. Even though we only keep a
subset of our original sample, we find that results are similar even when not
employing these sample restrictions.
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Gender di↵erences in changes in competition
In Table B.2 we show that there are di↵erences in the first stage e↵ects by
gender. These results are consistent with di↵erences in the timing of physical
growth between boys and girls. At the age 11 cuto↵, the di↵erence in quality
competition is slightly larger for girls than boys (p-value=0.069). However,
at the age 13 and 15 cuto↵ the di↵erence is significantly larger for boys,
where changes i competition are almost twice as large.
E↵ect of Changing Category on Performance Measured in
Seconds
We replicate Table 2.3 from the paper, but using race time measured in
seconds as the dependent variable (instead of log time). The results are
presented in Table B.3. Consistent with our main results, there are significant
discouragement e↵ects, where swimmers are almost one third of a second
slower on average when turning 11 and 13. These results are consistent with
our main findings in terms of direction and magnitude, showing that our
results are not sensitive to how the dependent variable is defined.
Graphical Evidence
In Figures B.1 and B.2 we present graphical evidence showing the binned-
scatter of our dependent variable with respect to the birthday at di↵erent
ages. Figure B.1 shows the first stage results, documenting large di↵erences
in average speed of the competition at category change ages, while there are
no significant di↵erences at non-change ages.
Similarly, Figure B.2 presents the reduced form results where the depen-
dent variable is the natural logarithm of a swimmer’s race time. Consistent
with the point estimates presented in the paper, we can see that there are
significant discouragement e↵ects at the age 11 and 13 cuto↵s. At the same
time, note that the curves are shifted upwards and their speeds do not re-
cover to their previous trend, even after 2 months. This suggests that the
discouragement e↵ect on performance is not short lived.
Finally, Figure B.3 we show the sensitivity of our estimates to the window
size used for the main age cuto↵s. Overall, our results are not sensitive to
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Table B.2: E↵ects of age-category change on
competition by gender
(1) (2) (3)
Girls Boys P-value Di↵.
Panel A: Age 11
Treatment -0.128*** -0.122*** 0.069
(0.00174) (0.00232)
Panel B: Age 13
Treatment -0.0752*** -0.1305*** <0.01
(0.00134) (0.00200)
Panel C: Age 15
Treatment -0.0346*** -0.0614*** <0.01
(0.00136) (0.00170)
Notes: Sample of swimmers competing within 62 days (both be-
fore and after) of their Nth birthday (indicated in each Panel).
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the average time for all
other swimmers in age-group (i.e. 11-12, 13 over, 15-16) excluding
their own time for that event-meet. Each coe cient corresponds
to a separate OLS regression that includes swimmer-event fixed
e↵ects. Controls includes: number of heats swum that day, to-
tal distance swum, number of long distance swims, and number
of days since last meet. The functions of running variable (days
with respect to Nth birthday) are event-specific and interacted
with Treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the swimmer
level.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** signifi-
cant at 1% level.
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Table B.3: E↵ects of age-category change on
performance (in seconds)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: Swim Time (in seconds)
Panel A: Age 11
Treatment 0.239*** 0.250*** 0.261*** 0.291***
(0.0146) (0.0293) (0.0146) (0.0292)
Observations 851,081 851,081 851,081 851,081
Ev-Swimmers 254,932 254,932 254,932 254,932
Panel B: Age 13
Treatment 0.304*** 0.336*** 0.305*** 0.351***
(0.0157) (0.0318) (0.0160) (0.0318)
Observations 928,198 928,198 928,198 928,198
Ev-Swimmers 272,130 272,130 272,130 272,130
Panel C: Age 15
Treatment -0.0482** -0.0449 0.00537 0.0394
(0.0208) (0.0421) (0.0211) (0.0420)
Observations 745,106 745,106 745,106 745,106
Ev-Swimmers 209,769 209,769 209,769 209,769
Controls No No Yes Yes
Linear Model Yes No Yes No
Cubic Model No Yes No Yes
Notes: Sample of swimmers competing within 62 days (both before and
after) of their Nth birthday (indicated in each Panel). Dependent variable
is the swim time (in seconds). Each coe cient corresponds to a sepa-
rate OLS regression that includes swimmer-event fixed e↵ects. Controls
includes: number of heats swum that day, total distance swum, number of
long distance swims, and number of days since last meet. The functions of
running variable (days with respect to Nth birthday) are event-specific and
interacted with Treatment. Linear Model indicates that the function used
is linear, while Cubic Model indicates that a cubic specification is used.
Standard errors are clustered at the swimmer level.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1%
level.
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Figure B.1: Adjusted log(average competition swim time) relative to
birthday
Placebo cuto↵s Category change cuto↵s

































































































































































































Notes: Dots are point estimates of running variable dummies (-1 is the omitted category), accounting for
controls and swimmer-event fixed e↵ects. Lines represent 95% confidence interval, standard errors are
clustered at swimmer level.
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Figure B.2: Adjusted log(swim time) relative to birthday
Placebo cuto↵s Category change cuto↵s







































































































































Notes: Dots are point estimates of running variable dummies (-1 is the omitted category), accounting for
controls and swimmer-event fixed e↵ects. Lines represent 95% confidence interval, standard errors are
clustered at swimmer level.
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Figure B.3: Estimated Treatment E↵ects by Window Size
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Window size in days
Notes: Solid line indicate point estimates, dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for treatment
e↵ects using di↵erent sized windows. The sample restrictions described in section 3.4.1 are applied in each
iteration. Regressions include event-specific cubic function of the running variable (days with respect to
birthday) and its interaction with treatment, time-varying controls and swimmer-event fixed e↵ects.
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